

THE AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

VOL. XXI.

DECEMBER, 1943.

NOS. 2 AND 3.

LOGICAL POSITIVISM (I).

By J. A. PASSMORE.

POSITIVISM AND PHILOSOPHY.

LOGICAL POSITIVISM developed, as a movement, out of the informal discussions of the "Vienna Circle" which met from 1922 onwards, under the leadership of Moritz Schlick, then Professor of Philosophy at Vienna. In 1928, the Circle was more formally constituted as the "Ernst Mach Society".¹

That a philosophical movement should invoke the ghost of Mach as patron is, at first sight, a little surprising. For Mach had written "There is above all, *no* Machian philosophy, but at most a scientific methodology".² But it was precisely this renunciation of philosophy which logical positivism was to imitate. Thus Carnap writes "We are not a philosophical school and put forward no philosophical theses whatsoever",³ and again "the logic of science takes the place of the inextricable tangle of problems which is known as philosophy".⁴

Schlick, it is true, protested against Carnap's attempt to derive logical positivism not from philosophy but from the procedures of science. "Some of my friends", he says, "would prefer to pass as representatives of science rather than as

¹ The following works give some account of the origins of the movement:—R. Carnap: "The Unity of Science" (Introduction by M. Black)—referred to as U.S. J. R. Weinberg: "Examination of Logical Positivism" (Introduction). E. Nagel: "Analytic Philosophy in Europe, II" (*Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 2). A. Blumberg and H. Feigl: "Logical Positivism" (*Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 11). H. Feigl: "Logical Empiricism" ("Twentieth Century Philosophy", ed. D. D. Runes).

² "Erkenntnis und Irrtum", quoted by C. B. Weinberg in "Mach's Empirio-Pragmatism", p. 9.

³ U.S., p. 21.

⁴ "Logical Syntax of Language" (L.S.L.), p. 279.

philosophers; they attach the greatest importance to the scientific character of our thought and pretend that our doctrines derive entirely from the sciences and owe nothing to traditional philosophy. Often they mock at it and sometimes they go so far as to prohibit the use of the term 'philosophy' as a description of their own works. . . . This attitude appears to me to rest on a complete misunderstanding."⁵ But it was the attitude Schlick here criticises which finally triumphed;⁶ it was as a species of scientism that logical positivism was to gain its reputation—and Carnap is its best-known exponent.

As positivism, then, logical positivism stems rather from Mach than from Comte. There is nothing of the "religion of humanity" in logical positivism; and Comte's historical and social approach to metaphysics is deprecated. Logical positivism, in fact, is not simply anti-metaphysical; epistemology and ontology (except in so far as they are natural sciences in a disguised form) are also regarded as anti-scientific pseudo-subjects.

What, then, is left as occupation for the philosopher? Logic, certainly, but logic conceived, not as a set of true propositions, but as a set of tautologies, or rules of operation disguised as propositions. On this point, the influence of Wittgenstein's "*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*"⁷ is decisive. "All propositions of logic say the same thing. That is, nothing" (5.44). As Schlick puts it, "Arithmetical rules have a tautological character. . . . The same is true of all logical rules. The logical principles are no propositions either, they do not express any knowledge but are rules for the transformation of propositions into one another. A deductive inference is nothing but a purely analytical transformation."⁸

⁵ "L'École de Vienne et la Philosophie traditionnelle", reprinted in Schlick's "*Gesammelte Aufsätze*" (G.S.), from "*Actualités scientifiques et industrielles*", 533, Paris, 1937.

⁶ Cf. Feigl (op. cit., p. 377): "Philosophy is the disease of which analysis should be the cure."

⁷ All references to "Wittgenstein" are to the doctrines presented in this book.

⁸ "The Validity of Knowledge" (G.S., p. 222) .

Thus, it is argued, the criticism commonly maintained against the empiricist that he can give no account of the "higher truths" of logic and mathematics has no force. The so-called "higher truths" are not, properly speaking, truths at all. They assert nothing themselves, but merely indicate rules for transforming other assertions.

Naturally enough, this thesis is most frequently illustrated by a reference to the so-called "laws of thought". It is pointed out that "either p or not- p ", for example, asserts nothing whatsoever. To know that "either it rains or it does not rain" is not to know anything about the weather.

But to support the view that deduction is always analytic, a special theory of propositions has to be maintained, viz. that any proposition is either an elementary (or atomic) proposition or a conjunction of such propositions. Then p implies q can always be written as a, b, c implies a, b , and this is tautologous. This theory has clear connections with Mill's doctrine that syllogism involves a *petitio principii*, but Mill is held to have expressed himself too much in psychological terms, and to have fallen into the trap of trying to give an empirical account of arithmetic, as if arithmetic were a set of genuine assertions. It is rather Hume's distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact, Hume's view that deduction is nothing but a recombination of ideas we already know, which the logical positivists recognise as a foretaste of their own doctrine.

"In no way", writes Wittgenstein, "can an inference be made from the existence of one state of affairs to the existence of another entirely different from it. . . . Superstition is the belief in the causal nexus" (5.135, 5.1362).

Has, then, the philosopher nothing whatever to say? This is the conclusion Wittgenstein had drawn. "The right method of philosophy would be this. To say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy" (6.53). Schlick follows Wittgenstein on this point, as on so much else. Philosophy, he maintains, is an activity, not a theory. The

Socrates of the early dialogues is the true philosopher. "He was not a naturalist like the ancient Ionians. He was not 'savant et journaliste', like the Sophists; he was not a metaphysician like the Eleatics; he was not a mystic like the Pythagoreans. But he was a seeker after the sense of propositions" (G.S., p. 396). Socrates, that is to say, realised the essential difference between philosophy and science. "Science", says Schlick, "should be defined as 'the pursuit of truth' and philosophy as 'the pursuit of meaning'."⁹ Or as Wittgenstein has put it, "the result of philosophy is not a number of 'philosophical propositions' but to make propositions clear" (4.112).

Carnap, however, deviates from Schlick's position. Although Carnap rejects the name "philosophy", he thinks that when we remove nonsensical elements from traditional philosophy, there is a theory left behind, viz. the logic of science. But it is still true that he strongly emphasises the rôle of philosophy (or what he calls "logical analysis") as an activity, and furthermore as an activity which consists in finding the sense of propositions. "The function of logical analysis is to analyse all knowledge, all assertions of science and of everyday life, in order to make clear the sense of each such assertion and the connections between them."¹⁰

In this way, the main problems of logical positivism are set:

1. What is meant by "elucidating" a proposition, by finding its "sense" or "meaning"?
2. If philosophy is an activity, not a theory, what is the status of those philosophical assertions we cannot help making, and, if it is a theory, how is it to be distinguished from science?

And it is by arguments derived largely from Mach and Mill, from Russell and Wittgenstein, that the logical positivists attempt an answer.

⁹ "The Future of Philosophy" (G.S., p. 126). Reprinted from the "Publications in Philosophy of the College of the Pacific" (1932).

¹⁰ "Philosophy and Logical Syntax" (P.L.S.), p. 9.

THE POSITIVIST THEORY OF MEANING.

"The meaning of a Proposition", writes Schlick, "is the method of its Verification" (G.S., p. 181)—and this formula is central to logical positivism. But as the logical positivists have so often pointed out, in criticism of their adversaries, philosophical formulæ may be used as incantations rather than to convey facts precisely. This is certainly true of the "verifiability" formula; its virtue in exorcising metaphysics is undoubted, but its own meaning by no means clear. And, as we shall see, the more thorough the attempt to assign to the formula a precise meaning, the less formidable its magic becomes.

There are two obscure points. First, what is meant by "verification", secondly, what is meant by "the method of verification" ("verifiability" as distinct from "verification"). The history of logical positivism is the history of a gradual change of doctrine on both these crucial points.

SCHLICK'S THEORY OF VERIFICATION.

It is convenient to begin with a detailed study of Schlick's theory of meaning, because about that theory later controversy turns. In "The Future of Philosophy", Schlick writes as follows: "We know the meaning of a proposition when we are able to indicate exactly the circumstances under which it would be true (or what amounts to the same thing the circumstances under which it would be false). The description of these circumstances is absolutely the only way in which the meaning of a sentence can be made clear. After it has been made clear, we can proceed to look for the actual circumstances in the world and decide whether they make our proposition true or false" (G.S., p. 127).

According to Schlick, then, to know the meaning of a proposition *p*, we must be able to discover a set of circumstances *q*, *r*, *s* such that if these circumstances exist *p* will be true, and if they do not, *p* will be false. And this leads to a theory of "simple circumstances" which cannot themselves

be propositionally presented. For otherwise, there is an infinite regress. If to understand p we must be able to state a circumstance q , and to understand q to state a circumstance m , then clearly we could never understand the sense of any proposition. If this regress is to be avoided, we must either reject the view that all propositions require "understanding" or maintain that it is possible to pass beyond propositions altogether, to assign a meaning in a non-propositional way.

The latter hypothesis is Schlick's choice. "In order to arrive at the meaning of a sentence or proposition",¹¹ he says, "we must go beyond propositions. For we cannot hope to explain the meaning of a proposition merely by presenting another proposition. When I ask somebody, 'What is the meaning of this or that?', he must answer by a sentence that would try to describe the meaning. But he cannot ultimately succeed in doing this, for his answering sentence would be but another proposition, and I would be perfectly justified in asking, 'What do you mean by this?' He would perhaps go on defining what he meant by using different words, and repeat his thought over and over again by using new sentences. I could always go on asking, 'But what does this new proposition mean?' You see there would never be any end to this kind of inquiry, the meaning would never be clarified, if there were no other way of defining it than by a series of propositions." To illustrate his point, he takes the case of a person

¹¹ Schlick sometimes, as here, identifies "sentence" and "proposition" and sometimes draws a sharp distinction between them. Thus in "Meaning and Verification", he argues that "we cannot enquire into the meaning of a proposition but [can] ask about the meaning of a sentence, and this amounts to asking 'What proposition does the sentence stand for?'" (G.S., p. 339). The sentence is taken to be "a complex of physical signs" (words, etc.). But on the very next page Schlick is to be found talking about the meaning of *propositions* and repeating the verifiability formula. This is not an accidental inconsistency. If it is *sentences* that have meaning, then verifiability must go (we can't be said to verify a group of words). Yet Schlick also came to realise that to have a proposition before us is already to understand it, and that it is ridiculous to go seeking its meaning (p. 338). We can seek the meaning of sentences, then, but can't verify them; we can verify propositions, but have no need to seek their meaning. The verifiability formula can only be maintained by now identifying, and now distinguishing, sentence and proposition. Thus the meaning of "proposition" is a third obscure point in the verifiability formula.

looking up words in a dictionary, who finds each word described by other words. "But this process cannot go on indefinitely. Finally you will arrive at very simple terms for which you will not find any explanation in the encyclopedia." Thus, he concludes, "all our definitions must end by some demonstration, by some activity" (op. cit., p. 129).

This argument of Schlick's has a familiar ring; the attempt to discover simple entities which will be "the real meaning" or "the explanation" of everything else is common to rationalism down the ages. (The so-called "British empiricists" also seek such ultimates—Hume, for example, with his "simple impressions"—but in so far as they do this, they are not empiricists but rationalists.) Immediately, Schlick's argument derives from Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein, too, had argued that "to understand a proposition is to know what is the case, if it is true" (4.024); that "what is the case is the existence of atomic facts" (2); that such atomic facts consist of "objects" which are quite simple and that, if this were not so, it would never be possible to discover the meaning of any proposition, since the search for meaning would merely lead us to other propositions (2.021-2).

It is important to notice that we are committed to some species of rationalism as soon as we accept the formula "the meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification"; we are committed, that is, to a distinction between the ultimate and the derivative, between "reasons" and propositions. For to talk in this way of the meaning of a proposition is to suggest that propositions do not carry their own meaning with them but need to be explained by something else. And to speak of *the* method of verifying a proposition, as distinct from our ordinary recognition that a proposition can be verified in a number of ways (whether we take "verification" to mean "confirmation" or "proof"), is to suggest that there is some final way of verifying, some way which takes us to the indisputable and the unanalysable.

That there must be such ultimates follows then from the initial assumption of logical positivism, the distinction

between propositions and their meaning. If we are prepared to recognise that no such distinction can be made, although, as Schlick came to see, we can distinguish between a set of symbols and *their* meaning, the demand for ultimates can be seen to have no real basis.

The position is complicated by the fact that we *can* seek for the meaning of a *term*; we can inquire, that is, into definitions of it and divisions of it. If the term is P, we seek an X, Y such that any P is both X and Y and anything which is both X and Y is P, and an M, N such that anything which is either M or N is P, and anything which is P is either M or N—that, crudely, is the situation, though there are other requirements as well. But although we talk thus of *the* meaning of a term, it should be understood that there is no end to the ways in which that meaning can be stated, e.g. since an A, B can be found which is a division of M, and a C, D which is a division of N, we could as easily say that the meaning of P is A or B or C or D as that it is M or N. We are not, that is, committed to saying that there are “ultimate constituents” of the term nor “ultimate descriptions” of it.

If it is objected that this theory makes it impossible to state the meaning of the term, since some pertinacious inquirer may always demand the meaning of A, B, C, D also, the answer is that whether or not we can explain the meaning of a term to a particular inquirer depends entirely upon the extent of our knowledge and the extent of his knowledge (cf. the quite parallel situation in regard to proof). If at no stage we can arrive at terms with which he is already acquainted, then we cannot explain the meaning of the term to him at all. “Pointing” is no way out. We cannot be properly held to explain a term by pointing to an example of it, any more than we explain it by offering a description of it. If we are asked what a camel is and reply “there is one”, that is like replying “a sort of animal with a hump”, i.e. we help the person to whom we are talking to recognise “camels” (and further examples he sees, and descriptions he reads, will help him further), but nevertheless we do not state the meaning of

"camel"; we leave it possible by our pointing that he will think camel means "a brown animal kept in zoos" and by our description that he will confuse a camel and a dromedary. These are rough, approximate methods, which need to be replaced by accurate statements of the meaning (which can only be given in propositions). There will always be terms we only understand in a rough-and-ready way (we may never meet a dromedary and hence a crude understanding of "camel" will be good enough for us); but the search for meaning is precisely an attempt to get beyond this rough-and-ready level, the level of practice.¹²

I have spoken at such length of the meaning of terms, because although Schlick begins by talking about the meaning of propositions, the illustrations he gives are of the meaning of terms. (We cannot, for example, look up a *proposition* in a dictionary.) The search for the meaning of a proposition comes down to an inquiry into the meaning of its terms (cf. the emphasis of "operationalism" upon "concepts"); what Schlick is saying is that a proposition has meaning when its terms can be reduced to a set of simple characters. ("Stating the meaning of a sentence amounts to stating the rules according to which the sentence is to be used, and this is the same as stating the way in which it can be verified (or falsified) The grammatical rules will consist partly of ordinary definitions, partly of what are called 'ostensive' definitions.")¹³ This shift from propositions to terms is necessitated by the fact that no illustration could possibly be given of the way in which, by pointing at simples, the meaning of a proposition can be shown. For in a proposition one thing is described by means of another; in a proposition, therefore, there can be no simples. (Cf. Plato's *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*).

Now, if it is maintained that to know the meaning of a term, we must be able to indicate a set of simple character-

¹² Although it follows, and so far Schlick is correct, that terms of which we have such a practical understanding, will have to be used in certain of our definitions.

¹³ "Meaning and Verification" (G.S., p. 340). Reprinted from "The Philosophical Review", Vol. 45.

istics which together constitute its meaning, it follows that to know a term we must know all about it. That is not implied by the view that we know the meaning of a term *X*, only if we can find an *AB* such that all *X* are *AB* and all *AB* are *X*—this is quite compatible with *X* being *C* without our being aware of the fact at all. But if to define a term is to discover a set of simple characters *P*, *Q*, *R*, *S*, which together *are* the term, then only those terms can be said to have meaning about which there is nothing further to be learnt; so that all assertions about terms are either meaningless or tautologous. (Cf. Locke on “trifling propositions” in the *Essay*, Book IV, Ch. 8, and N. K. Smith on the theory of “simple natures” in his “*Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy*”, p. 38ff.) And if we hold that there is always something more to be learnt about terms that will be a sufficient reason for rejecting this theory of meaning.

To say this is to hold that any term is a general term; and a parallel then arises to the difficulty the positivist meets in giving an account of general propositions. For the meaning of a proposition is held to be a set of circumstances such that if they occur, the proposition is true. And it is clear that whatever “circumstances” are held to be, most general propositions cannot be reduced to any set of them—and, therefore, that general propositions are meaningless. Only two sorts of propositions have meaning; “atomic” propositions composed of “simple” terms and “molecular” propositions which are combinations of atomic propositions. (If *p*, *q* are atomic propositions, *p and q* will be a molecular proposition.) If, then, science is to be restricted to what has meaning, it will follow

1. that no term is to be employed which is not reducible to a set of simple terms;
2. that no proposition is to be employed which is not reducible to a set of propositions composed of such simple terms.

And clearly these self-denying ordinances, even if the conditions they set down could *ever* be fulfilled, will make

nonsense of the greater part of science. It is for this reason that later logical positivists, like Carnap, work away from the earlier interpretation of verification.

The second important feature of Schlick's theory of meaning arises from his definition of "circumstances". "Circumstances", he says, "mean facts of experience; and so experience decides about the truth or falsity of propositions, experience verifies propositions and therefore the criterion of the solubility of a problem is its reducibility to possible experience."¹⁴ He denies that he is in any way committed to solipsism; experience he insists is "neutral".

Once more, the germs of Schlick's theory are to be found in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. "What Solipsism means", Wittgenstein there wrote, "is quite correct, only it cannot be said, but shows itself. That the world is my world, shows itself in the fact that the limits of the language (the language which only I understand) means the limits of my world" (5.62). Thus, in the first place, "the limits of my world" are set by what I can experience, and this I *alone* can experience. But "I" am no part of what I experience. "If I wrote a book 'The world as I found it', I should have therein to report on my body and say what members obey my will and which do not, etc. This, then, would be a method of isolating the subject or rather of showing that, in an important sense, there is no subject; that is to say, of it alone in the book, mention could *not* be made. . . . The subject does not belong to the world but is a limit of the world. . . . Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to a pure extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it. . . . The I occurs in philosophy through the fact that 'the world is my world'. The philosophical 'I' is not the man, not the human body or the human soul of which philosophy treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit, not a part of the world" (5.631, 5.632, 5.64, 5.641).

¹⁴ "A New Philosophy of Experience" (G.S., p. 143). Reprinted from "Publications in Philosophy of the College of the Pacific" (1932).

That the world can be known as mine, but that I am not known; that we can mention that other things can be co-ordinated with the subject, but cannot mention the subject; that the I cannot be known as part of my world, but can nevertheless be known to be "a pure extensionless point"—this is the sort of mystery we will be obliged to accept, if we wish to hold that "the world is my world" but that this in no way commits us to solipsism. Or taking Schlick's phrase "experience is neutral", we are compelled to think of an experience which is not anybody's experience; compelled to say that what is known is known as being known, but not as being known by anyone. If all that is meant is that *what we experience* is neutral, that it is not anybody's, this objection disappears; but then we shall no longer say that we experience "experiences" but *things*, and that "experience gives the limit of my world" will be the harmless tautology "the only things I know are the things I know" (which does not imply that what I know is in any sense "my world").

Schlick, however, insists that "experience" is "private", and, while this is maintained, it is impossible to hold that experience is *neutral*. In a series of important but obscure lectures on "Form and Content" (first delivered at the University of London in 1932, now published in G.S.) he draws a sharp distinction between structure and content. Structure is independent of the knower, can be expressed and communicated to other people. It alone can properly be said to be known. Content cannot be known, but can only be "enjoyed". There is not, however, a "world" with structure, and a "world" with content. "There is just the one old world which we are 'enjoying' all the time, but which we know only in so far as we express its structure or order" (G.S., p. 217). Structure, that is to say, is enjoyed as well as content, but content is the incommunicable part of what we experience, structure the communicable part.

Structure is the description of things in terms of other things; content is the thing itself. It is what metaphysicians have sought when they spoke of "the inmost essence of things";

and when science is reproached for "ignoring quality" it is content which is meant. But this search, and this reproach, are pointless; both rest on the mistaken assumption that there is some way of communicating content.

It is content which gives meaning to science (which presents only structure). Science is "a system of propositional functions"; it is a "hypothetical-deductive system" which will only be useful if "we find entities in nature, which, when substituted for the variables of the system, will change all its propositional functions into true propositions" (G.S., p. 204). But this "finding of entities in nature" is observation; and observation is of content. Only by filling the structure of the propositions of science with content can science be "applied", only then have its propositions "meaning". The consequence is that meaning, as content, is incommunicable.

"The empty frame of a hypothetical-deductive system [has] to be fitted with content in order to become a science containing real knowledge and this is done by observation (experience). But every observer fills in his own content. We cannot say that all observers have the same content, and we cannot say that they have not—not because we are ignorant, but because there would be no sense in either assertion. All the different individuals communicate to each other the structural forms, the patterns, and they can all agree about these; but each one has to find out for himself their applicability to the world, each one has to consult his own experience, thereby giving to the symbols a unique meaning and filling the structures with content as a child may colour drawings of which only the outlines are given" (G.S., pp. 208-9).

Now, one clear objection to a theory of this type is that Schlick manages to say that there are contents, that they can be enjoyed but not communicated, and much else about them—and yet it is supposed to be impossible to communicate contents in any way! Like Wittgenstein, he takes care to point out this inconsistency. "It must be remembered", he says in exculpation, "that my sentences do not have the

ambition to be propositions themselves, their purpose is to give a direction to the reader's thoughts" (G.S., p. 206). But whatever their "ambition", his sentences *are* propositions, or alternatively they are meaningless, and then they could not "direct our thoughts" in one direction rather than another. The absurdity involved in expressing the inexpressible, in speaking of the unspeakable, is not to be removed by the mere confession of it. (Schlick, according to Waismann, was not himself satisfied on this point—he could not "zu voller innerer Befriedigung über diese Frage zu kommen"¹⁵—and certainly his later essay on "Meaning and Verification" avoids all mention of a distinction between content and structure, nor did Schlick himself ever publish the lectures on "Form and Content". But its influence was none the less important.)

Secondly, while Schlick speaks of the sentences of science as "hypothetical-deductive", as pure structure, he thinks that science of this purely structural kind has only recently been arrived at. "In our present day", he says, "the last traces of content as it were, have been removed" (G.S., p. 200), and again he refers to *pure* geometry (as distinct, say, from Euclidean geometry) as "mere structure without content" (G.S., p. 203). He at once maintains that we can *never* communicate anything but structure, and that science is to be distinguished from the statements of everyday life because it *alone* is purged of all content. There is an uneasiness revealed here about the possibility of saying that ordinary propositions are "pure structure", that their meaning can only be given by filling them out with content; that, in short, the propositions of everyday life are also "hypothetical-deductive". No account of the structure of such propositions could plausibly be given which did not assume the communicability of "content". To say, for example, that we can communicate the relations between things but not the things themselves is clearly impossible—the relations can only be communicated as holding between things. Thus the things have to be converted into "variables" before we arrive at real structure. And the

¹⁵ Introduction to G.S. (p. xxvii).

conclusion would be that *only* the propositions of pure science can be communicated, that all other propositions are meaningless in so far as they try to communicate content. No wonder Schlick felt dissatisfied!

But there is yet a third difficulty. It is never possible, on the content theory, to communicate the meaning of a proposition to anyone else, or to show him that it has a meaning. Now this, it might be said, doesn't matter. It is of no importance to the scientist, or to anyone else, if the structure he communicates has the same meaning (is the structure of the same content) to various people. So long as the contents they experience have the same structure that is all that is necessary. (They will then agree that the proposition is true.) But if this is the situation, why such a to-do about "observation" and "verifiability"? To maintain, as a criterion of meaning, that a structure must have *some* content, is to set up a criterion which is quite unemployable. If a person chooses to say that a structure has content *for him*, there is no way of disputing his case, no way of arguing that the structure is *in fact* senseless. There may be such a thing as "meaning-for-me", corresponding to "verifiability-for-me", but there is no way of talking about "meaning" generally, and certainly no way of using "meaninglessness" as a weapon in polemics. "Meaning", "structure", "content" are otiose terms; we can neither explain what they mean nor show, even, that there are such things.

These are not, of course, the only criticisms which might be directed against Schlick's theory of verification; but they are the ones which weighed most heavily with his fellow-positivists, and led to their gradual rejection of the notions of "content" and of "experience". One of the most important features of Schlick's work, in fact, is that he brought out the consequences of drawing a contrast between experience and knowledge, between content and structure, between the communicable and the incommunicable and showed that any one of these contrasts implies the others.

The rejection of "content" leads back to the proposition. So we find it argued by Neurath and by Carnap that verification is by propositions (or "statements" or "sentences"). "Proposition is to be compared with proposition", writes Neurath, "never with 'reality' or 'things'."¹⁸ But it was still argued that meaning is given by verification; so that we are back at the vicious circle. If we can understand the verifying propositions without verifying them, then why cannot we understand the original propositions in the same way? And if, on the other hand, we need to verify the verifying propositions also, then how can we understand the meaning of any proposition? The only way of avoiding this circle is to insist that some propositions are of a quite different kind from others, that some propositions can be "directly verified", so that we can read off their truth, and consequently their meaning, by simple inspection. Such propositions Neurath and Carnap thought they had found in "reports" or "protocol statements".

THE THEORY OF PROTOCOL STATEMENTS.

Of protocol statements, Carnap offers two descriptions; one in the "material mode" and the other in the "formal mode". One description, that is to say, makes reference to something other than statements and the parts and relations of statements, the other refers only to statements and their relations. In the material mode, Carnap says that protocol statements "describe directly given experience or phenomena"; in the formal mode they are defined as "statements needing no justification and serving as a foundation for all the remaining statements of science" (U.S., p. 45).

Carnap will not, in *The Unity of Science*, commit himself to any particular view of the nature of the given and, hence, to any particular view of the form protocol statements will take. He sets down three possibilities; that they are of the form "here now, Blue" (sensory atomism), or of the form "Red circle, now" (Gestalt) or of the form "a red cube is on

¹⁸ "Physikalismus", p. 355 (as quoted by Werkmeister, p. 288).

the table". But whatever form such statements take he insists that there must be protocol statements; that something must be "given".

At the same time, Carnap saw that if "given" means "given to me", then to say that protocol statements refer to the given is to make each protocol statement unverifiable by anyone except the person who proposes it. "Every protocol language", he says, "could be applied only solipsistically; there would be no intersubjective protocol language. . . . Even when the same words and sentences occur in various protocol languages, their sense would be different, they could not even be compared" (U.S., 80). He concludes, therefore, that we should give up using the material mode; since it leads us to "pseudo-questions", such as how there could be any relation between the "protocol language" and "the language of physics" (how, that is to say, an objective science can ever be constructed if the "basic assertions" of science can only be verified by the people who put them forward). We should, therefore, restrict ourselves to the formal mode. "If, instead of speaking of 'the content of experience', 'sensations of colour' and the like, we refer to 'protocol statements' or 'protocol statements involving names of colours' no contradiction arises with the inferential relation between protocol language and physical language" (U.S., 83).

If we could find in this renunciation of the material mode a recognition that the notion of "the given" must be abandoned, this would be something to the good. But, in fact, Carnap is still assuming in *The Unity of Science* that protocol statements do refer to the given; we are just not to mention that fact because if we do, we shall find ourselves confronted with insoluble problems. The discovery of an "insoluble problem" (insoluble in the strict sense that it can be shown there is no possible way of constructing science from "private experiences") does not, as it should, lead Carnap to reject one of the competing doctrines—but only to resolve not to speak of it.

By these means, Carnap hopes to have it both ways. "Protocol statements" are *guaranteed* because they refer to "the given"; but they can serve as the basic sentences of science only if we forget altogether their relation to the given, and treat them simply as statements. If the theory of "the given" were abandoned, then it could no longer be shown that certain particular statements were "protocols", were in some special sense "basic", capable of "direct verification".

It appears to have been at one time suggested by Carnap and Neurath¹⁷ that a way out of this difficulty might be met by considering as protocol statements any statement which is of the form " S_1 reports m ". Other assertions would then have meaning in so far as they could be reduced to a set of such reports. Thus the meaning of "there is a table in the room" would be " S_1 reports m ", " S_2 reports m_1 ", " S_3 reports m_2 ". These reports can be put together into a group report "the group reports m, m_1, m_2 ", where m, m_1, m_2 are the meaning of "there is a table in the room".

There is no need to add anything to L. J. Russell's detailed and devastating criticism of this theory. He points out first of all that " S_1 reports m " is a fact on no different footing from any other fact; it should therefore be presented as " S_2 reports that S_1 reports m " and that, in turn, as " S_3 reports that S_2 reports that S_1 reports m " and so on. Thus the attempt to insist that we should take as basic only "reports" and not facts involves us in an infinite regress; we can never find anything to take as basic.

The second point is that to put together a series of reports as a group report is to assume a further fact, viz. that these reporters constitute a group. But whose report is this? If we can recognise directly this fact, then it should be possible to recognise other facts in precisely the same way, without referring to anyone's report about them; if we can't recognise this fact directly then we shall need a further group-report to show that S_1, S_2, S_3 are a group and so on, indefinitely.

¹⁷ I take this theory from L. J. Russell's "Meaning and Verification" (Proc. Ar. Soc., Supp. Vol. XIII).

The whole argument, in fact, depends on a quite illicit transition from "it is indubitable to S_1 that he is in a position to report m " (this itself highly contestable) to "it is indubitable that S_1 reports m "; only constant ambiguity in the use of "report" (which at one time equals what is reported, at another time its being reported) can conceal the transition.

Considerations of this kind apparently led Neurath eventually to a coherence view of "verifiability". "Every proposition", he wrote, "is being confronted with the totality of accepted and mutually harmonised propositions. A proposition is called correct if it can be fused with the others; and whatsoever cannot be fused with the rest will be called incorrect."¹⁸ Thus Idealism has its revenge! Carnap, for his part, has turned to "conventionalism", which is itself a special form of the coherence theory of truth. Unable to assign any reason for considering one proposition rather than another as "basic", he has been led to argue that we *choose* to consider certain propositions, the truth of which it is particularly easy to discover, as "basic" or "atomic"; although there is nothing to prevent us from choosing a different set, if we so desired (nothing, that is, except "convenience"). "It should be noticed that our theory does not assume anything like ultimate facts. It is a matter of convention which predicates are taken as primitive predicates of a certain language L , and hence likewise which predicates are taken as atomic predicates and which sentences as atomic sentences."¹⁹

"Conventionalism" is the last refuge of a rationalist. Instead, that is, of recognising that there are no basic propositions, that it is possible to question at any time the truth of any proposition (although it is also possible for various inquirers, perhaps for all inquirers, to agree that a given proposition is true), Carnap speaks as if we *lay it down* that certain propositions are to be basic. This, then, is the final outcome of the search for "basic propositions", that we have

¹⁸ "Physikalismus" (Erkenntnis II, p. 354), as quoted by Werkmeister (p. 289).

¹⁹ "Testability and Meaning", I ("Philosophy of Science", Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 448). Referred to as "T.M., I".

been looking for what we have all the while had it in our power to construct for ourselves. The implications of this conclusion will concern us later, when we come to consider the positivist "rejection of metaphysics". But we have still to consider the use Carnap wishes to make of "basic propositions", the precise way in which he interprets "verification", and that will be our next concern.

CARNAP'S THEORY OF VERIFICATION.

Schlick's theory of meaning and verification, as we saw, rests on two assumptions. The first was that every meaningful proposition must be either atomic (composed of simple terms) or a combination of atomic propositions; and the second that every term must be reducible to a set of "experiences". Carnap rejects both these assumptions, by implication in *Philosophy and Logical Syntax* and explicitly in *Testability and Meaning*.

He there points out, in the first place, that any attempt to reduce a proposition like "On May 6th, 1935, at 4 p.m., there is a round black table in my room" (to say nothing of propositions less precisely dated) to a set of propositions of the form, "If on May . . . somebody is in my room and looks in such and such a direction, he has a visual perception of such and such a kind", together with similar propositions about "tactual perceptions", assumes that there is a finite set of such "possible experiences". Now, it has certainly not been *shown* that the set is finite. (We could carry Carnap's criticism further by producing an argument to show that the set cannot be finite.)

Secondly (and this can be accepted as an *argumentum ex concessis* against the "reductive" form of positivism), on the Russellian theory of hypotheticals "if p, q" is true whenever "not-p" is true. (If "not-p", then "not-p or q" and hence "if p, q".) Thus, whenever an observer does not enter the room at all, these various hypothetical propositions are true. It is, then, possible for all these propositions to be true without there being any table in the room at all, this happening whenever it is true both that no observer enters

the room and that there is no table in the room (T.M., I, p. 464).

For these reasons, then, Carnap rejects the view that the truth of a so-called "singular proposition" is equivalent to the having, by observers, of various "experiences" (or to any set of propositions about "possible experiences"). Now, it is clearly true (this was never denied) that it is also impossible to reduce a "law of nature" or a "hypothesis" to a set of "singular" propositions; and Carnap refuses to accept the view that laws of nature and hypotheses are nonsense, although "important nonsense".

Thus, he maintains, when we speak of propositions as "verifiable" we do not mean that we can show that they are true. Propositions are "verified" by taking them with other propositions we believe to be true. If, in this way, a true conclusion can be derived, then we have a verification of the proposition.

In *Philosophy and Logical Syntax*, Carnap draws a distinction between "direct verification" (verification of "protocol sentences") and "indirect verification". "Every proposition in the wide fields of science", he says, "has this character, that it either asserts something about present perceptions or other experiences, and is therefore verifiable by them, or that propositions about future perceptions are deducible from P together with some other already verified propositions" (p. 13).

In his *Testability and Meaning*, "direct verifiability" disappears; and he prefers to substitute the word "confirmation" for "verification", since "verification" might be taken to mean "showing to be true". But the main thesis remains (although now as a "proposal", not as an "assertion"), that a proposition has meaning in so far as it can be taken with a true proposition in such a way as to imply another true proposition. It would seem to follow that we can make mistakes about meaning, since the "true propositions" may not be true propositions; and it is to avoid this conclusion that Carnap speaks of "decisions" and "conventions"—the position

being that we cannot be held to be making a "mistake" about whether a proposition has meaning, if we find it implies, when taken with a proposition we have *decided* to be true, another proposition on the truth of which we have *decided*. But, of course, there is no more reason why we should be unable to make mistakes about meaning than about anything else; conventionalism, as we said before, is simply a species of rationalism.

It should be observed that once "verification" is taken to mean "confirmation", it is no longer possible to say that a proposition's meaning is the method of verifying it. There is a variety of quite different ways of confirming any proposition; its meaning cannot be identified either with any one of them or with them all taken together (since there is no such "all"). The most we can say is that if a proposition has meaning, then it must be possible to confirm its truth; and if it has no meaning, then there will be no possible way of confirming its truth. Thus verifiability may be taken as a *test* of meaning, but not as "the meaning of meaning".

Berlin, however, objects³⁰ that the proposition "This logical problem is bright green" would not be meaningless, on this criterion. For it would be possible to argue:

This logical problem is bright green,

I dislike bright green,

∴ I dislike this logical problem,

where the truth of the conclusion and of the major premise verifies the truth of "this logical problem is bright green" (the minor premise when the syllogism is properly set out). Now, Carnap is quite conscious of this fact, and in *Testability and Meaning* he takes a similar instance, "This stone is now thinking about Vienna", and maintains that to call this meaningless is a "careless use of the word meaningless" (II, p. 5).

The position is that there are many propositions which no one would ever assert; because having any knowledge of

³⁰ "Verification" (p. 234), in "Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society" (1938-9).

the terms would involve seeing that the proposition was false, e.g. we could not have the slightest knowledge of what "logical problems" were, without seeing that it would be impossible to describe them as "bright-green". (Or is even this true? If "a logical problem" is a set of symbols, or if it is a particular type of bodily action, it *could* be bright green—and both these theories would have their devotees.) But the contradictories of these propositions are false, not meaningless. It is false to say that "logical problems are bright green" or that "the stone is thinking about Vienna", or that "squares are round". (From this it follows that the assertions "bright green logical problems are always difficult", or "pensive stones are liable to indigestion" or "round squares are geometrical figures" are not false but *meaningless*—their contradictories are also meaningless.)

Carnap's theory of confirmation owes much to Karl Popper.²¹ It does not seem to have been generally observed that Popper's "thesis of falsifiability" is precisely equivalent to the theory that verification means confirmation. To demand that there must be some way of falsifying a proposition is the same as demanding that there be some way of confirming it; since the proposition which (if it is true) confirms another proposition will (if it is false) serve to falsify it. To say it is possible to falsify hypotheses, but not to prove them (by "reduction") is equivalent to saying that they can be confirmed, but not proven.

A. J. Ayer, in his criticism of Popper, misses the point at issue.²² Ayer criticises Popper's thesis by arguing that "when we take the occurrence of certain observations as proof that a given hypothesis is false, we presuppose the existence of certain conditions". This is perfectly true, and it is quite

²¹ Popper was not a member of the "Vienna Circle", but worked in close contact with the Circle. I have not seen his "Logik der Forschung" (1935), but there is an account of his views in W. H. Werkmeister: "Seven Theses of Logical Positivism", I (Philosophical Review, Vol. XLVI, 3); John Laird: "Recent Philosophy" (Ch. IX); H. Reichenbach: "Experience and Prediction" (passim); J. R. Weinberg: "An Examination of Logical Positivism" (passim); R. Carnap: "Testability and Meaning" (passim).

²² "Language, Truth and Logic", p. 25.

important to notice that we cannot prove or disprove the truth of any proposition by asserting the truth of *one* proposition alone. (What is called "immediate inference" is not proof. If it were, the distinction between disproof and mere counter-assertion would disappear, and any circular argument could be presented as a valid proof.) If, for example, we took the mortality of Socrates to disprove the assertion that "no men are mortal" we should be assuming that Socrates is a man, and quite possibly it would be this assumption—not the universal proposition—which was erroneous.

But recognising that we can thus go astray in our confutations, it is still true that a confutation can be presented as a *proof*, whereas a confirmation cannot be. The argument of a confutation runs as follows: "If no men are mortal then since Socrates is a man, Socrates will not be mortal, but he is mortal and hence the hypothesis is confuted"; and it can be presented as a proof of the contradictory of the hypothesis thus:

Socrates is a man,
Socrates is mortal,
∴ Some men are mortal.

On the other hand, the confirmation of a hypothesis can in no way be taken to *prove* the hypothesis. This is a most important distinction between the two cases, even though it is true, as Ayer argues, that we cannot arrive at a "conclusive" falsification, if this is taken to mean a falsification which involves no risk of error. (But is this what we mean by a "conclusive" argument? Only a rationalist would think so.)

The significance of the Popper-Carnap theory of verification is two-fold:

1. it involves the rejection of any identification of meaning and verifiability;
2. it represents a working away from rationalistic theories of science (theories of "ultimates").

It is, indeed, a serious question whether it is not misleading to speak of these later views as "logical positivism"; certainly few movements have ever disintegrated with such rapidity.

VERIFICATION AND VERIFIABILITY.

"We call a proposition verifiable", wrote Schlick, "if we are able to describe a way of verifying it, no matter whether the verification can actually be carried out or not. It suffices if we are able to say what must be done, even if nobody will ever be able to do it" (G.S., p. 183). Thus we are not to regard propositions like "On the last Friday in July, 1814, Napoleon went to bed early" as meaningless, even though (in the absence of documents) it may be impossible to tell whether this proposition is true or not. It is sufficient that we should be able to say that this proposition would be verified *if* such-and-such things could be done; it is not necessary that we should be able to "realise" these circumstances (to use Carnap's terminology).

The difficulties of this position can be seen more clearly if we ask under what conditions a proposition could be called non-verifiable; how we could say that it is *impossible* to discover circumstances which would verify a proposition. In "Experience and Prediction", Reichenbach distinguishes three sorts of impossibility; technical impossibility, physical impossibility and logical impossibility (pp. 38-9); and this will serve to illustrate the different accounts of "verifiability" which logical positivists have offered. If, for example, to verify means to reduce to a set of experiences of mine, then it is *technically* impossible to verify the proposition about Napoleon (there is no procedure which would lead me to have a set of experiences such that I could say "Napoleon went to bed etc."); it is *physically* impossible to verify the proposition that "men who live in the centre of the sun complain of the climate" (since it would contradict "the laws of nature" to suppose that I could have experiences of such men); it is *logically* impossible to verify the proposition that "square circles are carnivorous" (because it is *logically* impossible for me ever to encounter a square circle).

It was not at all clear, in Schlick's earlier writings, whether it was "physical" or "logical" non-verifiability to which he objected, but in "Meaning and Verification" he came

out strongly in favour of the principle that all we are entitled to insist upon is that it shall be *logically* possible to verify a proposition. "Since we cannot boast of a complete and sure knowledge of nature's laws", he says, "it is evident that we can never assert with certainty the empirical possibility of any fact. . . . Is the possibility of verification which we insist upon of this empirical sort? In that case there would be different degrees of verifiability, the question of meaning would be a matter of more or less, not a matter of yes or no. . . . How could we ever know that we had tried long enough, if none of our methods were successful? Might not future efforts disclose a meaning we were unable to find before?" He insists, therefore, that "the possibility of verification which is essential to meaning cannot be of the empirical sort"; that "when we speak of verification, we mean logical possibility of verification and nothing else" (G.S., 346-8).

What, then, is "logical possibility"? Schlick's answer is that "I call a fact or process 'logically possible' if it can be described, i.e. if the sentence which is supposed to describe it obeys the rules we have stipulated for our language". And this in turn implies that "the only case in which verification is (logically) impossible is the case where you have made it impossible by not setting any rules for its verification". Thus the principle of verifiability amounts to nothing more than this; that if we use words, and combinations of words, to which we have not assigned any meaning, the sentences in which the words appear will be meaningless. Not much of a stick to beat a metaphysician with!

As examples of sentences it is logically impossible to verify he gives "My friend died the day after tomorrow", "The lady wore a dark red dress which was bright green", "The child was naked, but wore a long white night gown" (p. 348). Now, to say that it is "impossible to verify" these sentences, is to treat them as if they were *propositions*; no question of verifying a sentence can arise. But the real point (partly suggested by Schlick himself) is that they are not

propositions at all; that there are no terms to which the words "died the day after tomorrow", "naked and wearing a long white night gown" refer.

The difficulty, of course, is that these sets of symbols are composed of words which individually (or in groups) do refer to terms, e.g. "day after tomorrow", "died". So we cannot by merely looking up a dictionary, for example, see that the whole group of words does not refer to any term (as we could see that "googas" has no sense). It is only because we know meanings of the words used that we can see that these assertions are senseless. And it appears plausible to argue, in connection with the illustrations Schlick gives, that we could not know a meaning of the terms concerned without immediately seeing that the combinations are senseless (except, perhaps, in the case of the bright-red, dark-green combination). But it should be observed that there are other senseless combinations where we could know meanings of the separate terms, without knowing that the combination was senseless (e.g. "featherless bipeds who are not human", "carnivorous kangaroos"). Are we to say that these combinations are "logically impossible" also? For it is clear that there are *some* definitions of the terms which if they were substituted for the original terms, would produce the combination "X and not-X".

Once we realise that terms have a multitude of definitions, we see the common feature of all meaningless combinations "X and Y" is that in fact "no X are Y". When Schlick says that "whenever we speak of 'logical impossibilities' we are referring to the discrepancies between the definitions of our terms and the way in which we use them" (G.S., 348), he really assumes that there is something called *the* definition of a term. On any other showing it will be clear that the so-called "logical impossibility" of combining two terms (unless they are actually X and not-X) is really a physical impossibility. (The example "he died the day after tomorrow" I am not sure about—it has the special complication that it is not the combination of "dying" with "day after tomorrow" but the

combination of a *past tense* with "day after tomorrow" which provokes the difficulty.)

Carnap, for all his enthusiasm for "grammar", does not appear to be contented with Schlick's narrow interpretation of "verifiability". He appears to prefer the view suggested in the quotation from Schlick which began this section that we must be able to *describe a way* of verifying propositions. In considering the example given by Schlick "Rivers flow up-hill", which Schlick had held to be verifiable on the ground that it is not logically impossible for rivers to flow up-hill, Carnap says: " S_1 " (this sentence) "is confirmable not because of the logical possibility of the fact described in S_1 , but because of the physical possibility of the process of confirmation; it is possible to test and to confirm S_1 (or its negation) with the help of survey instruments" (T.M., I, p. 423).

The contrast between Schlick and Carnap is here well brought out; the fact that "verification" to Schlick was more and more a matter of seeing what a *sentence* signified, to Carnap of confirming a *proposition*. That leaves Carnap with the task of showing what he means by speaking of "the physical possibility" of testing a proposition; and again, he can answer only in terms of "convention"; the rules of our language will determine what is verifiable and what is not. The implications of this conclusion for the positivist rejection of metaphysics will be our concern in a later article.

(*To be continued.*)

THE ESTHETIC THEORY OF JAMES JOYCE.

By A. D. HOPE.

JAMES JOYCE is better known for his novels than for his theory of art. Yet this theory of art is embodied in his novels and it is important that critics of the novels should understand it because of the light that it throws on the structure and themes of the works themselves. Of course the theory is presented dramatically. It is put into the mouth of Stephen Dedalus, a character in "Ulysses" and in "A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man", so that it cannot be strictly attributed to Joyce. But there is plenty to show that Joyce did hold these views at the age at which Stephen is represented to be, and there is no reason to think that he ever changed them.

Joyce goes to Aristotle and to St. Thomas Aquinas for the basis of his theory, though he does not claim to derive it in any systematic way from the work of either. They simply provide him, says Stephen, in *A Portrait of the Artist*, with one or two ideas in the light of which he elaborates his own theory: "If the lamp smokes or smells I shall try to trim it. If it does not give light enough I shall sell it and buy another."¹ It is important to remember this in discussing the implications and consequences of Joyce's theory, but it is also true, I think, that the ideas Joyce borrows involve him in accepting certain other features of scholastic philosophy from which these ideas are systematically derived.

The problems with which Stephen Dedalus deals in the last few sections of *A Portrait of the Artist* appear in fairly logical order and form a connected discussion, a fact which is not quite clear owing to the dramatic form in which they are presented. The topics are:

¹ "A Portrait of the Artist", pp. 212-213; Jonathan Cape, 1928.

- (a) the nature of beauty,
- (b) the nature of a work of art, as distinguished from other beautiful things and from other human products,
- (c) the general characters of a work of art,
- (d) the types of works of art and the distinction of literary modes (tragedy and comedy),
- (e) the conditions of producing a work of art and the nature of the artistic process.

Each of these questions is made to depend on the answer to those preceding² it so that the theory, although by no means complete, can be regarded as an attempt at a coherent system.

The crux of this system is the problem of the nature of beauty. The definition given both by Joyce in his notebooks³ and by Stephen in *A Portrait of the Artist*⁴ is that of Aquinas: *Pulcra sunt quae visa placent*,⁵ "That is beautiful the apprehension of which pleases", and he links this with Aquinas's definition of the good: *Bonum est in quod tendit appetitus*,⁶ "The good is that towards the possession of which an appetite tends". These are Joyce's translations. Beauty in fact is regarded as a particular class of "good". Now the good in Thomistic philosophy forms one of the five "transcendental" properties which all beings possess. The most important of these transcendental properties are unity, truth and goodness. These are not properties in the sense that colour, for instance, is a property of some beings but characters which all things possess in virtue of their relations with other things. To say that a thing is one is, in a way, no more than to say that it is a complete being in itself distinguishable from all the other beings in the universe. To say that it is true is to say that it is intelligible, and to say that it is good is to say that it is desired. But if we ask why one being desires another we find

² In the order in which I have placed them; the order in which they occur in the book is slightly different.

³ H. Gorman, "James Joyce: A Definitive Biography", p. 133.

⁴ Pp. 211, 236.

⁵ *Summa Theologica*, I, Q.V, art. 4.

⁶ *Ibid.*

that it does so by the law of its own nature which disposes it to desire this thing and not another: "that to which an agent tends definitely must needs be befitting to that agent, since the latter would not tend to it save on account of some fittingness thereto. But that which is befitting to a thing is good for it. Therefore every agent acts for a good."⁷ Thus goodness is not merely a relation in which beings stand to one another. The agent and its object form a "set" analogous to that of a wireless receiver and transmitter. It is necessary to know the nature of both agent and object in order to be able to say in what respect the object is good, but that is not to say that by "good" we simply mean a relation in which one stands to the other. The good is the end which the agent seeks in order to perfect a lack in its own nature. A substance is only to be called food in view of the fact that it nourishes a specific animal. And it is in virtue of the fact that the animal seeks to eat this substance that we call it food. But the character of the substance does not depend on the animal but on its own nature. When an archer lets fly at a target, both the archer and the arrow act each for its appropriate good and that good is the actual target.⁸ The properties of the target do not vary and they are determined by the kind of thing it is in itself. Otherwise we should have to say that the arrow and the archer aimed at different things.

The beautiful is distinguishable from other kinds of the good in several ways. The most important of these are: (a) the specifically intellectual nature of the beautiful, whereas St. Thomas uses "the good" to describe the end of *any* activity;⁹ (b) the fact that the beautiful has the character rather of a formal than of a final cause. The good is defined simply as that by which an appetite is appeased. And everything that acts does so because it has an appetite. But it pertains to the nature of the beautiful that the appetite in question is appeased by the mere sight or contemplation of its

⁷ *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Bk. III, Ch. III; English translation by Dominican Fathers; Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1928. (References are to the same text throughout this article.)

⁸ *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Bk. III, Ch. II, p. 4.

⁹ *Ibid.*

object.¹⁰ This distinction of intellectual from other acts is a fundamental one in the system of Aquinas and it comes up again in connection with Joyce's discussion of the characters of a work of art. For the moment it is enough to say that the intellect is not swayed by the desire and loathing which are characteristic of animal natures but is that part of man in which he transcends his animal nature. The importance of the distinction, as we shall see, is that it allows us to distinguish esthetic and intellectual activities and enjoyments from practical. Aquinas for instance makes a sharp distinction between the senses of taste and smell, appetites which are appeased by sensual gratification, by actual possession of their objects, and those of sight and hearing which are appeased by contemplation of them.¹⁰ So that when Stephen Dedalus says that Aquinas uses the word "visa" to cover esthetic apprehension of all kinds, whether through sight or hearing or through any other avenue of apprehension,¹¹ he is only correctly understood if we remember that Aquinas does not regard all the senses as sharing equally in the intellectual nature. Not that the intellect is without its specific and proper appetite. The beautiful like the true can only be classed as types of the good in so far as they are the objects of some appetite,¹² and as knowledge is an activity it argues an appetite in the agent.

Aquinas connects beauty and goodness in another way. As a thing is said to have an appetite for the good in so far as it is perfected by the attainment of its natural desires, so it is said to have an appetite for the beautiful inasmuch as it is modified, or attains the specific characters of the sort of thing it is, by the exercise of its natural appetite.¹³ Aquinas regards all finite beings as in a process of becoming, of self-realisation. Only in complete realisation, when the potential characters of a being in act are perfected by the attainment of the end of its natural activity, does a thing exhibit the wholeness and due

¹⁰ *Summa Theologiae*, I, Q.XXVII, art. 2; also I, II, Q.XXXI, art. 6, in which Aquinas deals with the sense of touch.

¹¹ "A Portrait of the Artist", p. 236.

¹² "Commentary on the Sentences", Bk. I, Dist. XXXI, Q.II, 4.

¹³ *De Veritate*, Q.XXII, art. I, 12.

proportion of its parts in virtue of which it is called beautiful. Thus the activity of the intellectual nature, which is to know, induces finally the completeness, harmony and due proportion that is beauty in the agent. This is an aspect of Aquinas's doctrine of the unity of the knower and the known in the act of comprehension.

Joyce, however, does not adopt this side of Aquinas's theory, though he seems to touch on it in his treatment of the quality of "Claritas" or radiance which he says a work of art should possess. As far as concerns what he calls the phenomena of artistic conception, artistic gestation and artistic reproduction, he finds Aquinas inadequate.¹⁴

The second main distinction of the beautiful from the good in Aquinas lies in the fact that an agent is said to be able to seek its ends in virtue of the fact that it is proportioned to those ends. The senses, for instance, are duly proportioned to their objects and are gratified by virtue of a similarity in themselves to those objects.

The sensitive object affects the sense by its quality so as to impress itself upon it like the form of the seal impressed on wax. If we were to suppose the wax conscious, then in consciously taking on the form of the seal it would know the shape of the seal by becoming it in terms of itself. This image, though employed by St. Thomas, is inadequate, as the process is on a higher level than that of material analogy, but it serves to bring out the two sides in sensation, the part played by the external object and the immanent activity implied in sensation. . . .¹⁵

In man sensation is accompanied and completed by intellectual act which it furnishes with the means by which, by abstraction, the formal structure of things is made clear. For a being to become intelligible, however, it must exhibit four types of cause, material, efficient, final and formal. The object of sense is called good because it is the object of the sensory appetite without which sensation would not be possible. The good has the character of a final cause. But we call it beautiful inasmuch as the senses are gratified by the

¹⁴ "A Portrait of the Artist", p. 238.

¹⁵ M. C. D'Arcy, "Thomas Aquinas"; O.U.P., 1937, p. 203.

correspondence of a certain form in the object with the induced form in the subject. Without this correspondence of forms sensation would not be possible. So that the beautiful has the character of a formal cause.¹⁶

This view of the nature of beauty has two important consequences for esthetic theory, though Aquinas nowhere develops a systematic esthetic theory himself.

In the first place it involves a clear contradiction of the popular view that some things are intrinsically ugly, and of the view that, if art is concerned with the beautiful, some subjects are improper for the artist. On the contrary, whatever is intelligible is beautiful since a thing is beautiful in so far as it is capable of being the object of intellectual contemplation. Ugliness, like all forms of evil, must consist in defect. It must consist in things of incomplete or discordant, irrational or contradictory nature of which complete intellectual comprehension is impossible. In nature it will rarely, if ever, arise, but in works of art, owing to the defects of man's intellectual nature and the confusing irrelevancy introduced by his animal passions,¹⁷ it will frequently arise.

Joyce's notebooks written at Pola in 1904¹⁸ show that he realised and extended this implication of Thomism. Like Aquinas he divides the act of apprehension into two parts: simple perception and recognition. The first, in Aquinas, is the activity of the *sensus communis* which differentiates and compares the impressions of the various senses. This is the *species impressa* which is largely passive perception. Partly the work of memory and partly the work of the *intellectus agens*, however, is a second activity by which the universal and formal characters of experience are presented to the mind as a *species intelligibilis*. Joyce is not necessarily committed to this machinery but it certainly seems to underlie his division of the act of apprehension. The importance of his view is that all objects, in so far as they satisfy the separate

¹⁶ *Summa Theologica*, I, Q.V, art. 4, 1.

¹⁷ *Summa Theologica*, 2, II, Q.CLXXX, art. 2.

¹⁸ Gorman, pp. 133-135.

activities of the act of apprehension, must be said to be beautiful.

Consequently even the most hideous object may be said to be beautiful for this reason (viz. that it is recognised) as it is *a priori* said to be beautiful in so far as it encounters the activity of simple perception.¹⁹

It is hardly necessary to point out the importance of this view in connection with the criticism so often levelled at *Ulysses* that it deals with subjects improper to a work of art. Joyce's view is precisely that nothing is improper to art in so far as its treatment exhibits certain general characters. In themselves all natural objects are potentially beautiful. On the other hand, unless we understand Joyce to accept Aquinas's theory of knowledge, he would appear to be putting forward a relational theory of the beautiful.

Beauty is that quality of a sensible object in virtue of which its apprehension pleases or satisfies the esthetic appetite which desires to apprehend the most satisfying relations of the sensible.²⁰

For it is only the assumption that there is either a hierarchy of appetites or a clear distinction between lower and higher appetites that gives us a criterion of "the most satisfying relations of the sensible". If all appetites are on an equal footing any of the qualities which satisfy them in the highest degree would, by definition, be those which the esthetic appetite desires to apprehend. And, if not, then the statement means no more than: Beauty is that quality of a sensible object which satisfies the appetite for Beauty. But in fact Joyce does seem to make a distinction between intellectual and other appetites similar to that made by Aquinas:

The true and the beautiful are spiritually possessed; the true by intellection, the beautiful by apprehension, and the appetites which desire to possess them, the intellectual and esthetic appetites, are therefore spiritual appetites.²¹

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 134.

²⁰ Gorman, p. 133.

²¹ Gorman, p. 133. See also *A Portrait of the Artist*: "The desire and loathing excited by improper esthetic means are really not esthetic emotions not only because they are kinetic in character, but also because they are not more than physical. Our flesh shrinks from what it dreads and responds to the stimulus of what it desires by a purely reflex action of the nervous system" (p. 234).

Elsewhere of course Joyce defines beauty not in terms of esthetic appetite, but in terms of the qualities themselves which a beautiful object must possess, the qualities of wholeness, proportion and radiance, and it is on his definition of these that the real test of whether his view of esthetics is a relational one, must finally depend.

The second important consequence of Aquinas's theory of beauty lies in this clear distinction between the animal appetites and the intellectual or contemplative appetites. Aquinas regards man as a link in the hierarchy of beings between the purely intellectual and spiritual beings and the material things. He partakes of both natures. Inanimate objects are moved by external forces; living creatures of a lower sort move themselves but their activity is tied to specific ends outside the creature and they are not able to modify their activity because it is not conscious of its ends. Higher animals, bound by instinctive behaviour as they are, are, however, conscious and able to modify their behaviour in a limited way. But as they are unable to reflect on their behaviour and unable to form universal concepts, their consciousness is bound to the objects of the animal appetites. In man and higher creatures, however, we see a new type of free behaviour. Man is a creature capable not only of animal consciousness, but of an activity which is tied to no specific objects. Intellection has as its object anything in the whole universe and therefore is the first example of *free* activity. But as the essence of a substance determines its type of activity this argues the existence of a specific intellectual substance, the soul. The appetites of this substance and its pleasures are not like those of lower substances bound to specific objects. Its "good" consists not in possession but in contemplation of its objects. This is, of course, a very inadequate account of Aquinas's theory of the soul. But it is enough to give some notion of the background against which Joyce's theory is developed.

Joyce, too, puts forward a theory of the soul as something which grows or emerges within man's animal nature. For him,

too, the soul's activity is a free intellectual activity and is contrasted with that other part of man's behaviour which is concerned with and bound by movements of desire and loathing, the instincts and appetites of his animal and social nature. The problem touches his esthetic theory when he asks whether beauty is a stasis or a kinesis. How is it that different races of men, for instance, admire seemingly incompatible types of female beauty? One answer is that what we call an esthetic appetite is simply a disguised form of animal desire connected with the instinct of propagation.²² Stephen Dedalus admits that this is possible but prefers the alternative that there are certain characters in all things called beautiful which satisfy a specific intellectual appetite and which arouse a specific esthetic pleasure.²³ He does not say why he prefers this view but it seems clear from the whole discussion that he bases it on some division of appetites similar to that put forward by Aquinas. He speaks of the birth of the soul in terms which suggest the same thing²⁴ and among his early notes²⁵ occur the following sentences from Aristotle:

The soul is the first entelechy of a naturally organic body.

Only when it is separate from all things is the intellect really itself, and this intellect separate from all things is immortal and divine.

The intellectual soul is the form of forms.

and so on. . . . He obviously does not use the word soul in any merely literary sense.

What Joyce's precise theory of the soul may have been and how far it was the same as that of Aquinas is not at all certain. The important point is that his esthetic theory seems to involve him at the outset in two assumptions that may present considerable difficulties. One is the assumption that there are specific intellectual motives of a disinterested kind as opposed to those which are connected with the preservation of the species or of the individual, those which are tied to

²² "A Portrait of the Artist", p. 237.

²³ "Certain relations which satisfy and coincide with the stages in themselves of all esthetic apprehension"; *ibid.*, p. 238.

²⁴ "A Portrait of the Artist", p. 231.

²⁵ Gorman, pp. 95-96.

practical ends. The other is the assumption there are two ways of knowing or types of apprehension. In Aquinas the first assumption depends on the second and both rest on the vulnerable logical doctrine of essences. Whether Joyce could have found other grounds for defending either view is uncertain. But in the discussion on *Hamlet* in *Ulysses* there is a hint that he regarded free intellectual activity, specifically, that of the artist, as made possible not by a superior intellectual faculty but by achieving a balance or harmony of the conflicting motives such that none could be too dominant, the achievement of a kind of democracy of motives within the individual made possible in turn by "exile", by cutting oneself off from the forces in one's society which tend to dominate opinion and behaviour.

However that may be, one consequence of Joyce's solution of the problem of the unity of the characters of the beautiful in the various and sometimes apparently incompatible examples of what different races think beautiful in a woman, is this: it tends to free art from the tyranny of techniques and recipes. The whole tendency of modern European art has been to stress the esthetic importance of styles, of tricks of the trade. On Joyce's view there seems no reason to think that schools of painting, for instance, which are often claimed to be putting forward incompatible views of art, are doing more than advocating different styles adapted to different types of beauty. It may be that they are actually painting different things. If impressionists set out to paint light and atmosphere while the pre-Raphaelites set out to paint shapes and contours, the details of objects, it is inevitable that they will require different styles, but there is not necessarily any conflict of esthetic theory involved. This indicates that the whole question of schools of art should be examined anew. The primary distinction between good and bad art would be that between disinterested and propaganda art.

The feelings excited by improper art are kinetic, desire or loathing. Desire urges us to possess, to go to something; loathing urges us to abandon, to go from something. The arts which excite them, porno-

graphical or didactic, are therefore improper arts. The esthetic emotion . . . is . . . static. The mind is arrested and raised above desire and loathing.²⁶

This view, of course, is important in any consideration of the common assertions that *Ulysses* is a pornographic or obscene work. It is interesting to see that Aquinas like Joyce discusses the problem in terms of our ideas of personal beauty. Beauty he says is like health in this respect; the physical balance of humours which would make for health in a boy would not do so in an old man, yet health in all cases consists in a certain kind of balance or proportion of humours adapted differently to the needs of each nature. It may even be that health for a lion is death for a man. Similarly, examples of bodily beauty can vary tremendously while beauty in all cases consists of the balance or proportion of the limbs and colouring suited to that type. If the Bible says that Christ was beautiful we are not entitled to understand that he had yellow hair.²⁷

When we come to the question of what constitutes a work of art as distinguished from other beautiful things and from other human works Joyce's definition is:

Art is the human disposition of sensible or intelligible matter for an esthetic end.²⁸

The distinction between sensible and intelligible matter here is that of Aquinas between the objects of sensory and intellectual apprehension. The intellect deals with the formal and universal. One might ask whether Joyce means that a purely intellectual or abstract art is possible as opposed to those which deal with sensibles and particulars. The answer is: no! Art is an activity which consists in the contemplation of the intelligible through the sensible aspects, of the universal through the particular. This is to be inferred from Aquinas's theory of knowledge:

Movement and action do not follow from a universal concept save through the medium of a particular apprehension: because

²⁶ "A Portrait of the Artist", p. 233. See also Gorman, p. 96.

²⁷ "Commentary on the Psalms" (Psalm 44, verse 2).

²⁸ Gorman, p. 98; "A Portrait of the Artist", p. 235.

movement and action are about particular things.²⁹

One consequence of this, though it is a view that Joyce only indirectly indicates, is that it defines the relationship of art and science. Art deals with the particular but reveals its structures, the universal characters which it exemplifies. Science deals with abstract and general relationships as such.

Truth is beheld by the intellect which is appeased by the most satisfying relations of the intelligible; beauty is beheld by the imagination which is appeased by the most satisfying relations of the sensible.³⁰

Again the language, the distinction of intellect and imagination is thoroughly Thomistic.³¹

Another interesting implication of this definition of art in the light of the scholastic theory from which it proceeds is that it would imply that literature, as the art in which intellectual analysis is most possible would have to be considered the highest of the arts³² in much the same way that sight is regarded by Aquinas as the highest of the senses. Moreover it is the only art which uses words with their superior power of presenting conceptual knowledge, and the final and highest intellectual act in Aquinas's description of the operation of the intellect is called "*dictio*" or "*productio verbi mentalis*".³³

As far as I know Aquinas does not discuss the fine arts at all, though his theory of beauty and his distinction of the terms "*utile*" and "*honestum*"³⁴ lead us to suppose that had he done so he would have placed them on a different footing from that on which he places the practical arts³⁵ and that like Joyce he would have arranged the arts in an intellectual hierarchy.

Joyce gives some examples of human products which are not works of art, excrement, lice, children, photographs, an

²⁹ *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Bk. II, Ch. XLVIII, p. 115. See also *Summa Theologica*, I, Q.LXXXIV, art. 5, 6 and 7.

³⁰ "A Portrait of the Artist", p. 236.

³¹ See, for instance, the discussion of the distinction between the imagination and the possible intellect in *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Bk. II, Ch. LXVII.

³² "A Portrait of the Artist", p. 244.

³³ D'Arcy, "Thomas Aquinas", pp. 216-217.

³⁴ *Summa Theologica*, I, Q.V, art. 6.

³⁵ *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Bk. III, Ch. XXXVI.

image of a cow made fortuitously by a man hacking in fury at a block of wood.³⁸ Once again the scholastic background of his argument is important. A photograph is not a work of art because it is not a *human* disposition of sensible matter for an esthetic end. This looks like saying that my hat is not a hat unless it was made by a hatter. It seems to make the criterion of art a purely formal one. Joyce, however, is not thinking of a formal requirement. A photograph may be beautiful but if what it represents is not the result of the human selection, arrangement and elimination by which the mind presents its material as a work of "imagination", that is, so disposed as to bring out more than the immediate impression of sensible particulars, to bring out the "*quidditas*" or essence of the thing, then it will be lacking in the "*claritas*" which is essential to a work of art.

The art of the crude realist, of the writer who offers you a "chunk of life", of the merely representational or "photographic" artist are all equally incompatible with Joyce's view.

In the same way the cow cannot be a work of art because it is not produced for an esthetic end. This seems to suggest that the intention of the artist is itself the criterion of art rather than the character of the work. What Joyce appears to be saying, however, is that, since every act is proportionate to its end, then, as rage comes under the head of the appetites of fear and loathing, it will tend to produce something with the characters that satisfy this appetite and this will not be a work of art, because that can only be produced by the specific esthetic appetite. The argument is not: that to decide whether a work is art or not we must know the intention of the maker. It is more the type of argument that might underlie the statement that a hen cannot lay a duck egg. There is the further possibility that the man might be an artist and that while he hacked in fury at the wood he was also actuated by his habitual artistic impulses. For instance there is the type of argument which says that there is no reason why a work of

³⁸ Gorman, pp. 98-99; "A Portrait of the Artist", pp. 243-244.

art should not be both pornographic and artistic, or both didactic and artistic. But both Aquinas and Joyce would have to reject this. An essential of beauty for both is a balance or due proportion of the parts, and a completeness, a freedom from merely accessory or irrelevant features. Where two so different appetites as the esthetic and irascible are aiming at the same end, the hacking away of the block of wood, it is impossible that the result of the conflicting appetites should have the coherence and proportion necessary for beauty. Moreover, Aquinas argues that intellectual beauty is actually incompatible with the operation of certain appetites:

especially is it in temperance, which restrains the concupiscences which especially darken the light of reason.³⁷

Aquinas here is speaking of intellectual beauty of the higher sort. In another place he does, it is true, make a sharp division between corporal and spiritual beauty in men. Physical beauty is not incompatible with lustful appetite. Spiritual beauty is.³⁸ This however only indirectly affects the argument since men are not works of art.

Joyce, in keeping with his theory that the characters of beauty are general characters which any object may possess, does not deny that things which serve practical ends may be works of art.³⁹ A chair in so far as it is a chair is made for a practical end. Its "*bonum*" consists in "*utile*" according to Aquinas's classification. But if the maker constructs it to an esthetic end, that is to say if he finds that its nature as a chair is compatible with its possessing the requisite characters of wholeness, proportion and radiance, and if he constructs it to that end, then a chair can be a work of art. Architecture then can be classed with the fine arts, though like sculpture it would probably be classified by Joyce as an inferior art.⁴⁰

The nature of the whole theory, of course, depends on the three essential characters of a work of art. Joyce describes these essential characters in the terms of Aquinas:

³⁷ *Summa Theologica*, 2, II, Q.CLXXX, art. 6.

³⁸ *Summa Theologica*, 2, II, Q.CXLV, art. 2.

³⁹ Gorman, p. 99.

⁴⁰ "A Portrait of the Artist", p. 244.

Ad pulcritudineum tria requiruntur integritas, consonantia, claritas. I translate it so: *Three things are needed for beauty, wholeness, harmony and radiance.*⁴¹

These three characters correspond to the phases of apprehension. *Integritas* is the esthetic image "apprehended as selfbounded and selfcontained upon the immeasurable background of space and time. . . . You apprehended it as *one* thing. You see it as one whole. You apprehend its wholeness."

Consonantia is the esthetic image apprehended in its coherent complexity. "You apprehend it as balanced part against part within its limits; you feel the rhythm of its structure. In other words the synthesis of immediate perception is followed by the analysis of apprehension. Having first felt that it is *one* thing you feel now that it is a *thing* . . . made up of its parts, the result of its parts and their sum, harmonious."

Claritas is the esthetic image apprehended in its essence. "When you have apprehended that basket as one thing and have then analysed it according to its form and apprehended it as a thing you make the only synthesis which is logically and esthetically permissible. You see that it is that thing which it is and no other thing. The radiance of which he speaks in the scholastic *quidditas*, the *whatness* of a thing. This supreme quality is felt by the artist when the esthetic image is first conceived in his imagination. . . . The instant wherein that supreme quality of beauty . . . is apprehended luminously by the mind . . . is the luminous silent stasis of esthetic pleasure"

It is obvious that these three characters are simply Aquinas's three transcendental characters of all being, *unum*, *verum*, and *bonum*, as they appear specifically in the esthetic image and that the three phases of artistic apprehension correspond to his three main levels of apprehension, that in which the mind receives the image passively, that in which the *intellectus agens*, the active intellect views the object of contemplation by means of the phantasma or image, lights up

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 241.

the image as it were by the process of abstraction of its formal structure, and finally that by which the intellect in its highest act totally comprehends its object and is united with it. In this final act the appetite is appeased and this is the stasis, the state of intellectual delight which arises from the perfection of the act.

The passage to which Joyce refers seems to be the following from the *Summa Theologica*. Aquinas is discussing beauty as an attribute of a member of the Trinity:

*Nam ad pulchritudinem tria requiruntur. Primo quidem, integritas sive perfectio. Quae enim diminuta sunt, hoc ipso turpia sunt. Et debita proportio sive consonantia. Et iterum claritas unde quae habent colorem nitidum, pulchra esse dicuntur.*⁴²

In other passages Aquinas mentions only one⁴³ or two⁴⁴ of these characters essential to beauty, omitting the first; but there seems to be nothing inconsistent in this for when one examines these passages it is clear that he mentions just those characters which are relevant to the particular point under discussion. We must remember that Joyce's hero is speaking of the "esthetic image", that is to say, not the butcher's boy's basket at which he and Lynch are looking, but the artist's image of it which, when reproduced in the medium of words or paint, will be the work of art. This explains the fact that he describes the characters of beauty in psychological terms, as though they were ways of seeing the object rather than characters of the object itself. The basket as a work of art may be contrasted with the basket as it appears to the butcher's boy in that the work of art presents the spectator with the artist's analysis as well as with the basket—this is the meaning of the esthetic image. It is not that the characters of beauty are added by the mind. The mind elicits them and makes them explicit in the image. There is a close correspondence between this theory and Aquinas's theory of

⁴² *Summa Theologica*, I. Q.XXXIX, art. 8.

⁴³ *Summa Theologica*, I, Q.V, art. 6; "Commentary on the Sentences", Bk. I, Dist. XXXI, Q.II, 4; "Commentary on the Psalms", Ps. XLIV, verse 2.

⁴⁴ *Summa Theologica*, 2, II, Q.CXLV, art. 2; 2, II, Q.CLXXX, art. 2; "Commentary on the Sentences", Bk. I, Dist. III, Q.I, 1; Commentary, *In Dionysium de divinis Nominibus*, Ch. IV, Lect. 5.

"imagination". The esthetic image as it first appears in the mind corresponds to the *phantasma* of Aquinas, and the process described by Joyce corresponds fairly closely to the process of the *intellectus agens* on the phantasm. Joyce's account also preserves the Thomistic type of realism. It is the actual basket at which the two students are looking, the "esthetic image" is not the object but the means by which the lower faculties enable the *intellectus agens* to apprehend the basket itself, somewhat as, using what is of course an inadequate analogy, a map may help the traveller to apprehend the landscape spread out before him on the hill top. It is likely, therefore, that when Joyce speaks of the apprehension of the beautiful by the imagination and the true by the intellect⁴⁵ he is strictly following Aquinas. For the *intellectus agens* acts in a mediate capacity providing the concepts by means of which the final intellectual act is accomplished. Not that, in man, it is possible to have knowledge which is entirely without intellectual form. Knowledge, though a complex, is a single process and the whole intellect through its complex machinery of sensation, imagination, conception has as its actual object the real world. This is because it is a self-conscious process. It is immediately aware of its own activity.

This mediate position of the imagination throws light on the technical structure of Joyce's two later books *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*. It is the function of higher powers than the imagination to complete the work of abstraction which is seen in scientific thought. On the esthetic plane of apprehension the abstract and general aspects of the being apprehended remain, as it were, emergent but "embedded" in their particulars. *Ulysses* deals with the theme of the conditions of freedom, but it would be improper to the method of art for the author to treat the theme "scientifically", to elucidate his theme in abstract terms, to comment or explain. Instead he uses the method proper to the art of literature. Taking Vico's theory of the law of history by which the history of races and civilisations is conceived to repeat itself in much

⁴⁵ "A Portrait of the Artist", p. 236.

the same general way as the life history of human beings repeats itself in each individual, Joyce shadows his esthetic image with another, the image of the *Odyssey*. Neither *integritas* nor *consonantia* is broken, for in a sense the two stories are the same, Bloom is the Ulysses of Irish Dublin. It is not an allegory. For the book is about Bloom, he is not a mere cover for a concealed meaning, not a symbol. The method of the book is that of a complex metaphor worked out in minute detail. It is by presenting the esthetic image in two forms that the mind is led to that in their structure which is common, to apprehend the abstract elements of the form in their particularity. Tolstoi, facing a similar problem in *War and Peace*, finds himself constrained to pass every now and then from art to science, from the presentation of his esthetic image to abstract historical analysis and comment. Thus the method of *Ulysses* is no mere *jeu d'esprit*. From Vico Joyce derives the theory that art is a form of myth-making. But from Aquinas he draws the philosophical justification of the myth as a proper esthetic method in literature. At the same time he recognises a progression from the simplest to the most complex arts. The simplest objects are more simply apprehended in their unity and coherence because they *are* simpler and more immediately familiar. The mere presentation and apprehension of the rhythm of their structures makes them esthetically intelligible.⁴⁶

The most difficult of Joyce's three esthetic characters to conceive as an actual character of the work of art itself is that of *claritas* or radiance. He admits some doubt as to Aquinas's meaning here and rejects as "literary talk" the view that Aquinas had in mind "symbolism or idealism, the supreme quality of beauty being a light from some other world, the idea of which the matter is but the shadow, the reality of which it is but the symbol", the idea that "*claritas* is the artistic discovery and representation of the divine purpose in anything or a force of generalisation, which would make the esthetic

⁴⁶ "A Portrait of the Artist", pp. 234-235.

image a universal one, make it outshine its proper conditions".⁴⁷ The Commentary on the Divine Names does suggest such a view⁴⁸ and in other passages the sense of *claritas* is perhaps ambiguous—e.g. that *claritas* in bodies may be a physical property.⁴⁹ But Joyce's explanation of the term, within "the proper conditions" of the imagination, seems to be the correct one. As the passage stands, however, *claritas* hardly seems to be a *quality* of the esthetic image at all. It would seem to be more accurately described as a response of the mind to the image or an emotion accompanying and produced by the mind's operation. Joyce also calls it "supreme" among the qualities of beauty though the sense of the epithet is not clear, and he calls its apprehension a *synthesis*, though it seems to make no composition or combination that has not been already comprehended under the account of *integritas* and *consonantia*.

Once again we must return to Aquinas's theory of knowledge. If we take the metaphor of the traveller pausing on the hill top and surveying the landscape before him with the help of a map it may be possible to give some idea of the nature of the conception that underlies Joyce's description of *claritas*. If we imagine the map as in the traveller's mind and as the work of his mind, such that instead of the formal signs of roads, houses, fields and hills the mind has constructed a map-picture, we shall have something like the phantasma, or in the case under discussion, the esthetic image. We can further imagine the map-picture to be a transparent one such that when it is held between the intellectual eye and the landscape the traveller not only perceives the landscape endowed with its formal meaning, he is also able to observe the exact correspondence of the details of the map with the details of the landscape before him. He becomes aware of the truth of his mental work. His impression becomes a formal judgement. This is, in fact, the act of judgement that now takes place, the assertion or judging of the nature of what he sees in

⁴⁷ "A Portrait of the Artist", p. 242.

⁴⁸ Ch. IV, Lect. 4 and Lect. 5.

⁴⁹ *Summa Theologica*, I, Q.XXXIX, art. 8.

terms of the map. It is necessary to stress that this is no more than a metaphor, that it oversimplifies and in some respects distorts Aquinas and that it omits several very important aspects. But it will serve to illustrate the nature of Joyce's theory. This final judgement is the synthesis to which Joyce refers and, as he is speaking of the esthetic image, it can be truly described as a character or quality of the image in which it exists "potentially" or formally according to the Thomistic distinction of act and potency. Secondly, as the apprehension of *integritas* and *consonantia* were mediate operations by which the image was constructed, it is clear in what sense it may be described as the supreme quality among the qualities of beauty. Thirdly, as the act by which the intellectual and the esthetic appetite is appeased and consummated it will be a joy unmixed with desire, and as a moment of complete consciousness both of the essence of the object and of the activity of the mind itself it can be described as an illumination—or as Joyce describes it:

the luminous silent stasis of esthetic pleasure, a spiritual state very like to that cardiac condition which the Italian physiologist Luigi Galvani . . . called the enchantment of the heart.

The fact that the apprehension of *claritas* is a state for which Aquinas uses the technical term "*gaudium*", joy, is the initial step in Joyce's discussion of the literary modes of tragedy and comedy. Tragedy he defines as the form of art which

aims at exciting in us feelings of pity and terror. Now terror is the feeling which arrests us before whatever is grave in human fortunes and unites us with its secret cause and pity is the feeling that arrests us before whatever is grave in human fortunes and unites us with the human sufferer.⁵⁰

Aquinas's doctrine that a thing is only intelligible when its causes and its proper act are apprehended here excludes from true tragedy those literary works which simply present us with disastrous events without laying bare their "secret causes". The death of a young girl killed in a street accident

⁵⁰ Gorman, p. 96.

is not tragic.⁵¹ Comedy is the art which while not urging us to seek something beyond itself (desire) excites in us a feeling of joy and it is to be judged as more or less excellent according as this feeling of joy is excited by whatever is substantial or accidental in human fortunes:

and even tragic art may be said to participate in the nature of comic art so far as the possession of a work of tragic art (a tragedy) excites in us the feeling of joy. From this it may be seen that tragedy is the imperfect manner and comedy the perfect manner in art.⁵²

This illuminates Joyce's realism, particularly that aspect of it which has been so much attacked; his faithful presentation of aspects of life that are usually considered unpleasant or obscene. Critics are often heard to praise what is called "stark realism" in literature, the unflinching presentation of the unpleasant as unpleasant or loathsome. Joyce has sometimes been treated as a writer of this sort of "realism". This is entirely to misunderstand his view of art. On the other hand what has bewildered or misled some of his critics is that he presents his subject in all its aspects as an image imbued with a kind of serene joy. It is perhaps the aspect of his work that most clearly distinguishes it from that of the majority of writers of the so-called Realist school. It is the aspect of his art in which it can most significantly be described as classic. Even Dante whose greatest work is based on and inspired by the philosophy of Aquinas, though in the very agony of Hell he twice refers to his poem as a comedy, yet treats comedy as the lower and tragedy as the higher art.⁵³

Finally Joyce has something to say about literary forms. He distinguishes three forms progressing from one to the next.

These forms are the lyrical form, the form wherein the artist presents his image in immediate relation to himself; the epical form, the form wherein he presents his image in mediate relation to himself and to others; the dramatic form, the form in which he presents his image in immediate relation to others.⁵⁴

⁵¹ "A Portrait of the Artist", pp. 232-233.

⁵² Gorman, p. 97.

⁵³ Letter to Can Grande della Scala, § 10.

⁵⁴ "A Portrait of the Artist", p. 243.

His treatment of these forms is clear enough not to need comment, but it is perhaps not entirely fanciful to see in the three forms a suggestion of Aquinas's theory of the mind's three stages of consciousness of its object.

It is clear then that Joyce's esthetic theory is indebted in a more systematic way to scholastic philosophy than his own statement might suggest and that in particular it is rooted in a theory of knowledge that is open to the sort of criticism that can be levelled at a system based on the Aristotelian notion of causation and on the doctrine of essences. Such criticism need not however affect the three most important aspects of Joyce's theory, namely the notion that beauty is a positive character of works of art, the notion that this character is one of unity and coherence of theme and the notion that art is intrinsically a contemplative and analytic rather than a persuasive and superficially representational activity. For these notions can be supported in other ways.

There is another side of Joyce's theory which concerns the conditions under which the artist is produced and functions. As this, however, is not, strictly speaking, a theory of esthetics, as it derives more from Joyce's study of Vico than from his study of Aquinas, and as it forms part of the theme of another work, *Ulysses*, it would be more properly treated in another place.

THE SERVILE STATE.

By JOHN ANDERSON.

THE prognostications of Hilaire Belloc in "The Servile State"¹ were not taken very seriously by the Socialists to whom they were, in the main, addressed; and, in the period between the two wars, they must have seemed to many to have lost such point as they had ever had. Even then, of course, there were thinkers who associated the actual establishment of servile conditions with attempts at Collectivism. But for the most part Socialism was still felt to be a liberating force, and the tendency to enslavement was regarded as coming from avowedly anti-Socialist quarters. At the present time, however, the danger of regimentation must be acknowledged to have grown enormously, and at least a strong case can be made out for the view that propaganda of a "Socialist" colour has largely contributed to the decline of the sentiment of liberty. Under these circumstances it is interesting, and may be important, to return to Belloc's analysis and consider its relation to the contemporary situation.

There is, indeed, much in the book which remains as unconvincing as it was thirty years ago. The doctrine of the Distributive State, and the account of its growth from an originally servile civilisation and its decay at the beginning of the modern period, are marked by preconception and partisanship. And though the discussion of Collectivism might be little affected even if the references to Distributivism were completely excised, still it is coloured by the same sort of assumptions, by an undue emphasis, in particular, on property and legality. The emphasis on property leads to a "class"

¹ First published in October, 1912. References here are to the third impression, October, 1913.

theory which brings Belloc close to the commonly accepted interpretation of Marxism—to a division of society into two sets of individuals,³ the propertied and the propertyless, as opposed to a distinction of functions (of ways of living and forms of organisation) which may operate variously in the same individuals. And the emphasis on legality affects the whole argument of the book.

This may be illustrated from the fundamental definition given on p. 16: "That arrangement of society in which so considerable a number of the families and individuals are constrained by positive law to labour for the advantage of other families and individuals as to stamp the whole community with the mark of such labour we call The Servile State." No doubt formal enactment is important; and the "social" legislation whose inception in England was a principal stimulus to this book, was of great political significance. Nevertheless, Belloc's formulation obscures the fact that actual legislation is neither a necessary nor a sufficient determinant of political reality. On the one hand, a law may not be enforceable (as witness attempts in various parts of the world at various times legislatively to abolish strikes); on the other hand, people's social situation may prevent their doing what they are legally "free" to do. This was recognised, in Socialist propaganda, in the application of the term "wage-slavery" to the condition of workers in present-day society, even in the absence of that legal compulsion to labour for a master of which Belloc speaks (p. 3). The usage may be a bad one; the differences between the position of wage-workers and that of slaves may be vastly more important than the resemblances, and particularly the differences in respect of possibilities of *organised* action. But it implies the truth that "status" is not simply a matter of law.

The illustration is an important one in several respects. Clearly, as Belloc argues, the contention that a servile status

³ Cf. the disabilities imposed in Russia (for a period at least) on persons "of bourgeois origin". Consideration of what justification for such procedures could be found in Marx does not fall within the scope of this article.

with security is preferable to wage-labour with insecurity is no sort of proof that the latter also is servile. That the worker is subject to disabilities (disfranchisements) is undeniable; it is equally undeniable that he has certain enfranchisements. Some measure of servitude, an inequality of franchise, the existence of privilege, may be inseparable from society as such. But, in any case, the antithesis of political freedom and economic power is a false one; and it is false, too, to say that the worker cannot have political freedom while economic inequality exists. Here the Marxian doctrine (largely followed by Belloc) of the proletariat or propertyless class is particularly misleading. The divorce of the worker from certain forms of property ("capitalist" property) does not imply his "de-humanisation", his divorce from enterprise, his lack of all control of the processes of production. If he had no such control, he would have no political freedom, no power of agitation, no influence whatever on the progress of events—he would really be a slave. That some workers under some conditions would prefer security to such rights (powers of enterprise) as they now possess may well be true. But that enterprise, such as it is, has the social force of property, and any analysis which concentrates on the legal possession of certain movables can only obscure the issues.

The distinction between the worker and the slave, then, is in terms of enterprise (of rights, of a "movement"), which is at once political and economic. But it is also moral. And here it is remarkable to find Belloc professing, in his inquiry, to "keep strictly to the economic aspect of the case. Only when that is established and when the modern tendency to the re-establishment of slavery is clear, are we free to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the revolution through which we are passing" (pp. 19, 20).³ No doubt it does not advance discussion of events to say that some of them "ought to be" and others "ought not to be". But to regard that as moral

³ It is perhaps less remarkable to find James Burnham, in "The Managerial Revolution", similarly professing to avoid moral issues and to deal only with the actual trend of affairs.

characterisation is to treat the moral characters of things as not really belonging to them, to take their "advantages" and "disadvantages" not as inherent in their operation but as annexed to them from without—and what would be the force of such judgments *after* the facts had been ascertained is not at all apparent. It is impossible, however, to discuss social processes except in terms of ways of living or forms of enterprise, and that is moral characterisation. To know, in particular, that servitude is bad is to know something of its mode of developing and what will help and what hinder it.

Belloc, indeed, does not succeed in avoiding moral considerations; for example, in the fifth Section, he has a good deal to say about the "moral strain" (tension) involved in the divergence between the professions of capitalism and its actual procedures. But in his proposal to postpone moral questions he again exhibits affinity with Marxism, particularly as expounded by Engels. In what precise sense economics can be said to be primary and other aspects of culture (including morals) secondary is a question of great difficulty for the student of Marxism—it may, indeed, be impossible to give *any* clear sense to this doctrine. But at least it has been a commonplace of Socialist propaganda (as it is of current propaganda of "social improvement") that material conditions have first to be put in order and "higher" things can thereafter be attended to. And the view that material things come first is certainly that taken by Engels—most strikingly in his speech at Marx's funeral (contained in "Karl Marx, Man, Thinker, and Revolutionist", edited by D. Ryazanoff; English translation published by Martin Lawrence in 1927).

Marx, said Engels, "discovered the simple fact (heretofore hidden beneath ideological excrescences) that human beings must have food and drink, clothing and shelter, *first of all*, before they can interest themselves in politics, science, art, religion, and the like. This implies that the production of the immediately requisite material means of subsistence, and therewith the extant economic developmental phase of a nation

or an epoch, constitute the foundations upon which the State institutions, the legal outlooks, the artistic and even the religious ideas, of those concerned, have been built up. It implies that these latter must be explained out of the former, whereas the former have been explained as issuing from the latter" (pp. 43, 4; *my italics*). This, of course, is glaringly false. It is not the case that the winning of subsistence is antecedent to cultural ideas and activities; it is, for the most part, bound up with them and is frequently postponed or subordinated to them (i.e. men risk their subsistence for the sake of their "ideas"). If moral forces exist in society at all, they must (as they obviously do) affect economic exchanges and the whole system of production, and any economic theory which puts them out of consideration will be defective on that account. In fact, the attitude of "putting the economic first" leads straight to that servility whose growth Belloc undoubtedly deploras.

It can be said, then, that while Belloc recognises moral factors in society and indeed considers them of very great importance, his procedure is such as to obscure them. One considerable influence, in his view, making for the establishment of the Servile State, is the desire of the masses themselves for "security and sufficiency". Under capitalism, with its general condition of "political freedom" but restriction to the few of property in the means of production, the many have neither security nor sufficiency; and, seeing no way back to the Distributive State in which the wide diffusion of property gave "economic freedom" and thus such security as is possible to men, they are to a large extent prepared to accept a servile status on the understanding that their material wants will be provided for. This, of course, is only one of the facts recognised by Belloc as leading towards slavery. But the important moral fact which he, with his insistence on property, passes over, is that the desire for security and sufficiency is the very mark of the servile mentality.

No one will deny that certain materials are required for any way of life whatever; but a way of life which sought to have its materials *secured* for it would be poor and unenterprising. Here we may advert to Sorel's distinction⁴ between the outlook of the consumer (emphasising ends, things to be secured) and that of the producer (emphasising activities, a way of life, a morality). Excising the utilitarian part of Marxism and drawing upon the work of Proudhon, Sorel takes the social importance of the "working-class movement" to reside in its development of the productive spirit—a development which depends on "expropriation" and can only be retarded by proprietary sentiments. Naturally, Sorel would not claim that the continuance of this spirit is *secured* by existing social divisions, but would regard it as possible for the workers' movement to degenerate—as indeed it has done. If it were true (though Belloc gives no real evidence for it) that already in 1912 the mass of workers were concerned above all with security, that would imply the breakdown of workers' enterprise; and it is certainly against that enterprise that "social service" legislation was and is directed. But, while it flourished, it was bound up with the "propertyless" condition of the workers, with their *lack* of security. And in general it can be said that movements enlivening society and advancing freedom have to engage in constant struggle for the materials they require, and lose their independent and creative spirit under "protection".

The producer's mentality was never, of course, characteristic of the Labour movement, or even the Socialist movement, as a whole. Belloc draws attention, in the eighth Section, to the type of "Socialist" (now in the ascendant) whose real interest is in social regulation and not in social equality. And closely akin to him is the "sentimental Socialist" who seeks to "abolish poverty", for whom, that is to say, the worker is defined negatively, by what he is deprived of, instead of by his positive participation in certain forms of organisation and

⁴ In "Reflections on Violence". (Cf. my article, "Marxist Ethics"; this Journal, June, 1937.)

activity—a kind of view which, as we have noted, appears in Marxism, in spite of Marx's criticism (e.g. in "The Communist Manifesto") of social philanthropy. But in arguing that even the sincere and revolutionary Collectivist is forced in the same direction, that he "finds the current of his demand canalised" (p. 125) since the road to confiscation is checked and barred while the way to "securing human conditions for the proletariat" is open (viz. by sacrificing freedom, by accepting a position of legal servitude, with security, under the capitalist), Belloc again misses a vital point. That is that by taking Socialism *as an end*, by seeking an established condition of society in which workers' disabilities would be done away with, the Collectivist is already manifesting a servile outlook⁵—and the same applies to the Distributivist "solution" of capitalist instability. To aim at a stable society is to attempt to do away with the conditions under which free activities are possible, and the well-intentioned reformer *always* produces results which he did not anticipate, helps on tendencies to which he is avowedly opposed.

This leads us to consideration of the actual experiment in "collectivisation" which we have witnessed, viz. in the Russian system. It is no reproach to Belloc that he did not anticipate Bolshevism. The fact remains that he was wrong in holding that the Socialist movement would be only a factor contributing to the enslavement of the workers to the existing capitalist class, and would fail to realise Collectivism in the sense of "the placing of the means of production in the hands of the political officers of the community" (definition given on p. 5). It is not, of course, in any literal sense that one can speak of the rulers of Russia as officers "of the community", but their regime is of the character of State Socialism, and the workers are slaves of the State (to the admiration of the Fabian lovers of regulation of whom Belloc spoke) and not of capitalistic owners. No doubt this result

⁵ The view of Bernstein (though his position is less clearly and forcefully developed than Sorel's) is also in point here—that it is the movement, not the end, that matters.

has come about in a curious way; the monopoly of enterprise by the ruling party was achieved in the *name* of the workers and was marked in its early stages by sincere attempts at devolution of control. No doubt, also, the ruling group is, in some sense, a capitalist class—as the privileged controller of industry. Still, the system was established through confiscation; and it is part of the criticism of Socialist theory that the attempt to establish a Socialist order leads to this new kind of privilege and not, as Belloc supposed, to the mere strengthening of the old privileged class through the agency of the State. This new type of regimented State could have come about in the first instance only with the aid of Socialist propaganda, though, once the example had been given, a similar kind of political control could be brought about by other means. In fact, it could not come again by the same means, since the consolidation of the ruling order has been marked by the gradual disappearance of the revolutionary side of Socialist ideology and the dominance of an ideology of “security and sufficiency”, which has been reflected in the ideology of the Labour movement everywhere, the result being that it now *seeks* only what Belloc said it was effecting—a State-guaranteed provision for the people’s wants.

Granted that this line of development could scarcely have been anticipated, it should be noted again that what principally distorted Belloc’s view was his concentration on property (on legal title to materials) as against the notion of *control*—in terms of which, as we saw, the formal propertylessness of the workers is offset by their power of organising their own industrial and political activities. And here again the antithesis of the economic and the political is misleading. The lesson of Bolshevism is that political monopoly (“dictatorship”) is a major economic force, that the monopoly of industrial enterprise which it carries with it, does not require to be supplemented by formal property rights—may, indeed, operate all the more effectively without them. As Burnham puts it (though the view is not original to him), “the concept

of 'the separation of ownership and control' has no sociological or historical meaning. Ownership *means* control. . . . If ownership and control are in reality separated, then ownership has changed hands to the 'control', and the separated ownership is a meaningless fiction."⁹

It is unfortunate that Burnham, while he clearly delineates certain of the characters of the new ruling class, comes down on the side of management rather than direction (of the internal rather than the external relations of enterprises) as its main distinguishing feature. This involves an underestimation of the importance of *political* monopoly, of centralised direction by "the party". No doubt the technicians are of importance to the party and may influence its policy; but to treat them as the rulers is to ignore important conditions both of the rise and of the continuance of totalitarian regimes—and indeed to ignore essential features of any industrial society. And the point is specially important because Burnham discerns in the capitalist countries (with particular reference to the United States) the growth of the same "managerial" tendencies as have come to fruition in Russia and Germany. We may, I think, properly apply the term "servile" to those States which are marked by the suppression of all political opposition and thus of all independent enterprise. But in other States the managerial and bureaucratic stratum seems to be less closely linked with the really directing class, to occupy a middle ("mediating") position between it and the masses, and the system, in the absence of "the party", is reminiscent of the state of affairs anticipated by Belloc rather than of totalitarianism—with the important proviso that, so long as there are competing parties, the workers will have *some* political power.

It can scarcely be denied, however, even if we reject the "managerial" diagnosis, that the capitalist countries are

⁹ "The Managerial Revolution", English edition, May, 1942; pp. 87, 8. (Cf. the statement on p. 69 that the State, in managerial society, "will, if we wish to put it that way, be the 'property' of the managers. And that will be quite enough to place them in the position of ruling class.")

moving in the direction of regimentation and that the *ideology* of servility is rapidly gaining ground. The process has, of course, been greatly accelerated by the war; this might, indeed, if we abstract from particular national aims and consider the whole society of predatory nations, be described as the "purpose" of the war. Naïve persons believe, because one side is opposed to freedom, that the other side must be in favour of it. But freedom consorts ill not merely with regimentation "in the national cause" but with the avowed aims of the "liberating" belligerents. Even if the *word* freedom is used, "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear" are simply the *sufficiency* and *security*, the desire for which marks the servile mentality. And it is this which gives appositeness to Belloc's analysis, even though, as we have seen, he takes these aims not to be servile in themselves but only to make for servility in their collision with existing economic trends. The decline of liberalism could not be more clearly marked than by the association of the name with the advocacy of regimentation, of the "protective" State.

The propagandist character of these formulae should not, of course, be lost sight of. They are partly retrospective and defensive—it has to be made out that the responsibility for war and insecurity rests upon certain particular nations and movements, the subjection of which can thus inaugurate an epoch of peace and security. In this aspect the "security" propaganda, like Wilsonism and the doctrine of "making the world safe for democracy" in the last war, implies no real intention of removing disabilities; its function is that of silencing, or of justifying to the public at large the steps taken to silence, demands for political independence at the present time. But that is not its only aspect. There is the real intention of permanently reducing political independence and extending the powers of the State, and this, as Belloc saw, has to be combined with promises of "benefits" in return for the surrender of rights. The expectation of such benefits is of course delusive; there is no system which can abolish

insecurity and guarantee sufficiency. But, by the time that is realised, it will not be possible to have back for the asking the rights that have been surrendered in the name of solidarity. Solidarist conceptions, of course, have always been widely accepted, but in ordinary times their influence is checked by independent movements. In time of war, however, the doctrine of "national service" gains enormous force, which can be turned to the establishing, for peace-time, of a corresponding doctrine of service of the community. Thus war, by undermining political independence, gives impetus to the movement in the direction of the "social service" (or servile) State.

It has been argued that, even if the provision of absolute security and sufficiency is impossible, it is still a reasonable policy to "get as much of them as we can". But here it has to be emphasised, first, that no reliance can be placed on the State or any other earthly Providence. As already indicated, the States in question all have their share of responsibility for the "insecurity" which it is proposed to remove; their mode of operation *includes* war and oppression. And those persons who expect "sufficiency" to be provided for them, will find themselves worse off in relying on what the State deems sufficient than in making their own organised efforts for the provision of the materials they require; they will soon find (as indeed they could see already if they wanted to) that State provision will be hedged about with all sorts of qualifications and restrictions, so that, except for those who will themselves embrace bureaucratic careers, their last state will be worse than their first. But the second and more vital point is that the pursuit of security and sufficiency is itself a low aim, that the maintenance of a high level of culture depends on the existence of a plurality of movements which take their chance in the social struggle, instead of having their place and their resources assigned to them from a supposedly all-embracing point of view. Croce, in "History as the Story of Liberty", has particularly emphasised the way in which liberty

(and, with it, culture) declines under conditions of fancied security and is reborn in adversity. On this view both liberty and servility are features of society at any stage, but at least the *ordering* of society is antipathetic to liberty.

The absurdity of the pretences of the advocates of a "planned society" should be noted here. It is assumed that the agents of centralised control are capable of fitting every form of social activity into a general scheme. Even in war-time, when many activities are willingly abandoned or curtailed, the anomalies and confusions of directed work are only too apparent. But this will be nothing to the chaotic condition of affairs if the fuller activities of peace-time are to be similarly directed. There is no one who is competent to make provision for all departments and aspects of social life. But if the decline in liberty, the progressive abandonment of the voluntary principle, has been such as to prevent the recrudescence of independent movements, if the desire for security has really taken possession of the mass of the people so that "planning" is inevitable, it can only take the form of the subordination of social life to certain narrow interests, interests, especially, of a commercial kind. That is the direction in which the propaganda of "public utility" and "service of the community" is working. And it is because the Labour movement is so thoroughly devoted to these interests (is, indeed, their standard-bearer) that it can be said, as a movement of "emancipation" or social regeneration, to have failed—in fact, to have made good Belloc's description of it (with special reference to its Socialist side) as working towards slavery.

Contemporary Labour propaganda (with few and unimportant exceptions) is imbued with the fallacy that what opposes Fascism must be supporting freedom—as if two tyrannies could not conflict. Hence it upholds solidarity, is in favour of the regimentation of strikers and the imprisonment of dissidents (or those suspected of dissidence), and is indifferent to free discussion. In taking this line it ignores

the fact that solidarity can only mean the maintenance of present privileges, and that a struggle "for freedom" can proceed only *from* freedom and not through enslavement. And planners in general miss or conceal the fact that planning can advance only *what can be planned for*—and that is not culture but commerce. The particular importance of discussion at the present time lies in the fact that there are different possible outcomes of the war (including a negotiated as against an oppressive peace), and the sinking of opposition "in the interests of all" means an artificial "unity" in which some special interest (and the outcome which it prefers) is favoured. That this will in any case be the commercial interest is hardly to be doubted; but planning will make assurance doubly sure.

These considerations are specially appropriate to the question of planning for education. The conclusion that this can only mean commercialising education is confirmed by observation of present facts, as well as by consideration of the propaganda of the planners. That people's education, for the time being, should be directed by reference to the assistance they can give in the prosecution of the war, will appear plausible to many, though it makes the assumption of identity of interest which has been criticised above—in other words, though it passes over the fact that the kind of society that will emerge from the war will depend in part on the kind of educational and other social activities that have been carried on while it lasted. In fact, it is perfectly clear that the same conceptions of utility and "service of the community" that inform the present regulations will, if our planners have their way, continue to dominate education in the future. Here, as in other planning, there is the pretence at exact measurement of capacity (a pretence which has the support of the tribe of "mental measurers"), there is the fitting of people into their appropriate pigeon-holes—a procedure which has the effect of killing the natural interest in learning and encouraging a narrowly professional careerism. These measures are taken

under such demagogic slogans as "equal opportunity for all", but such formulae betray the commercial mentality of their users. The real educational question is not of the provision of a career to individuals, of the supplying of education to them as a commodity, but of the maintenance of a tradition of learning, the continuance of the learned way of life—however few or many may participate in it. To attempt to postpone that task to the service of the State is to manifest a deplorably low level of culture.

It must indeed be allowed that, apart from any special planning, the level of culture, the social status of learning, has been falling; and this cultural decline can be closely correlated with the encroachments of "Science" on education. There is not, of course, any scientific field in which disinterested inquiry cannot be pursued; nevertheless, it is practical considerations (e.g., "the needs of industry") that have very largely determined the problems to which scientists have addressed themselves, and it is certainly on account of their practicality that scientific studies have gained ground in the schools. But this is the sort of practicality which takes "social unity" (i.e. established interests) for granted. There is in fact a direct opposition between the "practical" and the critical outlooks, and it is only the study of, and absorption in, ways of life (the study of "the humanities") that can promote criticism.⁷ The naïveté of scientists, trying to "get things done" and ignoring the whole range of the literature of social and political criticism, imagining, for example, that social conclusions (in the crude form of precepts) can be drawn from biological premises, is a sufficiently well-marked phenomenon of our times. It might well be argued that the contemporary scientist (whose affinity with the managerial stratum has been emphasised by Burnham) is the typical exponent of a servile ideology. Or, if this description could be applied more aptly to the psychologist, who has introduced a factitious "exactness" into the field of humane studies, at

⁷ In saying that this is necessary I do not, of course, say that it is sufficient.

least the propagation of "scientific methods" has gone hand in hand with the overlaying of freedom and culture by Philistinism.

Now the importance of all this for the lover of freedom is that, exemplifying the adverse conditions which can overtake culture, it enables him to see more precisely how regeneration comes about. One condition of this recovery is the sharpening of the issues which occurs when servility is gaining ground, the demonstration of the mischievous character of conceptions which had seemed harmless or even admirable—conceptions of "service" or of "the development of personality", the whole mass of philanthropic ideas. Their implications become clearer, and hitherto unawakened minds begin to see into what a morass they are being led, while more fully developed thinkers come to realise what opportunities of criticism they have missed, what are the vulnerable points on which they might have directed their fire. But this leads on to the second condition of recovery—the realisation by these thinkers of their own shortcomings, of their failure to develop the resources of their own fields of study. Thus the adverse conditions under which humane studies, and especially classical studies, may be expected to labour for a considerable time, may lead to their renewal in a more critical form—one in which they may shed their pedantry and appear at once as the true form of scientific thinking and as the vehicle of an intellectual *opposition*. In fact, the two outstanding features of any movement upholding a liberal culture will be intellectualism and opposition.

The intellectualist attitude is especially important in the field of social study, for it is there that the notion of objectivity, of the recognition by the inquirer of the ways of working of things themselves, is weakest. It is quite commonly assumed by teachers in the social sciences, not merely by the uninstructed public, that these are "practical" subjects, the very conception of which involves reference to some purpose (the realisation of "welfare", or whatever it may be), and that it is misleading—to the Marxist it is "reactionary"—to

treat them as mere matter of fact. We have noted, indeed, that even the inquiries of the physical scientist are dominated by "practical" considerations, that he treats things from the point of view of what can be done with them. Up to a point this does not affect the objectivity of his inquiries; but it implies a false division of things into users and used, the counterposing of a voluntaristic to a mechanistic realm, and, while in the end it leads to false conceptions of "nature", it confirms the attitude of those who, from a different starting-point, take a voluntaristic view of society. All this may help to explain why the scientist not merely fails to subject established interests to scrutiny but shows no conception of the difficulties of social study and is ready to make pronouncements in that field without having the preliminary training which he would consider essential in the field of his own special study.

The vital point here is that there are *no* "practical" subjects, that social study, like any other study, consists in finding out what is the case, how the things studied actually do work. Of course, people have policies, to which the things they study are relevant. But, while this is equally the case whether these things are human or non-human, while, again, the operation of policies is itself the subject of study, it is part of the findings of that study that what people are doing is very different from what they think they are doing, and that the attitude of "trying" is far from dominating human behaviour—and, in particular, that the activity of study itself is an independent force, having its own "laws" or ways of working, and not depending for its existence on being chosen, either "for its own sake" or for some ulterior purpose. In fact, any *attempted* subordination of study to other purposes is an attack on study itself; and the principal anti-theoretical attitude at the present time is meliorism, the setting up of "betterment" as the guide to social theory and practice.

The confusions inherent in this doctrine have already been partly indicated. The main point is that it represents

as a question of degree what can only be a question of kind. Any scheme of social improvement must be such as to advance certain *specific* tendencies and could be treated as "of benefit to all" only in terms of some quite indefinite conception of "benefit". Goodness does not admit of degrees; and if we raise the question of its extension over a wider field, the advancement, let us say, of inquiry as one particular good, it is obvious that there are interests to which this will be a hindrance. Not only so, but such advances can never be settled and secure. It is only in the struggle with evils that goods exist, and the attempt to eliminate evils, as Croce points out (op. cit., English translation, p. 62), could lead, at its most successful, only to a drab existence which would emphatically be evil. Liberty "has lived and always will live . . . a perilous and fighting life". It is the permanence of this struggle, with its ups and downs, that meliorism ignores.

The scientific student of society, then, will not be concerned with reform. What he will be concerned with is opposition—what he will be above all concerned to reject is "social unity". And he will reject it not merely as a description of present conditions but as a conception of a future society. The doctrine of history as struggle is at once the liberal and the scientific part of Marxism; the doctrine of Socialism as something to be established ("classless society") is its servile part. The point is not merely the drabness that might result from attempts to eliminate social struggles, but the impossibility of eliminating them—and, therewith, the loss of independence and vigour that can result from the spreading of the *belief* that they can be eliminated. The belief (in spite of evidence) in the present existence of a society without "classes", i.e. without distinction and opposition among ways of living, has, more than anything else, facilitated acceptance of the view that insecurity and oppression (brought under the single head of "Fascism") can be done away with. But this view is not merely unscientific, in that it treats such social phenomena as accidental, as having a source essentially alien to society,

as arising from the peculiar "wickedness" of a particular individual or group (and all the more unscientific in that there could be no possible safeguard against the repetition of such "accidents"); it is also indicative of a failure in responsibility, of a desire to be relieved of troublesome problems—in a word, of servility.

How far the process of social regimentation and cultural degeneration will go it is, I think, impossible to say. What can be said is that so long as there are rights of opposition (so long, e.g., as we are not subjected to a one-party system), culture will still have a front to fight on. And here independent institutions are of special importance—institutions, i.e., which are not merely nominally autonomous but have a *doctrine* of independence; Universities, trade unions, etc., which will resist being treated as servants of the State, or in which, at the worst, a resistant minority will remain. For the measure of freedom in any community is the extent of opposition to the ruling order, of criticism of the ruling ideas; and belief in established freedom, or in State-guaranteed "benefits", is a mark of the abandonment of liberty. The servile State is the unopposed State.

REVIEWS.

THE TRAINING OF TEACHERS IN AUSTRALIA: A COMPARATIVE AND CRITICAL SURVEY. By I. S. Turner. Published for the Australian Council for Educational Research by the Melbourne University Press. 1943. Pp. 482. Price 15s.

DR. TURNER'S book is in part a very detailed description of the methods of selecting and training teachers in operation in each of the Australian States. Nothing of importance connected with the subject appears to have escaped his survey. He deals with non-state as well as with state agencies. He describes the buildings, equipment and staffing of the different institutions; the types of students they contain; the courses prescribed in each State for the different categories of teachers; the methods of instruction and examination and the organisation of the practice schools; the systems of certification; the facilities available for the further education of teachers after they have begun their teaching service. These are the main topics covered in a thorough and illuminating survey.

To his treatment of each topic the author adds a brief account of the current practice in England and Wales, Scotland, and the U.S.A. In each chapter also, as well as in a final chapter of conclusions, he presents a critical estimate of the position in each of the States. I do not think that the critical part of the book is as satisfactory as the descriptive. The author does not attempt any extended discussion of the nature of modern education, and of the sort of training that the teacher ought to receive. He raises such questions as whether prospective teachers ought to have some instruction in the theory and practice of democracy; or whether it is essential for teachers to have made some study of sociology and contemporary social problems. Such questions, however, he does not pursue very far. His own views appear most

often in the form of plain assertions or assumptions. Again throughout the book the author takes a very poor view of the value of the courses now given by the Universities to prospective secondary school teachers. But what he has to say on the subject, as I want to show, is very brief and not at all illuminating. The value of the book would certainly have been much enhanced if the writer, even at the cost of some of his descriptive detail, had attempted a rather more serious discussion of some of the more general and fundamental theoretical questions. One appears to detect a tendency among professional educationists to fight shy of discussions of what Dr. Turner calls the "philosophy of education".

It appears from Dr. Turner's account that the situation in N.S.W. and S. Australia, at least, compares quite favourably in most respects with current practice overseas. Even in these two States, however, the two-year course is still the standard course of training for primary teachers; and one of Dr. Turner's contentions is that nothing less than a three-year course is sufficient to make possible an adequate academic training for teachers as well as a proper training in the professional subjects. An interesting feature of the South Australian set-up is that not only secondary teachers but the majority of primary teachers as well qualify in their academic subjects by attending degree courses in the University. One advantage of this procedure is that it enables two-year students who show ability in academic work to transfer to the four-year course. No doubt, it would also encourage primary teachers to complete the requirements for a university degree.

In Victoria, Western Australia and Queensland (and in Tasmania to a lesser degree) the position is much less satisfactory. Considering its population and economic development, Victoria especially comes out badly from this comparative survey; that unfortunate State, in education as well as in its politics, is the "dark South" of the Australian continent. In Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia the one-year course is the regular course of training for primary teachers. This means, as Dr. Turner points out, that the training of

teachers is conducted in a very narrowly professional manner. Moreover, in all states except N.S.W. and Queensland some form of pre-college training for teachers exists, though it has been abandoned in the other countries which the author considers. The Victorian form of the system is probably the worst. There, junior teachers spend on an average two and a half years, and may spend as many as five, teaching in the schools before they are accepted for their single year's training in the Teachers' College. Dr. Turner does not argue for or against this practice; he says that the arguments on both sides are familiar to educationists. But the comments he makes on the actual working of the system in the various States suggest that in practice junior teachers often acquire poor conceptions and methods of teaching which the college training has to try to eradicate. The author stresses the point that some of the main defects of the system of teacher training in this country (especially the survival of the one-year course) remain in spite of the efforts of educationists and because of the deliberate choice and the parsimony of governments. The situation in Victoria especially illustrates the seamy side of government control of education in general and of teacher training in particular.

Of course, the outstanding difference between the training of teachers in this country and in Great Britain is that here, apart from a few private agencies, the training of teachers is under direct government control. Dr. Turner devotes some space to considering the advantages and disadvantages of this arrangement. When governments are generous, they can do more than most private agencies in the provision of buildings, equipment and staff; in these matters, N.S.W. and South Australia have, on the whole, profited from government control. Government payments to students who are willing to take up the profession of teaching may also be counted an advantage. Obviously, a body of highly educated teachers could hardly be built up in Australia without the State's shouldering the cost. Dr. Turner makes the further point that government control has helped to avoid that large-scale unemployment of teachers

which has been a serious social problem on occasions in other countries.

The disadvantages, however, are considerable. The work of the Teachers' College is dependent upon a Minister of Education who may have little competence in educational matters and whose decisions would not always be determined by the interests of education. It has frequently happened in the past that the long-range or deliberate policies of the college authorities have been sacrificed to a sudden demand for economy by the government. But the most serious disadvantage that Dr. Turner mentions is that the staffs of the colleges, as public servants and bound by service regulations, do not possess the freedom that they should to criticise the government's policy in education or the administration of the state departments of education.

Unfortunately, Dr. Turner does not cite cases to show that college staffs have things to say which they are prevented from saying by the conditions of their employment. Some discussion of the relations between principals of colleges and ministers or departmental heads in the past would have been necessary to allow the reader to judge how serious in practice has been the disability to which he points. But, even apart from public service regulations, it is not difficult to conceive that staffs of colleges—especially the younger members—whose careers in the teaching service depend so much on the good will of departmental and public service chiefs might feel themselves handicapped in their work by a serious lack of independence. Nor would a government easily tolerate a college from which issued constant and radical criticism of departmental views and methods; or which produced a body of teachers with views on education strongly opposed to the conceptions predominant in the department. A state department of education will always be likely to insist that the training given to students in the college should be of the sort which suits its own departmental requirements.

However, this is a question on which Dr. Turner might easily have been more forthcoming. Having raised the general

question, he might have indicated whether, in his view, there has been any real limitation upon the freedom of college staffs; or whether governmental and departmental pressure has in fact hindered the development of the theory and practice of teacher training in this country. Whether or not it could be shown that direct government control of the colleges has been on the whole unfavourable to the development of teacher training, it is an obvious defect of education here that, in a country in which the State inevitably dominates the field, most of the highly qualified, professional students of educational theory are themselves employed by the state departments. As far as one can judge, the Teachers' Colleges play no noticeable part in the public discussion of the educational policies of the state departments. And some of the colleges, at least, seem to have been notably unsuccessful in producing a corps of teachers with original and independent ideas about the nature and organisation of education.

This matter also affects the Universities. In some of the States (Victoria is here the notable exception) the positions of principal of the state Teachers' College and Professor of Education in the University are combined. Moreover, the university lecturers in education are usually members of the Teachers' College staff. It can be argued that this arrangement is in the interests neither of the Universities nor of Australian education. Dr. Turner remarks that the administration of a large Teachers' College is itself a very heavy job; it leaves the professor no time to advance the independent study of education in the University. And one possible result of the system will be that the holder of the university chair will usually be a man whose interests are much more in educational administration and professional technique than in general educational theory (the "philosophy of education"). At least, the principal of a Teachers' College is bound to be a man whose mind is pre-occupied with the problems of education considered as a profession. It is doubtful whether this is the type of interest that ought to be expressed in a university chair of education.

But the chief point, which Dr. Turner also mentions, is that, because of the silence imposed on the professor by public service regulations, the university departments of education, which might have been one of the few centres from which public discussion of the State's administration could freely issue, cannot fulfil this function. If Universities wish to play any part in determining the practice of the schools (apart from the power they exercise by their fixing of matriculation requirements) one step they might take is to end this pluralism. As things are, the Universities appear to contribute nothing at all to the discussion of primary and secondary education; the appointment of full-time, independent professors of education might help to stir up some activity. And with a full-time professor, the University could attend to those departments of educational activity which it is now said to neglect, particularly to the field of adult education.

The State's control of teaching training in this country may also narrow the range of the educational experience which most teachers are able to receive. Most Australian teachers are educated at a state school; they are trained in a college in which the influence and atmosphere of the state department of education are bound to be strongly felt; they go out to teach in the same state schools. One obvious advantage in the South Australian system of allowing primary as well as secondary teachers to study their academic subjects in the University is that it gives students the opportunity to encounter a rather different intellectual atmosphere. Even apart from the special question under discussion, there is clearly much to be said for separating the academic and the professional training of teachers, and for allowing all students a year or two of study during which their minds will not be preoccupied with the problems of teaching and the business of the school-room. In the existing two-year college courses, in which the study of academic subjects is inevitably "professionalised" to a considerable degree, the student's free exploration of the subjects he is studying is bound to be interfered with by a preoccupation with the "needs" of children and

the methods and problems of teaching. As it is, having emerged from the discipline of the schools, students in the ordinary two-year college course are submitted to a highly organised and "professionalised" regime. The training of primary teachers in this country would be improved if, like prospective secondary teachers, they were allowed a year or two of freer, more spontaneous study.

A centralised state control of education and of the training of teachers is perhaps inevitable in this country. We could hardly imitate the sort of decentralisation or sharing of control that prevails in England. We do not possess local centres of social and cultural life of sufficient strength. But in his final chapter, Dr. Turner suggests several ways in which the State's control of teacher training could be made more indirect. It is not clear whether he thinks any of them "practical politics"; I cannot myself imagine governments agreeing to relax the control of the colleges they enjoy now. One suggestion upon which he puts some stress is that the work of training teachers should be transferred largely to the Universities; the existing Teachers' Colleges would become independent colleges affiliated with the Universities. But, he would support such a change himself only if "there were a considerable change of outlook on the part of the Universities toward the profession of teaching, to make it correspond with their attitude towards the preparation of students for the other professions" (p. 466).

Dr. Turner's treatment of the Universities, and of the education which they now give to prospective secondary school teachers, is the least satisfactory part of his book. On a question of such importance, and especially since his views are so sharply critical of existing practice, one could reasonably expect clearer explanation and fuller argument. One point that he makes is that the courses now given to prospective teachers in the faculties of Arts and Science take no account of the students' future profession, and he compares this situation unfavourably with the training given to doctors, lawyers and engineers. It is worth noting as a minor point

that, in advancing this view, he does not refer to the growing criticism of the professional faculties of the Universities. Some scientists seem at the present time to be just beginning to see the undesirability of subordinating the speculative or theoretical study of the sciences to the requirements of a profession. Some are beginning to maintain that specialised professional training is not properly the business of the University, and should be separated much more sharply from the foundational study of theory which Universities exist to advance. Knowing something of the unsatisfactory position in the professional faculties, one would require a much more serious argument before one could accept a proposal which amounts in effect to an attempt to professionalise the Faculty of Arts.

In any case, it does not settle anything to assert that the Universities ought to treat the profession of teaching as it treats other professions. The positions are not analogous; teaching is a peculiar case. The teacher does not *apply* the English or Latin that he learns in the way that the doctor applies his anatomy or physiology; he goes out to teach those subjects. On the other hand, if the Faculty of Medicine were organised primarily to produce not practitioners of medicine but teachers of medicine, then the position in that Faculty would no doubt be very different. The approach to the subjects taught in the faculty would be much more free and "academic" (an obscure word which Dr. Turner employs several times in a condemnatory sense without ever explaining it) than it is now.

Dr. Turner's conception of a university education suitable for teachers will be gathered from the following passages: "The criticism . . . is that the academic preparation of these teachers has been far too narrow, with the result that students on completing a university degree course know too little apart from the subjects they learnt at the Universities. This criticism is really directed against the Universities which, so many educators think, have not sufficiently taken into account the fact that so many of their students in the Faculties of Arts

and Science are prospective teachers. All critics would expect the students during their university studies to learn to understand and appreciate the meaning of real scholarship. Further, they would agree that this can best be done by requiring the students to pursue the advanced study of one subject (or one aspect of it) as far as possible towards the forefront of knowledge in that subject. . . . But the employers of students who have undergone courses of preparation for teaching in secondary schools have come to expect more than this. They expect the Universities to contribute not only to the students' deeper knowledge of one subject, but also to the broadening of their general education. This, they think, can probably best be done by the organisation of courses designed to teach the students (and especially prospective teachers) something of music, art, literature, philosophy, of science, economics, political science, sociology, health—in short, to teach them something of the world into which they will shortly go as teachers and (ideally) as leaders" (pp. 268, 269). I do not know whether Dr. Turner is suggesting that all students ought to be taught something of *all* the subjects he mentions; I cannot believe that this is his meaning. In any case, he emphasises the necessity for a number of "survey courses" which would be distinguished from the "severely academic manner of teaching" which is at present one of the main faults of the Universities.

This view is worth considering at some length because it is typical of a demand that is being pressed upon the Universities from many different directions at the present time. Briefly it is a demand for breadth and topicality as contrasted with the more specialised scholarship which Universities up to the present have taken as their ideal. I believe that the Universities would be wholly justified in resisting the growth of these "survey courses", at least as components of their degree courses; they are inconsistent with the kind of study which a University exists to maintain. (No doubt, university departments might do much more than they have done to provide broad courses for the general public or for students in

other departments and faculties.) It would not be argued that university courses need to be highly specialised and technical. But, at the same time, any university study must aim at avoiding the superficial and the second-hand. What ought to be distinctive of university teaching (as contrasted, perhaps, with some of the teaching in secondary schools) is the fact that it consists in training students in a particular method or craft which they are required to practise themselves throughout the course of their studies. The craft, of course, is simply scientific method or the method of scholarship; with most of the studies that are carried on in Arts, an important part of it is the ability to work critically from original documents and texts, to get behind the secondary source. This conception of university study implies (it is obvious that much university teaching already falls far short of it) that students are themselves active, are themselves acquiring the craft by working with original materials. If this is so, then Universities ought not to encourage the growth of a miscellaneous collection of "survey courses" which will usually consist of second- or third-hand generalisations and summaries; will assume a mainly passive or receptive attitude on the part of the student; and will for that reason tend to discourage the habit of scholarship. The proliferation of such courses could not but encourage among students the belief that being educated means being acquainted with the latest theories and being able to make play with the slogans fashionable at the moment in different subjects. This is precisely the habit of mind which a university education ought to aim at eradicating.

Dr. Turner is right to insist that the teacher especially requires a wide acquaintance with the different departments of knowledge. No doubt, he is also right in insisting that much university teaching at the present time does not put him in the way of gaining that wide acquaintance. But it is not obvious how the broadening of the curriculum by the provision of an array of survey courses would solve the problem. Suppose that a student is given a rapid account of some of the main

views held by philosophers, the problems that exercise the economist and political scientist, of some of the risky or pretentious generalisations of sociology, a little information about some of the natural sciences. Unless he has advanced sufficiently far in his study of each subject to arrive at certain views of his own, he is likely to find the whole thing simply confusing. A very good student might find such courses of some value in familiarising him with the outstanding literature in the subject and its general outlines; he would be more likely to be bored and irritated by their superficiality. And the weaker students would be mis-educated; they would be bound to accept such substitutes for learning and study as the genuine article.

Dr. Turner, I think, is asking the Universities to do what is impossible. "A broad understanding of a number of important fields of human endeavour" (p. 464) is something which, even under favourable circumstances, would take some years to acquire; it can hardly be conferred upon undergraduates. We ought to be able to assume that a teacher will retain his curiosity after he has finished with the University; then, if he has been well trained in the habit and craft of critical scholarship and has acquired a knowledge of certain fundamental subjects, he should be able to find his own way about in at least some of the main fields which Dr. Turner mentions. At all events, there is hardly any other way in which he could gain any real understanding in those fields. A quite non-scholarly introduction to them in his student days, full of uncriticised conceptions and assumptions, would be more likely to hinder and mislead him.

The problem to which Dr. Turner is here directing attention does not solely concern the training of teachers; it is the problem of a modern liberal education. The question is: What ought Universities to teach in order to produce graduates capable of taking an active, critical, coherent interest (as distinguished from the interest of those who are aroused by the latest "sensation" and are devoted to the newest intellectual fashion) in the main fields of contemporary

culture—politics, social thought, literature, art, philosophy and the rest? There are many who now argue that Faculties of Arts are not fulfilling the function of initiating students into the general cultural life of their own and earlier periods. No doubt, this is partly due to the increasingly detailed teaching in the individual subjects; the result being that the Universities, as Dr. Turner complains, are tending to produce graduates who know little about subjects even closely related to their own. And another criticism that might be made of much current teaching is that it doesn't advance; in particular, the approach that teachers take to their subjects is not sufficiently influenced by changes in the contemporary cultural environment. Such teaching does not appear to illuminate contemporary culture out of which, in the first instance, the interests of students arise. Professors do not like writing off any part of their intellectual capital. They do not like admitting that ideas which may have seemed important when they thought of them twenty years ago, or topics on which they then prepared lectures, are no longer particularly *à propos*. Historians know that history is constantly being rewritten, the past reinterpreted and the emphasis shifted, as events develop in the present and as prevailing interests change. University teachers do not usually see that other Arts subjects require the same continual revision if they are to retain vitality. I think that this is the large grain of truth in Dr. Turner's condemnation of existing Arts courses as "too academic".

There are many educationists like Dr. Turner who think that they can solve this problem by adding more and more to the existing curriculum, and by making it all thinner and thinner. This is an altogether too simple solution and not only because, as I have already argued, the sort of course they have in mind, since it makes an insufficient demand upon the student's own capacity for critical investigation and scholarship, is not really educational. Another important point, perhaps, is that it would not lessen the bad effects of the specialisation and "compartmentalisation" which are now

said to weaken an Arts education simply to require students to attend elementary courses in a large variety of different subjects. Such courses would themselves be more or less separate, unrelated packets of information. To expect students to spread themselves, very thinly, over a heterogeneous collection of subjects would hardly make it easier for them to take an active and clear-headed interest in the different facets of present-day culture, as distinct from the broad interest of the passive and somewhat gullible consumer.

Since the continuous advance of knowledge is bound to favour a growing specialisation, it is certainly not easy to see a solution to the problem. But I believe that Dr. Turner and similar exponents of broader, more numerous and less academic courses misstate the problem. It is not primarily (it is certainly not wholly) a matter of widening the student's curriculum, of bringing more subjects into his field of vision. In considering the nature of a modern general or liberal education, the serious problem is that of discovering, as far as possible, a way of *integrating* the main subjects that are now studied within a Faculty of Arts. If we are not content to produce students who take a relatively uncritical interest in a number of quite separate fields of study, our task is to provide a fundamental body of knowledge the applications of which can be traced within a number of special fields, and which can stand as a point around which more special studies, or the various aspects of culture, can be organised. It is only in this way that we could introduce any continuity and system into the wider studies which are regarded as necessary for a modern liberal education.

It might be possible to provide a more integrated, less compartmentalised general education if university teachers were to keep constantly before their minds the single object, the *subject*, which a Faculty of Arts exists to study. That subject, I should argue, is society. What is common to each of the subjects recognised as being peculiarly Arts subjects is the fact that they deal with materials which are social in character; and which are therefore affected by, and affect,

social factors of various kinds. In each of these subjects we are in large part concerned with the growth and the working of society. Something of this view, of course, is already contained in the conception of the "humanities". But that conception has other implications as well, and besides it is more readily applied to linguistic and literary studies than to such newer Arts subjects as psychology, sociology and anthropology. I should argue, then, that the connection between the different subjects could best be brought out if in the teaching of each of them emphasis were placed on the unity of subject matter.

To say that the "subject" of Arts is society would seem to imply, in the first place, that the education that is given in the Faculty ought to be predominantly an historical one. And we should take this partly in the quite literal sense to mean that an Arts education ought to be built around the study of history. In any education the object of which is to initiate students into the whole field of contemporary culture, history quite clearly occupies a peculiarly central position; partly because it is the study of the chief movements which have given its character to existing culture, and partly because it involves a general consideration of the main types of social factor—political, economic, legal, and so on—which affect "culture" in the narrower sense and of the ways in which they do so. But, in the second place, what is implied is not only that the subject of history ought to constitute an essential constituent in an Arts education, but also that the other subjects ought to be studied historically. As a matter of fact, philosophy usually is studied historically within the Universities; and any competent historian of philosophy is concerned to show the presence of important philosophical conceptions in the literature and in the political and social thought of the period, and equally to bring out the effects of social and political movements upon philosophy. There is no reason why the languages should not be taken up in the same way.

There would, for example, be no great difficulty in treating the study of literature as partly a way of approaching the history of a particular country or period, of getting at the leading social and political movements of the time and place. Thus, literary studies could be made to run parallel to the treatment of similar themes in historical studies (in the narrower sense), and could exemplify in greater detail movements or connections sketched by the teacher of history in a more general way. The main point is that a general interest and training in history (or, more broadly, in the interrelations of social and cultural movements) could quite easily be linked with literary interests; could give to the person who is predominantly interested in literature a way of entry into other social studies.

No one would want to argue that the study of history, or of the sociology of literature, ought to be *substituted* for the study of literature. We are considering the character of a modern liberal education, so far as a Faculty of Arts can provide such a thing. We are arguing that, in the study of such a subject as literature, whatever other aspects or questions it may be desirable to stress, its character as a social or historical study ought to be kept well in view. If this view is accepted, we should have to say that much of the linguistic and literary study that goes on in Universities is open to the strictures of the educationist. In the study of foreign languages there is the disproportionate amount of time that is devoted to achieving correctness of grammar and accent. In the study of English literature there appears to be an over-concentration on style and literary technique and on the tracing of purely literary influences, in addition to the discussion of purely æsthetic questions which no one would deny to be an important part of the study of literature. And, in contrast with this, there is the comparative neglect of the content of the work, especially its social content.

My argument, then, is that history is one subject that can hold together the different studies that are prosecuted in a Faculty of Arts. A man who has an interest and training

in history can occupy himself with other subjects or departments of culture not simply as a spectator or "general reader" but as an investigator. And I should argue that philosophy is the other subject which is quite essential and fundamental in an Arts education, and without which no liberal education is possible. Taking philosophy generally as "the criticism of categories", its central position follows from the fact that it is occupied with the examination of the main conceptions which are employed in the sciences, including, of course, the social sciences; in the æsthetic discussions which occur in literature and the other arts; and in political and social life not only in the present period but throughout the history of western Europe. The study of philosophy itself provides the most general introduction to the different branches of theory which Dr. Turner mentions, for it is devoted to the examination of the most important conceptions and assumptions which each of them employs. Certainly, it is the person who has received a philosophical training who is especially fitted to take that broad (and critical) interest in other branches of learning which Dr. Turner thinks to be desirable in the educated teacher.

What is essential, then, to any modern liberal education or to "a broad understanding of a number of important fields of human endeavour" is the combination of philosophical criticism and historical scholarship. When Dr. Turner refers to the desirability of teachers receiving some account of democratic theory and institutions, it could be pointed out that the student of history and philosophy will already have made a pretty thorough study of these things. It would be admitted, I think, that no one could pretend to an understanding of developments in the various physical sciences who was ignorant of mathematics; and I should argue that just as mathematics is a *sine qua non* in the investigation of physical things, so philosophy and history are a necessary part of the equipment of anyone who aims at a "broad understanding" of society and human culture.

In any case, if we are serious about this question of an all-round or liberal education and about the question which Dr. Turner raises of the liberally educated teacher, we have to deal with the sort of problem I have been discussing. It is not possible to produce a critical mind, or one with any real grasp of contemporary culture, by the policy of eclecticism which Dr. Turner and many other educators favour. What cannot legitimately be avoided in this sort of discussion is a thorough consideration of what subjects are central or essential and what comparatively secondary for the purposes we have in view. Dr. Turner speaks as if all the subjects he refers to are on the same level, and are all equally important and suitable for the ordinary student in the course of his university career to acquaint himself with. But this is not so. Sociology and political science, which he thinks it essential for students to know something of, are relatively learned and advanced sciences. They attempt to derive general hypotheses from a survey of the whole range of human history. The unscholarly and uncritical, no doubt, will often be satisfied and excited by a general account of some of the conclusions or hypotheses that sociologists and political scientists entertain. But it is only the student who has already made fair progress in history and philosophy who is in a position to undertake a critical and profitable study of such sciences, even if it is, at the same time, a fairly broad study. Without some such consideration of the foundations of a knowledge of culture and of society, no progress will be made in discussions of a liberal education for teachers or for anyone else. I should add that since the claims of philosophy and history as foundational studies seem to be falling into the background in the thinking and policies of many contemporary educationists, we are getting no nearer to the development of a modern liberal curriculum.

P. H. PARTRIDGE.

SEASONAL INFLUENCE ON GROWTH, FUNCTION AND INHERITANCE.

By A. B. Fitt. New Zealand Council for Educational Research. 1941. Pp. xi + 182. Price 10s. 6d.

IN the words of the publishers themselves Professor Fitt has, in this book, "assembled and analysed a mass of data bearing on the possibility of a connection between the course of the seasons and fluctuations in various human functions. He has presented a synthesis of the evidence and a tentative explanatory hypothesis." If the emphasis be placed on the words "possibility" and "tentative" this may be regarded as an adequate summary. The whole work is very tentative and the evidence somewhat weak and unconvincing though surprisingly consistent. The author has brought out this consistency with a considerable degree of skill and logical presentation.

The method of presentation is indicated by chapter headings and selected sub-heads. These are: Fluctuations in Physical Growth (Weight, Height); Fluctuations in Mental Growth and Function (Memory and Cancellation Tests; Retesting of Intelligence; Learning of General Science); Fluctuations in Other Functions (Muscular Capacity; Mortality and Disease Resistance; Suicide; Delinquency; Conception Frequency); Inheritance and Month of Conception (Weight; Height; Handgrip; Vitality; Intelligence; Personality Differences); Synthesis of Evidence; Biological Explanation; Conclusions and Implications.

Thus the method has been, first, to present the evidence, which as Fitt points out (p. 5) depends upon "the concurrence of various lines of evidence" rather than upon the "force of any single collection of data"; then to systematise and synthesise that evidence in preparation for a possible explanation.

The single strands of evidence derive partly from a very complete survey of previous studies in the field and partly from the author's own experimental work. Whatever their source these single strands are undoubtedly weak. Differences

are small though statistically valid; and rarely can one observe an uninterrupted trend. There is some uncertainty in the elements of the data whether they be physical or mental measurements or whether they be vital statistics. But beneath it all lies the stimulating fact, on which the author has built, that these rather wobbly statistics do seem, in general, to wobble in a consistent fashion through the various seasons of the year. However one cannot but feel that research carried over a number of years to reveal repeating waves of growth and function is still required. And, when among his threads of evidence Fitt includes statistics, relating to test scores, which suggest that month of conception influences the personality factors of introversion-extraversion and inferiority feelings, it becomes obvious that the experimental data lack sufficient control and analysis to be convincing. The attempt to explain this trend of "personality scores" by a third factor of "emotion" is not enough, but it is rather typical of the final hypothesis.

Having reviewed the evidence Fitt finds it sufficiently consistent to say that "all the data presented in this book conform to the general thesis that the human organism suffers relatively little stress in its growth and function during the autumn-winter and greater stress during the spring-summer" (p. 125). "The most typical index of minor stress (autumn-winter) is the high level phase in weight increase. . . . Mental work and many other forms of work are generally at their maximum for the year. . . . Vitality, as indicated by mortality and sickness, is also at its maximum. Crime and delinquency are relatively low in frequency as are suicide and insanity. . . . It is also the period of relatively low conception rate. The level of inherited differences for factors such as height, weight, handgrip and general intelligence, is at its highest for children conceived in this portion of the year" (p. 160).

"The tendency in all forms of work is rather the reverse for the spring-summer half of the year. . . . The maximum for the year occurs with muscular capacity, crime and

delinquency, morbidity, mortality, reproduction, suicide and insanity. . . . The trend is not uniform for the whole period, for in almost all respects there is a short return in a direction suggesting less stress toward the close of spring or in early summer. Again the stress is more marked in spring than in summer" (p. 160-1).

The biological explanation which Fitt offers is in terms of endocrine activity—particularly pituitary activity. He is much impressed by the analogy which may be drawn between his period of minor stress and the hibernation of animals. He devotes a lot of space to previous studies which indicate that hibernation is associated with endocrine activity; but he then adduces no evidence to show that just that endocrine activity has the effects, in human beings, which he has observed in physical and mental growth and function. And finally he is quite unable to say why and how seasonal changes should and do affect endocrine activity. His "explanation" thus involves the introduction of a middle factor, itself unexplained, and an analogy with the hibernating activity of animals.

The book is interesting and stimulating but hardly impressive. There can be little doubt that Professor Fitt has devoted much time and labour to this study and that he has indicated the present experimental position very well. At least there is evidence that here is a fruitful field for further exploration; with, as Fitt indicates, far reaching implications for Education, Psychometrics, and even for Mental Hygiene.

C. A. GIBB.

A CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY OF THE LIVING ORGANISM. By W. E. Agar, F.R.S. Melbourne University Press, in association with Oxford University Press. 1943. Pp. 207. Price 12s. 6d.

Professor Agar's main thesis is such that though he presents a considerable amount of detailed biological material, the philosopher and the psychologist will also find certain familiar questions raised in the book. Further it is possible

for the non-biologist to follow this material well enough to see its significance for the thesis, which is "that all living organisms are subjects; that all but the simplest organisms (and possibly even these also) are organisations or nexus of subjects; that the characteristic activity of a subject is the act of perception; and that perception is the establishment by the subject of its causal relation with its external world" (p. 7).

It might be said then that the sphere of psychology would be extended by Agar beyond any limits generally recognised; thus smaller living organisms within an animal such as cells would have at least a "mental pole", and the process of embryonic development would be "a long train of instinctive action—or rather of many trains of instinctive actions by relatively independent agents . . ." (p. 135—should the second "of" in the passage quoted be there?). More familiar issues connected with the question of the proper extent of "psychological explanations" are taken up in a chapter in which the constitution of animals by sub-agents is not emphasised; this deals with such topics as The Tropism Theory of Behaviour, Learning, Conditioned Reflexes, etc. And elsewhere Agar discusses the physiological questions connected with psychology, adopting the Gestalt description of the brain processes which are the concomitants of sensory perception, and presenting experimental work concerning cortical localisation and the relation between the brain and its receptor and effector agents.

This and other experimental work presented is of interest also to the philosopher, who sees positions to which he would object on logical grounds being shown up in detail (e.g. the notion of a tidy correlation between function and organ and the "telephone exchange" view of the brain), and gets a real sense of the complexity and flux of an organism. But it is disappointing to find that only one philosopher, Whitehead, is seriously considered. Agar seems to have turned to philosophy in search of a system that will give him philosophical backing;

this leads to his making explicit certain of the philosophical implications of his position, but also to his not taking up the philosophical issues in any detail. Thus his discussion of causality takes no account of the sort of criticism that would be directed against making efficient causation "derivative from final causation" and this view itself is not very clearly expounded.

Agar links final causation with perception because of the anticipatory aspect of the latter, and says that "Anticipation implies the potentiality of directing action in accordance with that anticipation; otherwise it would have no function" (p. 20). In speaking of potentiality here, Agar no doubt wants to emphasise that it is never impossible for us to direct our action in this way, that efficient causation never completely determines the action of an anticipating being, but in leaving the matter at potentiality he means, I think, that such direction *need* not follow anticipation. If that is so, then the position would be that upon anticipating, we are free not to act teleologically, i.e. we should have freedom coming in as something additional to both final and efficient causality. In any case I should argue that Agar would have to take this view because he has set up two types of causality and the passage from one to the other must be arbitrary. If final causation supervenes upon efficient causation at some point, it is an intelligible question why this takes place (especially when it is suggested that in some cases an event is all but completely determined by efficient causation), but no answer could be given to this in terms of either efficient or final causation. But if the anticipating subject has to *choose* to act teleologically—when it does so—, if the "representation" of the anticipated object in it is not sufficient for such action, then this so-called final cause is in the same position as the efficient cause is on Agar's theory, namely incapable of completely determining an event, and even combining the two kinds of causality gives no complete explanation. And of course if we have anticipation not followed by teleological action, the situation which actually follows is also without

an explanation; it isn't required by the efficient cause and there is no final cause operating.

When Agar comes to deal with causation in more detail in Chapter III, he is constantly raising the question of the temporal relation between cause and effect, but he does not give a consistent account of the matter in connection with efficient causation, nor does he succeed in distinguishing final causation from determination of an effect by antecedent circumstances, i.e. from efficient causation. But first it is worth noting that after denying that either a future or a past event can determine a present one, he goes on to say: "If B is a causal link between A and C, both non-existent during the duration of B, then both A and C must be 'represented' in event B. They must both be in some sense present in B. In the most developed types of mental processes, we speak of . . . the representation of C in B as the idea, anticipation, or purposing of C" (p. 63). It is surely time that "representation" ceased to be used as a way of having things both present and absent, but the quotation is of interest in relation to final causation. It suggests, as far as anticipation is concerned, that even if the object anticipated is not being presented as the final cause of anything, it nevertheless cannot be left out of account if an anticipation is taken to cause teleologically. Thus I should contend that if an object of anticipation does not require some particular mode of action on our part for its occurrence, it is quite implausible to speak of our anticipation of it as *finally* causing whatever behaviour follows upon this anticipating, and many objects of anticipation do not require such action. In such cases the position is sometimes (but not always) that this anticipating leads us (unteleologically) to anticipate a further object which does require special action from us for its occurrence; this is the situation covered by Agar's phrase "directing action *in accordance with*" an object of anticipation, but it should be noted that such action could be taken to be teleologically caused only by the second anticipation. The result of this sort of consideration would be that one could not plausibly

take anticipation to involve always even the potentiality of final action, if indeed there is any such thing.

As to efficient causation we have noted Agar's denial that a past event can be a cause of present events, and his suggestion that the cause of an event is "in some sense present" in it. Yet he more than once speaks in terms of the determination of events by preceding events, as, in the following: "Antecedent actual occasions are thus efficient causes of the character of subsequent actual occasions. But the relation is something more than that of cause and effect. The cause persists in the effect" (p. 72). Agar thus shilly-shallies between the view that an efficient cause is an event anterior to its effect and the view that it is something in the effect itself, using representation to obliterate the difference. Of these two views, determination by *past* events is perhaps the more prominent, and is the one Agar would need to take, since he holds causation within the event itself to be *final* causation. Also the other view is certainly inconsistent with Agar's notion that "physical causation is to be found at the junction or interlocking of events" (p. 63; cf. p. 73). This is, I think, equally inconsistent with the view that a preceding event is the efficient cause of a subsequent one, but one can see how these two views could come to be held together. There is a problem of continuity and discontinuity in connection with an event's causing a later event, though it is no solution to say that an event A causes a later event B at the "junction" of these two events, i.e. when A is no longer in existence.

It would clearly be an advantage for a theory of two types of causality, if some temporal distinction could be made between final and efficient causation, and Agar adopts an atomic theory in an attempt to make such a distinction. The force of this atomic theory seems to be that there are events which have to be taken as temporal units, though they are divisible in a sense. Thus Agar says: "A light wave from the red end of the spectrum has a space-time extension about double that of a wave from the violet end. It is, however, meaningless to divide the period of a red light wave into two

portions, each with the space-time extension of a violet wave. Although it is legitimate to distinguish between an earlier and later part of the period of the wave, the whole period is indivisibly involved in the nature of the wave. 'The wave is a periodic process with a characteristic space-time extension' (p. 61). We are not told why it is meaningless to divide this event into two portions, even though we can distinguish them, but I suppose the theory is connected with the fact that in the case of some processes at least, no one of the parts into which we could divide it would be of the same sort as the process as a whole—to follow Heraclitus's fragment, no part of an act of stepping is itself an act of stepping. However such a fact does not require an atomic theory, a theory which is reduced to the ridiculous when Agar goes on to speak of a "succession of many more elementary events" entering into the constitution of an atomic event. The value of the atomic theory for Agar seems to be that it allows him to speak of a cause of an event as not preceding, but being within that event. We are to think of the efficient cause determining an event to some extent (which we can only interpret as bringing about so much of the event), then the teleological factor enters in the form of "subjective aim" and the event "completes itself" as a result of its aiming at doing so. Actually what the teleological cause brings about would still be something later than itself, namely the remainder of the event, but if it is contended that the event has to be taken as a whole, we couldn't speak in that way. The teleological cause would have to cause the event as a whole, and so incidentally would the efficient cause—presumably each would partly determine the event, without this being translatable into each determining *part* of the event, but in that case to talk of the function of the subjective aim as "self-completion of the present event" would also be nonsensical. In presenting the theory Agar has to make temporal distinctions in the event and once these are allowed, we see that the "final cause" brings about something subsequent to itself, just as does the efficient cause.

Without embarking on a general criticism of a theory of teleological causation, it may be pointed out that to hold that there is only efficient causality is not necessarily to hold "purely physical theories of the behaviour of living organisms, including man", so that the rejection of such theories would not justify a teleological view of living things, as Agar holds (p. 73). Thus it is quite possible to allow that only beings which anticipate etc. behave in a certain way, without holding that this behaviour is caused in some special fashion. I should agree with what I take to be one of the main positions of the book, namely that there are certain types of events that cannot be explained without the recognition of mentality, but while that would involve one in saying that certain events are caused only in a distinctive sort of thing or only by a distinctive sort of thing, it would not require the setting up of a distinctive mode of causality for these events.

Leaving the question of teleological causation, I think Agar is too ready to find behaviour indicative of mentality, to dub it "trial behaviour" for example. He is constantly bringing up the fact that the same sort of situation results from different procedures on the part of some living thing, but such variation in the way something comes about would surely be admitted in the case of non-mental things, and would be required in all spheres if one takes seriously a philosophy of flux. Of course Agar himself expresses the situation rather differently and indeed in language that at least already *suggests* that the situation is one of purposiveness as when he says: "Many attempts have been made to eliminate the concept of purpose from the explanation of the fact that different routes may be followed to achieve the same end-result" (p. 23). This tendency appears in other places in the use of such words as "goal", "needs", "advantageous".

A natural reaction to Agar's conclusions as to the extent of mentality is to dismiss them as obviously false, but the question would be whether his procedure isn't a consistent following out of methods commonly used in attributing mentality to members of a more circumscribed field. It may

have a value in that way, as a sort of *reductio ad absurdum*, but since the question is of such importance for Agar's thesis, the question of the grounds on which we are justified in inferring mentality should have been thoroughly discussed; without this the detailed material which Agar brings forward, for example in the chapter on Embryonic Development, while it is interesting is not persuasive. And a certain amount of work has been done by philosophers on this problem though its value is lessened by the persistence of relational views of mentality. As far as Whitehead is concerned, Agar could not be said to be especially influenced by him on this problem, though Whitehead provides a philosophy which fits in with Agar's conclusions here.

In general I think Whitehead is a bad choice amongst philosophers. His terminology—prehension, concrescence, actual occasion and the like—at least hides the issues from a reader, if it does not sometimes cloak a lack of content. Brief expositions of his theories, when largely in his own terminology, seem very little use. Agar expresses diffidence about his exposition of Whitehead, but if it is, as he says, impossible to describe the course of the atom of process which is an actual occasion in a way that will carry conviction without going to lengths which would take him far beyond the scope of the book (p. 70), that exposition should surely not be attempted. And much of the Whiteheadian material, found especially in Chapter III, could be dropped from the book without affecting Agar's argument for his thesis. As it is, apart from its own unintelligibility or confusedness, it interrupts the course of the argument.

In his final chapter on Evolution Agar does not adopt any special interpretation because of his thesis, but accepts the Darwinian categories of random variations, natural selection and inheritance, with some elaboration in connection with the last. As some theorists whose views are similar to his have taken up a "Lamarckian" position, he devotes some attention to this, arguing that Lamarckian inheritance or the inheritance of acquired characters is not particularly useful

with respect to evolution, even if it is a fact. This last discussion does not seem very forceful to me, but in presenting the Darwinian position, Agar makes briefly certain important points. Thus he points out that by "random" or "chance" variation, Darwin did not mean uncaused variations, and he suggests an important sense in which "random" might be taken, namely as not related to the needs of the organism; variations might be useful to the organism or equally might be harmful. However he takes the use of the word "random" not to convey that there are no limits to variation. I should think that in calling variations random it would be conveyed that it is impossible to lay down some limited number of directions for variations, though one might allow that certain variations are impossible. In Darwin himself there are even, I think, passages suggesting that he would not allow the latter point. Again Agar stresses what had already been made clear by Darwin but needs reiteration, namely that there is no question of a separate evolution of each character of a thing; characters go together and the survival of a characteristic A useful to an organism may mean the survival of one B which is not useful to it.

Another point of interest in this chapter is the connecting of the variations with which Darwin was mainly concerned, namely variations in adult organisms, with variations in genes. A consideration of the earlier stages of an organism seems to me essential for a clear presentation of what is meant by a Darwinian variation. The problem is to get a clear distinction between it and an acquired characteristic, for clearly a variation which appears in adult life is in some sense an acquired character, and also it cannot be entirely divorced from the action of the environment on the organism. Perhaps the distinction could be made this way: an "acquired characteristic" requires a special sort of environment without which the organism would nevertheless survive, while for a variation it would only be necessary that the environment should not prevent the survival of the organism—the nature of the zygote or fertilised egg would be such that

if the organism survived to a certain period, that character would appear. For some Lamarckian positions, an "acquired characteristic" would further require some special relations between organism and environment (a character must appear as the result of *striving* before it could be called an acquired characteristic), but the term has a wider significance and in any case we could still mark off an adult variation in the way suggested above. Agar does not himself express the matter in this way, speaking of acquired as against innate "*differences*", but the suggestion is not, I think, opposed to anything he says. The result of the above would be that later variations depend upon earlier ones, and to judge from Agar's chapter the Darwinian category of natural selection has been to some extent transferred to these earlier variations, or at least to variations occurring during the process of morphogenesis. But Agar notes that the survival value of an earlier variation might be indirect, what has survival value directly being the adult variation dependent upon it, though in other cases natural selection would operate upon the early variations directly. In all this we have an extension of Darwin's work, though I think nothing disagreeing with it.

Finally I may mention some points in earlier chapters that need clarification or correction. I cannot follow Agar's notion of a Central Agent of an organism which is the organism as a whole; he seems to proceed from the view that within an organism there is some smaller organism concerned with the behaviour of the (larger) organism as a whole, to the view that this *is* the organism as a whole, and the notion that a whole "acts as a causal unit on its own parts" is perhaps connected with this confusion. Secondly Agar runs on in the one paragraph from a presentation of a paper by Whiteley to views not found in that paper without any indication of the change. Also he misrepresents Whiteley, who is putting forward a particular view of the type which he calls "causal" theories of perception. In this connection he mentions an objection often brought against such theories, but he does not suggest, as one would gather from Agar, that

this objection was misdirected, but only that the causal theory *can* be formulated so as to escape it. Also Agar does not adequately present the objection as can be seen by comparing Whiteley: "For if, as is usually said, we can originally and directly observe only sense-data, and reach our beliefs about physical objects by way of inference, then the physical object is a kind of object which is unobservable by us, and the relation between the physical object and the sense-datum 'caused' by it is likewise an unobservable relation" with Agar: ". . . since we can only know these physical objects by the *sensa* they cause in us, the assumption of a physical object as the cause of the *sensum* adds nothing to our knowledge" (p. 14). Again his comment on a position of the Gestalt psychologists that ". . . there is surely a logical fallacy in the argument. For the idea of physical fields and the necessities of their dynamical processes is itself the result of logical thinking, and therefore cannot be invoked to explain how that logical thinking arrived at a correct solution" (p. 50) is a poor one; what does it matter if the "idea" (knowing, as I should say) of physical fields etc. is the result of logical thinking, if these situations themselves are not? Lastly Agar has some curious remarks about Pavlov, where he seems first to misinterpret one of his statements, and then on the basis of this misinterpretation to proceed to an argument involving the inferring of an A from an I proposition. Pavlov speaks of a "What-is-it?" reflex as the *parent* of scientific method, and Agar seems to take this as the same as saying that this method *is* a reflex. Then all that I can make of his argument is that as some reflexes are accompanied by knowledge on Pavlov's own showing therefore the reflexes in the case of the dog must be accompanied by knowledge. Here we either have a syllogism with undistributed middle, or an argument from an I to an A proposition, followed by a valid syllogism.

I have noticed a few minor misprints: "or" for "on" (footnote 3, p. 153), "morphogentic" (p. 160), "potentialities" (p. 188), "speical" (footnote to p. 189).

ALICE R. WALKER.

UNIVERSITIES IN AUSTRALIA (THE FUTURE OF EDUCATION, No. 5).

By Eric Ashby. Australian Council for Educational Research, Melbourne, 1944. Pp. 34. Price: 6d.

THE first pamphlet in this series was reviewed in the last issue of the Journal. Subsequent numbers have not been sent to us by the publishers; we have received the pamphlet under review from the author, Professor Eric Ashby of Sydney University.

In the earlier review I drew attention to the character of advocacy which seemed likely to attach to the series, to the conception of "research" as seeking to discover what is to be done instead of what is actually happening, and to the insufficient emphasis placed on the *controversial* character of the issues. My view is borne out by the general description here given by the publishers to their "Future of Education" series. "The Australian Council for Educational Research is publishing, under the above general title, a series of pamphlets aiming to show (*sic*) the need for, and to provide a plan for the reconstruction of education in Australia." It is implied that the persons invited, as experts in some special region of educational theory and practice, to contribute to the discussion of current problems, will all agree not merely on the need for "reconstruction" but on its precise nature. We are perhaps to suppose that so much research has already been done, and such a body of basic principles established, that all that now remains to be considered is *application*.

But actual experience of the work of educationists, even without consideration of the very slight qualifications as "researchers" in education of most of the contributors to this series, will very quickly show that this is not the case, that advocacy has characterised the movement from the start—in fact, that it is a *political* movement, and that the agreement in question arises not from research but from a common devotion to social uplift (involving, I should argue, a muddling of social categories, and catering above all for careerists). If the Council's aim is really to inquire into "all phases of education and allied problems", it should give as

much encouragement to *criticisms* of reconstruction (of the whole idea, as well as of particular schemes) as it does to "practical" proposals for bringing it about. But especially it should consider "problems" as *theoretical*, as questions of how actual events are to be accounted for. Once such explanations have been given, they may be utilised by advocates of quite different policies; it is quite wrong to assume that a specific line of action will follow from the facts, to imagine (for that is what it comes to) that there is only one "end" which people can take the educational process to subserve. In fact, research could be quite usefully directed to a critical examination of educationists' notions of "ends" and of the relation between theory and practice.

These points are illustrated in the pamphlet under review. It is marked by improvisation, by a facile treatment of questions on which much solid thinking could be (and has been) done, and by the familiar conjunction of description with projects of "reform". At the very beginning Ashby disarmingly explains that he is addressing not his colleagues but the public—characteristically conceived as individuals with special avocations and wants, and not as participants in the movements and associations of cultural life. But actually the main points raised are of such a technical character that the ordinary member of the public could make little or nothing of them. What might appeal to him are the witticisms and catchwords and commonplaces with which the pamphlet is besprinkled and of which the following are examples.—"Given a good teacher sitting on one end of a log and an eager student sitting on the other end, the central problem of education is solved: you have the germ of a university." "Plato's *Republic* was written for his own satisfaction, not as a Royal Commission report." "Academic snobbishness is, of course, not unknown (many desirable reforms will be made only over the graves of some professors!)." "The kingdom of the mind has its *Munichs*, too." "Faculties of Arts . . . must send into modern society graduates who appreciate values, not only in the context of the Parthenon and Pericles, but also in the

context of greyhound racing and soap box oratory." "The good teacher prepares his class for ten or twenty years hence, when they will have forgotten all he is teaching them, except one or two guiding principles." And then the answer to the "practical man" who wants to know what use a graduate would be to him in the meat trade—"I can only repeat that universities traffic in quality of mind, not merely in technical information: he knows as well as I that in the end quality of mind prevails over all else, even in the meat trade". (A new meaning for "quality butcher".) I shall not disfigure this review by quoting the verses (by Mary Coleridge) which Ashby, in conclusion, takes as expressing "the contrast between the impermanence of things made by Man, and the permanence of Man's thought, *formed out of dreams*" (my italics); it should at least be clear what I mean when I speak of improvisation and the absence of hard thinking.

The affinity of Ashby's outlook with that of the A.C.E.R. is seen in the way he sets about his discussion. "In this essay I shall deal with the problems which Australian universities face to-day. They are problems which should be tackled now: for the future of this country depends on men and women; and men and women are slow to develop. If we want to produce sound citizens in ten years', in twenty years' time, we must begin now" (p. 6). There is no stopping to explain who "we" are or what is meant by "sound citizens" or why, out of a vacuum or in the midst of unsoundness, we must (or how we can) suddenly begin to produce them. It is obvious that there are unstated assumptions behind this fancied urgency, and what they are becomes more and more clear as the argument proceeds. For while Ashby endeavours to give an internal characterisation of Universities (a view of their "essentials"), he constantly comes back to the question of the "needs of society". "Provided a university is not disloyal to its tradition and does not lose sight of its purpose, it can, and should, shape itself to the society around it" (p. 12). "Universities are instruments of Society" (p. 30); and, below, with reference to the contention that Australian Universities are

out of touch with the Australian community—"The gravest [!] symptom of this is the gulf between the universities and the administrative arm of the Public Service." Accordingly (pp. 32, 3), it is "the universities' duty to work out what sort of education a public service in an age of technology needs. The State is now a gigantic enterprise of engineering, chemistry, agriculture, economics. . . . It has been suggested in many quarters that as Capitalism crumbles, so the administrators will inherit the earth. If they are to inherit the earth, it is the universities' business to see that they understand their inheritance."

Serving State enterprise—and finally being absorbed in it: that is the prospect which these considerations open up. It is because they adhere, consciously or unconsciously, to that tendency that the "researchers" exhibit such remarkable unanimity; it is that "imperative" which determines their assumptions and prevents them from seeing any force in criticisms of their "practicality". Ashby, of course, would like to make out that Universities can keep their independent character while serving the State. But he gives no indication of having considered the difficulties of that view; and, if he were going into the question seriously, he would have to explain why the Universities should not be found *opposing* the State or trying to *prevent* the administrators from "inheriting the earth". The fact is that he assumes the "unity" or reconcilability of all interests; and this means that, whatever he may say about the University's own character, his practical criterion, indefinite though it may be, is the "needs" of society.

His account of that character illustrates once more the fact that solidarism (the doctrine of social unity) goes with individualism, the two being opposed to the pluralistic view of society as embracing many movements, which cannot be brought to any common denominator and among which antagonism is found—the State then being conceived as the adjustment which has temporarily been set up amongst them (or as the mechanism of adjustment), and not as the totality

or system of social activities. The two essentials of a University, Ashby thinks, are that it is "built of men" and that its aim is "intellectual health". Now it is obvious that there can be no Universities without persons; but it is not at all obvious that "the spirit of a university depends on the men and women who assemble there" (p. 8). As against this individualistic assumption it must be urged that institutions are prior to individuals, that they *form* individuals, determine the nature of their achievement and the heights they can rise to. It is false that the character of an enterprise is determined by the entry into it of men of a certain "quality"; their quality is not independent of their work and their traditions. If the source of these traditions is a foreign one (as in the early stages of Australian University education), there must be some local tradition of a cognate character to enable the enterprise to get going at all. It is the quality it develops, when it does get going, which will determine whether "first rate" men will be willing and able to work in it—and the question of "cost" will be a secondary one. In fact, the academic quality is largely developed in the struggle against utilitarian tendencies.

Turning now to the second element, "intellectual health" (a vile phrase, reminiscent of Medley's "mental fitness"), we find that similar points can be raised in connection with it. Ashby refers here (p. 11) to Cardinal Newman, who "confessed that he could not find a word which expresses for the mind what health is to the body and virtue is to the soul. 'Knowledge' does not express the idea, for knowledge is not a 'state or habit of the intellect'. 'Wisdom' is not the right word, for wisdom relates not only to the intellect, but to conduct and morality. It is this elusive quality of 'intellectual health', for which our language has no word, which comes within the scope of a university; this and this alone." It is unnecessary to comment on this tawdry stuff in detail; it need only be said that our language has several appropriate words—one is *thinking*, another is *criticism*. But whereas "intellectual health" clearly refers to some special quality of the individual,

"critical thinking" describes as much the quality of a school, the character of a tradition, as the activity of an individual. We can talk of a history of thought, a history of criticism; but a "history of intellectual health"—that is plainly balderdash. Now if we say that a University is concerned to bring about *critical thinking* in its students (more exactly, that the academic life is a life of critical thinking), it is by no means apparent that it can "shape itself" to the society around it without being false to its tradition; its essential attitude to society will be that of criticism. Moreover, critical thinking is clearly a moral activity, so that the antithesis of the cultivation of the intellect and the development of moral character is a false one.

Now no one will doubt that critical thinking can be exercised on all subjects; but there may still be certain special studies in which it is nourished. Ashby, then, quite properly raises at this point the question of curriculum, or of what *are* university subjects, but he handles it in a very indecisive way. "Universities", he says (p. 13), "are being pressed all the time to divert more and more of their resources to professional training, to satisfy the desires of modern society. But universities are concerned first of all with the *needs* of society, which are not the same as its desires." It looks as if Universities had more than one "first" concern; and the point is scarcely cleared up by what is said a little later—"I have described how universities began as professional schools and later discovered that their peculiar contribution to society was the culture of the intellect. They continued to train for the professions, but their real training was for adventure in the world of ideas." Here "contribution to society" is simply dragged in, and the utilitarian bias is reinforced by the conception of the University's primary function as training and not as the intellectual activity of its *permanent* members. I have not thought it worth while to examine in detail the sketchy account of the history of Universities referred to in the last quotation, but it is pertinent here to remark that it completely ignores the Academy and all that followed from it.

Going on, then, to make this criterion more precise by reference to Whitehead's contention that "the spirit of generalisation should dominate a university", Ashby distinguishes between subjects which lead to generalisation ("breed ideas in the mind") and those which do not, but borrow their principles from older studies. The latter are not university subjects, training in any of them "is a technique, not an exercise for maintaining intellectual health", and while such training may quite properly be demanded, it is another matter altogether to demand it from Universities. Of course, the University "has no antagonism to any kind of learning, technical or otherwise. *But its resources are very limited* (tenpence per head of population per annum in Australia): *accordingly it has to adopt a policy of expediency*. This policy demands that a great many subjects should be excluded from the university curriculum; the criterion I suggest will determine which these subjects should be" (p. 15; my italics). What a declension! What a *failure* to maintain a criterion! But it illustrates that element in Ashby's propaganda which makes it dangerous in a time of confused thinking, and that is its character of compromise, its having something for everybody. This "advancing in all directions" is further illustrated in the succeeding paragraph (pp. 15, 16), which I think worth quoting in full.

"I want to make this criterion quite clear, because there is a good deal of misunderstanding about it. Universities are accused of holding tightly to useless subjects and of hankering after the curriculum of their medieval ancestors. They are accused of neglecting useful subjects simply because they are useful. Now the criterion of a university subject has nothing to do with use or lack of use; it has only to do with intellectual content. When a new subject appears before the university for admission, the questions asked are: Does the subject breed ideas? Can research be done in the subject? Is it merely derived from other subjects? Never: Is the subject useful? There are still a few professors so bemused with medieval culture that they would like to drive out agriculture,

commerce and the rest from the university, in favour of the trivium: grammar, rhetoric and logic. They are like the affected aesthetes of the last century who longed for the maypole and yule logs of Merrie England, and forgot the dirt and the stinks. When I assert that the university stands for the world of ideas and that its mission is to fight 'triviality, vocationalism and mediocrity', I do not advocate a retreat to the classics and philosophy, important as these are. In twentieth century Australia our prime need is to understand the twentieth century A.D., not the third century B.C. If it is properly taught, as much 'culture' can be put into a course on political science as into a course on Greek drama. Both subjects have a rich intellectual content. Both subjects involve the humanities. Both subjects are a training for intellectual health."

By means of the term "need" Ashby manages to play fast and loose with the criterion of utility—but it is his real criterion, as is further indicated when he goes on to say that, while "the faculties of 'liberal' studies have lost sight of the needs of society", the professional faculties have not realised that the *best practical training* is the most theoretical one. If it had been said that the liberal faculties had fallen short in the *criticism* of society, that would have been a sound criticism of them, and one which could readily be linked with rejection of the doctrine of social unity implicit in such phrases as "the needs of society". For the recognition of academic independence goes with the recognition of independent social movements in general—of conflicting social interests, including interests opposed to learning as such. But Ashby's argument also glosses over corresponding conflicts within Universities themselves. Increasingly influential groups do take the "usefulness" of subjects and courses as a sufficient reason for their adoption for existing or new degrees, and it is *their* side in the controversy that is served by the insistence on up-to-dateness. This is only to be expected; it is, in fact, one of the conditions of critical thinking that it has to struggle with uncritical thinking, that there is no citadel to

which it can retire and be secure. But that means that a University can never speak with a single voice, and it can be made to appear to do so only by a confusion of academic and utilitarian standards.

Now if we are to distinguish these two, if we are to see what academic standards are, we have to recognise that there are certain fundamental studies. No doubt it is possible in any subject to train in "principles" rather than in technique, but such a training presumes a study of those *subjects* which have "principles" for their content. Even the trivium, of which Ashby is so contemptuous, consists of subjects of quite general application. In particular, we can have a logical criticism of theories in the fields of agriculture and commerce, whereas agricultural or commercial criticism of logical theory would be merely farcical. How it is that logic (or philosophy) can operate in criticism of all theories and purposes, how it can concern itself with objectivity as such or set up absolute standards of judgment, is something that cannot be made clear without some penetration into the logical field itself. But even to pose the question sets it against the uncritical "modernism" which would measure changing realities by changing standards, and allies it with classicism. If there are standards of judgment at all, they are permanent standards, and they will not, on the face of it, be grasped better in relation to contemporary than in relation to earlier conditions. In fact, it would seem that some knowledge of *varying* conditions would be of advantage for a judgment of what is permanent, as against what is merely current prejudice.

Thus when Ashby says (p. 18), after explaining that a classical education has not the same "career value" in Australia as it has in Britain, that "Faculties of Arts must still preserve and encourage classical studies: that is their obligation to the past. But Faculties of Arts, no less than Faculties of Medicine, have an obligation to the present", he completely misses the point of these studies. Their interest is not

antiquarian; it is in standards of criticism that apply as much to the present as to any other time. What makes works and periods "classical" is their objectivity, their demonstration of the ways of working of things themselves (of human and non-human *nature*) as against personal purposes and local requirements. It is not merely (though this is true, too) that with the passage of time special interests fall into the background and the achievements of disinterestedness more and more stand out; that would apply to the study of the past in general. But there have been conditions under which disinterestedness (culture) rose to extraordinary heights, and it is because classical Athens provides an outstanding example of this that it is especially worthy of study *now* or at any time—not, of course, to the exclusion of those "classics" which crop up in modernistic periods like our own, but even so with a recognition of the considerable dependence of these later productions on the Athenian (or, more generally, the Graeco-Roman) tradition.

For while, in general, there can be no study of the present without study of the past, while we can be abreast of the questions of the day only by viewing them historically, it is especially in the classical age that we find the *foundations* of Western culture. It may be that schools of classical study have viewed the achievements of classical society in too narrowly "literary" a way and so have not developed a sufficiently broad criticism of *modern* society—though even taking Ashby's facile antithesis of political science and Greek drama, we can say that the student of politics might learn a great deal from the works of Aristophanes, as well as of the tragedians. But what he has above all to learn from is Greek political theory; if that is not included in the range of his studies, he will simply be unaware of the source of many of his views and his judgment of contemporary affairs will be so much the more uncritical. The "synthesis" of modern society which he is to get from "a study of the social sciences: economics, geography, history, political science, anthropology, and so on" (p. 18), will be all the weaker because he is

unacquainted with Socrates's criticisms of the "synthetic" views of the modernists of his period, the Sophists. Even if what was wanted was a programme and not an intellectual orientation, the heaping together of particular studies, as against the search for their common foundation, would not be the way to get it. If critical inquiry is to go forward, then, it will be by *advancing* (not retreating) to "the classics and philosophy", which alone can provide that foundation. In particular, as we have noted, this will be a basis for social criticism, including criticism of the judgment of Universities by their contribution to society, as against the judgment of society by its support, or otherwise, of learning.

The remainder of the pamphlet is taken up with practical considerations, and here we can still observe the simple-minded character of Ashby's social views. Distinguishing (p. 20) between legitimate and illegitimate barriers to University education and taking the removal of illegitimate barriers to be the only defensible policy, he asserts that the "chief illegitimate barrier is poverty". Here he associates himself with the demagogy which has accompanied the proceedings of the Universities Commission, which, he considers (p. 21), has greatly lowered this barrier. "By paying bursaries to students picked on merit, the Commission has to some extent excluded mediocrity and encouraged ability, irrespective of income level. This is the first step toward providing equality of opportunity in university education. Of course, it is only the first step", etc. It is, I say, a very simple-minded person who will imagine that the effects of poverty can be eliminated without the elimination of poverty itself—or, for that matter, that poverty itself can be eliminated. In the approach to any career there will always be facilities for the rich and difficulties for the poor. But, personal ambitions apart, it is *desirable* that there should be obstacles to overcome, that "opportunity" should not take the form of a gift. And while the facilities referred to have a negligible effect on institutions of learning, while, indeed, their effect, as far as it goes, is in some ways beneficial in that students have a social background

congruent with their studies, the effect of the Commonwealth's "provision of opportunity" is thoroughly detrimental.

If the Commonwealth simply provided Universities with funds which *they* could devote to the encouragement of needy students, there could be little objection—though it would be better that the Universities should not be tied down to one particular form of the allocation of such subsidies. As it is, subsidised students are under a Government control which harasses them at every point, which puts them in their appropriate pigeon-holes and claims their later services, and which works towards a general control of Universities. It is this policy which is served by the catchery of "ability v. mediocrity", and, in particular, by the treatment of entrance examinations, on which a rough but sufficiently accurate distinction of "passes" from "failures" can be based, as giving a reliable measure of ability all along the line—which involves a fetishism not only of marks but of ability, as if this were a fixed quantity, as if the sprouting of talent in an academic atmosphere were not one of the things on which a University should specially pride itself. And it is in support of regimentation, misnamed "equality of opportunity", that we get such contentions as the following:—"A fit person, if he studies conscientiously, should pass the examinations and qualify for a degree without mishap." "The standard of examinations in Australian universities is no higher, and the level of teaching is no worse than in British universities; but failures in Britain are less common. *Therefore*, the qualification for entrance must be too low" (pp. 21, 2; my italics). Much of this is merely tendencious dogma. It is surely a very narrow view which takes conscientious study as the sole mark of a student's profiting by his participation in University life, and insists on graduation in the minimum time; and the "therefore" covers a very hasty ruling out of other explanations of failure—particularly, bad schooling. The principle dictating such arguments is simply "social utility"—which has acquired a peculiar sanctity in its present form of "national service".

Little can be said, it seems to me, in favour of Ashby's other projects of reform. I should regard the statement that "you cannot treat a class as adults when 68% of them are no older than 17" as simply false; and, even if it were true, it would not settle the question of the degree of maturity to be expected of students at entrance, of the extent to which they should mature within the University itself. But it is interesting to observe that Ashby supports his view by reference (p. 23) to the suggestion of the Committee of the British Association on Post-War University Education that "the 'modal' age of entry to universities should be not less than 19, preferably after a year of approved national or international service". ("Or international" is the cream of the jest.) On the other hand, I see no force in the contention that the student's whole life should be taken up by his membership of the University, and the analogy by which Ashby reinforces that view strikes me as singularly inept—"An army which trains from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., five days a week, thirty weeks in a year, would make a poor show in battle. Yet we are satisfied with this part-time training for the defence of the kingdom of the mind" (p. 22). The student's independence (among other things, as an inquirer) is fostered by his participation in various institutions, and the unfree conditions of military service have only a negative bearing on the conditions of intellectual development. The "kingdom of the mind" fares badly when it is treated as a separate world and when students and teachers do not make vigorous incursions into political and social life.¹

The supreme example of hasty argument, however, occurs on p. 31, where Ashby is treating of the relation of the Univer-

¹ It might be thought that this would be partially achieved, as far as students are concerned, by Ashby's proposals (pp. 27, 8) for "migration" between Australian Universities. But, though there might be little harm in such a scheme, there would be little point in it. It is not by travelling about that a student will become possessed of "cultural wealth"; the criterion is not extensiveness (cf. the "social synthesis") but intensiveness, and this might well be hindered by "migration". It would certainly be prejudicial to this essential characteristic of University study to "coordinate" courses and examinations in the different Universities, for the sake of the migrating student.

sities to the Public Service. "We expatiate on the need for equality of opportunity; we demand a university education for all who matriculate. Therefore we apparently set a high value on education. On the other hand we set a high value on service to the state: no school speech day is complete which doesn't mention citizenship, and the need for our best brains to serve the country. We cannot have it both ways: either the entire educational system of this country is built on a fallacy, or the Public Services should be recruiting men for administration from the universities." Actually it is Ashby who is committing the fallacy—the commonplace fallacy of undistributed middle. He is arguing that it is inconsistent to put a high value on education and on public service, and not to see to it that public servants are educated. Formally, then, the argument runs:—The educated are valued, State servants are valued, therefore State servants are educated—for if they are not, that shows that we do not really value one or other of the classes in question; i.e. if the conclusion is false, at least one of the premises is false (another way of saying that the argument is valid). Incidentally, if consistent adherence to these valuations required that State servants should be educated, it would equally require that the educated should be State servants—a highly significant point in view of the political characterisation of the "reforming" movement given earlier in this review. There is, of course, no ground for arguing that, if we value two things, we must amalgamate them; there is no inconsistency in recognising distinct kinds of merit ("good brains") and in holding, for example, that administrative brains *are not* speculative brains, though this would be nothing against the existence of common features, and even a common part, in the training of the two. It may also be remarked here that, whatever interests may be served by the humbug of "speech day", the distinguishing-mark of citizenship is not service but the right of opposition.

In the foregoing discussion I have in the main followed the order of Ashby's exposition, but I have reserved comment on the section (pp. 23-27) dealing with Decentralisation of

Universities. This seems to me to be much the most vigorously argued part of the pamphlet, the only one, indeed, in which Ashby is really at home with his theme. In the essay as a whole, theory and policy, the exhibiting of the character of University work and the advancing of "reforms", trip over one another. No doubt this sort of confusion is inherent in the reconstructive mentality; in any case, clarity would require that the former matter be dealt with independently of plans and policies, and, in regard to the latter, that a general political programme be presented with no special emphasis on education or, perhaps better, with correlation between educational and other (especially industrial) planning. But in decentralisation we have a practical problem, i.e. one in which the implications of various policies can be estimated and compared, in the first instance against a background of academic assumptions but perhaps also in such a way as to bring the main issues home to non-academic persons. If this had been taken as the subject of the pamphlet, if the points raised had been developed more fully, with special consideration of the objections which have been or might be brought to the views adopted, that would have been a solid contribution to the discussion of educational prospects. As it is, the discussion of decentralisation suffers not only from its brevity but from being embedded in the larger and looser discussion I have been criticising.

The summary character of the discussion is particularly noticeable in the remarks at the outset on whether the expected influx of students after the war is to be met by increasing the size of Universities or by creating new establishments. "On the one hand it is maintained that Sydney and Melbourne, with three or four thousand students, are too big; expansion should, therefore, be through university colleges outside capital cities. On the other hand it is maintained that until we can provide better staff and equipment for the universities we already have it is bad policy to dissipate our limited resources on what are certain to be third rate colleges" (p. 23). Ashby thinks it easy to demolish both

sides of the argument, but does nothing towards that demolition except to give a few illustrations from overseas practice; and with the assertion (p. 24) that the "bulk of academic opinion favours some decentralisation of tertiary education, in order to stimulate local interest and because it is absolutely essential to abolish the mass teaching of first-year students", he proceeds at once to his main problem, what is to be the character of the new establishments.

But it should be noted that he has misstated the case of the opponents of new establishments; the point is that, under most circumstances, it is good policy to put available resources at the disposal of existing Universities because it enables them to give a greater variety of courses, to institute new lines of study, as against the conducting of studies of the same sort in different places—a point to which Ashby makes some concession in his further discussion (p. 25) in preferring to such duplication the institution of bursaries enabling country students to come to the city. Of course, there are conditions where a growing provincial centre may properly set up its own University, but nothing has been said to show that these conditions exist in Australia. In fact, in deliberately setting aside the question of new Universities and concentrating on the question of "colleges" of one kind or another, Ashby would appear to be aiming at a compromise with existing forces, whose character and tendency a more thorough consideration of principles might show to be anti-academic. At any rate, his judgment as to "the bulk of academic opinion" is discounted by the fact that academic opinion has not had the chance to consider the question fairly and fully, and that it has largely resigned itself to being confronted with decisions which it has had very little voice in determining. It will be time enough to talk about academic opinion when Universities are run by the people who work in them, though even now I very much doubt whether a plebiscite of professors would confirm Ashby's claim.

As to the size of first-year classes, the problem can be dealt with (as in many Universities) by dividing such classes

into sections; and, whatever inconveniences this may involve, it is at least better than separation into different centres, in that the student is brought into some contact with the work and life of a well-established University; moreover, the additional members of staff required by this system will not spend all their time with first-year classes, and a general strengthening of departments may result. More generally, the problem of numbers might be settled by separating professional schools from the University, perhaps even establishing them in country centres. This would be obviously suitable in the case of schools of Agriculture and Veterinary Science, admission to which could be by the University's B.Sc. degree—perhaps with a recommendation to candidates to include certain subjects in their Science course. It would no doubt be Utopian to look for a throwing off of B.M.A. influence and the setting up of a degree in pure Medical Science, the University not concerning itself with the professional courses to which this might lead up. At any rate, proper consideration is not, in my view, being given to the subject unless the question of the over-professionalisation of Universities is taken up.

Ashby, however, concentrates on the question of Colleges, and develops his argument around the distinction between a “vertical” and a “horizontal” cleavage among institutions preparing students for a degree. A vertical cleavage is one in which the same ground is covered in several places—though it is surely misleading to make it a question of the covering by the new college of “the whole gamut of the mother university, up to pass and honours degrees and post-graduate work”; there might still, under any scheme of decentralisation, without difficulty as to numbers or “local interest”, be some types of work that were done only in the centre, and particularly it might remain the *post-graduate* centre. On the general question of “daughter colleges”, then, Ashby asserts (p. 24) that if their students “are to enjoy the privilege of degrees from the mother university, the mother university must clearly control the curriculum and examinations. This

means that the college teaches (or crams) for an external degree, and that the student writes after his name the imprimatur of a university he has never attended. Since the passing of examinations is only one ingredient of a degree (according to some, the least important ingredient), there is a serious risk that the currency of the degree will be debased." (It will be remembered that the securing of a degree in the minimum time was earlier taken as a criterion of "fitness". And while this might conceivably be a necessary though not a sufficient condition of profiting from a University course, it is fairly obvious that immersion in other forms of University activity can lead to a student's failing in some of his examinations.) There would, of course, be such a risk, but it would presumably be even greater in colleges which were not organised after the same plan, and had not the same purposes, as the parent University. The "vertical" college, if its staff were appointed by, and kept in touch with, the parent University, might be expected to develop a similar outlook. And there is at least a parallel between the University's conducting of the examinations and a professor's examining of students on a course given by a lecturer.

We are apparently to understand that in the case of "horizontal" cleavage, where a college does *part of* the University's work or does work taken as equivalent to part of the work of a degree, there will be no such central control. Under such conditions, it seems to me, standards would inevitably be lowered; at any rate, to say that we can arrange, "*with the necessary safeguards*, for some work done at approved teachers' colleges and technical colleges to count towards a university degree" (p. 27; my italics) is to beg the question of the existence of *any* safeguard other than University control. It is also somewhat staggering to be told, out of the blue, that where necessary Junior Colleges can be set up in country towns "under the State Department of Education" (p. 26), no other type of control of Junior Colleges being anywhere suggested; this is not very promising for standards. One might sympathise with Ashby's parallel suggestion for the develop-

ment of "post-matriculation work" in schools, though there might be considerable doubt as to what exemption (if any) from University courses this should give, and though, again, the picture of the painful impact of the University on the schoolboy entrant seems to me grossly overdrawn. But, in regard to Colleges, Ashby's argument gives the impression that he has looked for objections to the "vertical" system and for considerations favourable to the "horizontal" system—more generally, that he is presenting us with a piece of special pleading in support of a fairly complete scheme on which he has made up his mind, and not with such a canvassing of principles as will open up discussion and lead to an exploring of possibilities.

A word might be said in conclusion on the footnote which appears on the opening page of Ashby's essay—"The opinions expressed in this essay are those of the author. It must not be assumed that they are the opinions of the Governing Body of the University in which he serves." It is the misfortune of Sydney as of most other Universities to be subject to the nominal government and the real interference of an essentially non-academic body. But it is strange that an academic worker, making public pronouncements on questions of the greatest academic importance, should think it necessary to guard against compromising such a body, even if he happens to be a member of it, and even if it has or is developing a policy on the "College" question. This attitude, in my opinion, compromises the cause of academic freedom.

JOHN ANDERSON.

THE CHRISTIAN FAILURE. By Charles Singer. Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1943. Pp. 120. Australian price: 5s. 9d.

PROFESSOR SINGER has written his book for the non-professional reader, be he scientist or philosopher, although the professional scientist may well wish to know what an historian of science has to say on the subject of *The Christian Failure*, and the professional philosopher will wish to find out

what Professor Singer has to say on a subject which in many disguises recurs with painful frequency in the philosophy of to-day. The question which the book attempts to answer is not why has Christianity failed, but why have Christians failed. In order to find an answer to this question Professor Singer divides his book into two, very nearly equal, parts. The first part gives an analysis of the relation between science and religion, and it deals with this relation from the point of view of 1943, not in the terms of a controversy half a century old. From this discussion the author goes on to distinguish between Christianity and "the religion of humanity"—a form of religion whose history he traces back to the time prior to the rise of Stoicism. In the second part of the book, which deals explicitly with the subject given in the title, Professor Singer draws sharp attention to the fact that the Christianity of present-day Christians is the outcome of the *whole* of the history of their religion; here he documents his point with some very telling quotations that will come as a surprise to most readers in English-speaking countries.

The book is to be welcomed by Christian and non-Christian readers alike, but above all by the philosopher who has a genuine interest in the relation between science, religion, and philosophy.

GRETA HORT.

THE REGENERATION OF CIVILIZATION. By E. H. Burgmann. Sydney. 1943. Pp. 121. Price 2s.

THE Bishop of Goulburn's Moorhouse Lectures were delivered in Melbourne in November, 1942. They are an expression of "liberal" Christianity; that is to say, they are thoroughly eclectic, drawing on a variety of doctrines of a semi-popular character (principally anthropological and psycho-analytic), and they aim at reforms, at some approach to the kingdom on earth. And, whatever may be said of Christianity in general, this form of it, I should contend, loses what is of value in religion, that in respect of which it

might still be culturally stimulating, namely, its pessimism, its antagonism to "the world".

Like the Freudians, Burgmann endeavours to found social theory on psychology, and especially on a theory of the operations of "the infant mind". But naturally he cannot derive his account of pre-history, which is even looser than theirs, from the infantile situation, and it is by a quite forced connection that he is able to make such statements as this (p. 72)—"It is clear then that the task of the Church is to make coercion by the State less and less necessary. The mother must tame the father and win him as much as possible to her ways of sacrificial service and persuasive love"—which is certainly neither social science nor psychology. Quite frequently, too, as in the following example (p. 64), greater certainty is attached to the conclusion than to the premises: "It must be remembered that the king retained much divinity in his person and was by right the first churchman in the community. We remember also that it is very probable that originally his right of divinity resided in the fact of his marriage to the queen. The original divinity therefore belonged to the mother and was inherited naturally by the Church, the institution that gathered up the maternal traits in social life."

The sickness of society, then, is taken to consist in its loss of vigour on this "maternal" side, in the attempt to settle everything by rational thinking; and its regeneration is connected, not very coherently, with the prosecution of the war and with "democratic planning" thereafter. It might be imagined that this was rational thinking over again; but we discover that, while "high regard" will be paid to freedom and initiative, certain views (e.g. Fascism) will not be tolerated and all our educational facilities will be used "to inculcate the spirit and work out the methods of democracy" (pp. 104-5). It is not surprising that this view of democracy should go with admiration for the Russian regime; and it may be added that insistence on social concord, with its implication of a dependent status for the ordinary citizen, is thoroughly

in accordance with philanthropic Christianity—though Burgmann was perhaps unwise here (p. 113) to reproduce the speculations of Joseph E. Davies on what might have happened if Marx (among others) “had been firmly grounded in the Christian faith”.

It is not only, however, that Marx’s error (with all its consequences of oppression) in supposing a society without fundamental conflicts to be possible, should not be used to gloss over his account of all known history as compact of such conflicts; consideration has also to be given to the moral theory (recognised in some forms of religious belief) that goodness can exist only in struggle, that doing away with evils would be doing away with goods. Such a view recognises devotion to a specific cause, whereas Burgmann’s ideal of complete unification abstracts from all real devotions and sets up *nonentity* as the supreme object. And, emphasising the social side of the matter (or taking the “cosmic” view to be a mere symbol of the social), we can say that to believe in the identity of interests is simply to submit to a ruling interest, and that the right of opposition, even to democracy itself, is inherent in democracy.

Now it is just the neglect of the factor of conflict that is the weakness of Burgmann’s psychological starting-point. If the infant were at any time in the suggested state of identification with his mother, he could never develop; he does so because he has tendencies to independence as well as to dependence. Actually, Burgmann can give no account of the passage from “the child’s social self, built on the image of the mother” to his “individual self”; it just so happens that the child “sets up” another function “within or over against the social self”, and conflict is treated as an unfortunate accident, which “need not be chronic” though it may cause great distress (p. 18), instead of as a condition of psychical, as of any other, existence. The recognition of diversity from the outset would also prevent the setting up of a faculty of “reason”, with all the old difficulties about its relation to instinct.

J.A.

JOURNALS RECEIVED.

MIND: A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY. Macmillan & Co. Annual subscription: 16s.

Vol. LI. No. 204, October, 1942. Intuitive Knowledge: R. I. Aaron. Some Recent Criticisms of Spinoza (III): H. F. Hallett. Rationalism and Intellectualism in the Ethics of Aristotle: Reginald Jackson. Vol. LII. No. 205, January, 1943. Some Recent Criticisms of Spinoza (IV): H. F. Hallett. The Logic of Question and Answer: A. D. Ritchie. No. 206, April. Knowledge of Physical Objects: A. C. Ewing. Psychoanalysis and Experimental Psychology: Gustav Bergmann. The Alleged Development of Berkeley's Philosophy: A. A. Luce. Berkeley on "Abstract Ideas": M. C. Beardsley. No. 207, July. Other Minds (VII): John Wisdom. Historical Explanation: Morton G. White. The Extra-Linguistic Reference of Language (I): Everett W. Hall. No. 208, October. Other Minds (VIII): John Wisdom. Analytic Statements in Semiosis: John R. Reid. Vol. LIII. No. 209, January, 1944. Hr. Von Wright on the Logic of Induction (I): C. D. Broad. The Extra-Linguistic Reference of Language (II): Everett W. Hall. Self-Contradictory Suppositions: Alice Ambrose.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY. Published fortnightly. Columbia University, New York. Subscription: \$4 a year.

Vol. XXXIX. No. 23, November 5, 1942. The Unholy Alliance of Positivism and Operationalism: A. Cornelius Benjamin. The Use and Abuse of Words: Harold N. Lee. No. 24, November 19. Are Ideas Physical?: Denison Maurice Allan. Recent Catholic Views on Art and Poetry: Katharine Gilbert. No. 25, December 3. Abstracts of Papers to be Read at the Forty-Second Annual Meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association. No. 26, December 17. Esthetic Appreciation and Its Distinction from Sense Pleasure: Sidney Zink. Vol. XL. No. 1, January 7, 1943. "Objectivity" in Value Judgments: Philip Blair Rice. The Genius of Pragmatic Empiricism (I): Bruce W. Brotherston. No. 2, January 21. The Genius of Pragmatic Empiricism (II): Bruce W. Brotherston. The Analysis of a Simple Necessary Statement: Max Black. No. 3, February 4. The Epistemological Relevance of Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge: Virgil G. Hinshaw, Jr. Perception and Cognition: Henry N. Wieman. No. 4, February 18. On Freedom: J. G. Clapp. On Tradition, Belief and Culture: Martin Lebowitz. No. 5, March 4. Notes on Existence and Necessity: Willard V. Quine. A Technique of Problem Solution: Llewellyn M. K. Boelter. No. 6, March 18. Is Moral Philosophy a Normative Theory?: Georges Gurvitch. On the Sociology of Ethics: Max M. Laserson. No. 7, April 1. Truth, Reality

and Behavioral Fact: Arthur F. Bentley. Definitional Rules—Their Nature, Status and Normative Function: John R. Reid. No. 8, April 15. Verification of Categories—Existence and Substance: Roy Wood Sellars. On Will or the Levels of Action: Max Rieser. A Report to Teachers of Philosophy: Walker H. Hill. No. 9, April 29. Some Remarks on the Method of History: Lincoln Reis and Paul Oskar Kristeller. No. 10, May 13. Reference and Relation: George Gentry. The Social Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead: A. H. Johnson. No. 11, May 27. Further Reflections on the History of Ideas: Harold A. Taylor. No. 12, June 10. Valuation Judgments and Immediate Quality: John Dewey. No. 13, June 24. Quality and Value: Philip Blair Rice. Universality and Individuality in Ethics: Gardner Williams. No. 14, July 8. Non-Normative Utilitarianism: William Curtis Swabey. No. 15, July 22. The Semantical Aspect of Sentences: Elizabeth Lane Beardsley. Our Pre-Copernican Notion of Time: Ralph B. Winn. No. 16, August 5. Language of Poetic and of Scientific Thought: Max Rieser. No. 17, August 19. On the Meaning of Necessity: Arthur Pap. No. 18, September 2. The Esthetic Object: Stephen C. Pepper. Art Forms and Science Concepts: George Haines, IV. The Function of Definitions in Social Science: Richard Popkin. No. 19, September 16. On the Meaning of Universality: Arthur Pap. No. 20, September 30. Types of Value Judgments: Philip Blair Rice. Further as to Valuation as Judgment: John Dewey. Feelings as Evidence: Philip Blair Rice. No. 21, October 14. On the Notion of Causality in Psychology: Robert E. Whallon. The Therapy of the Dialectic: James K. Feibleman. No. 22, October 28. Sensuous and Non-Sensuous Perception in Empirical Philosophy: Bruce W. Brotherston. The Affirmative Aspect of Scepticism: Martin Lebowitz. No. 23, November 11. The Principle of Parsimony in Empirical Science: Lewis White Beck. Three Views of a Candle: Carol Renius. No. 24, November 25. Fact: Dorothy Walsh. No. 25, December 9. Fictions in Science and Philosophy (I): J. E. Boodin. No. 26, December 23. Fictions in Science and Philosophy (II): J. E. Boodin.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Published every two months. Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y. Annual subscription: \$5.

Vol. LII. No. 1, January, 1943. Causality and Substance: Roy Wood Sellars. A Dilemma for Hume: Monroe C. Beardsley. Nietzsche's Contribution to the Theory of Language: Roger Hazelton. No. 2, March. Concerning Philosophy: E. Jordan. Symposium—Can Speculative Philosophy be Defended?: W. T. Stace, Ralph M. Blake and Arthur E. Murphy. No. 3, May. The Classification of the Elements of Discourse: H. R. Smart. Metaphysical Method: Stephen C. Pepper. Averroes' Doctrine of the Mind: Stephen Chak Tornay. No. 4, July.

Symposium in Honor of the Tercentary of the Death of Galileo and the Birth of Newton: Alexander Koyre, Leonardo Olschki, Ernst Cassirer. No. 5, September. The Cognitive Content of Art: Dorothy Walsh. Benevolence and Virtue: William Curtis Swabey. Perception as Fact and as Knowledge: Everett W. Hall. No. 6, November. Is the Antithesis of "Moral Man" and "Immoral Society" True?: Georges Gurvitch. Ethical Objectivity through Science: Horace S. Fries. Definition and its Problems: Homer H. Dubs. The Vision of Parmenides: J. E. Boodin.

PHILOSOPHY. Journal of the British Institute of Philosophy.

Published quarterly. Macmillan & Co. Annual subscription: 14s.

Vol. XVII. No. 68, November, 1942. Justice among Nations: H. J. Paton. Immortality of the Soul in the Platonic Dialogues and Aristotle: Sir Patrick Duncan. Kant's Doctrine of "Perpetual Peace": John Bourke. Some Reminiscences of the late J. H. Muirhead. Practical Reason: Reginald Jackson. Vol. XVIII, No. 69, April, 1943. The Philosophy of the Wolf State: W. R. Inge. Clearness and Distinctness in Descartes: Alan Gewirth. Gestalt Psychology: Maxwell Garnett. Ethics and Christian Ethics: E. S. Waterhouse. The World after the War: Viscount Samuel. Apropos de Kierkegaard: Clement C. J. Webb. No. 71, November, 1943. The Object of Observation and Knowledge: Laurence J. Lafleur. Whitehead's Philosophy—Space, Time and Things: Sydney E. Hooper. Chance, Free Will and the Social Sciences: Henry A. Mess. Act and Attitude: N. H. G. Robinson. The Interconnection of Faith and Morals: R. G. Norburn.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS. Organ of the International Psycho-Analytical Association. Baillière, Tindall and Cox. Price: 30s. per volume of four parts.

Vol. XXIV. Parts 1 and 2, 1943. 'How can Civilisation be Saved?': Ernest Jones. The Concept of Dissociation: Edward Glover. An Acute Psychotic Anxiety Occurring in a Boy of Four Years: Susan Isaacs. A Clinical Contribution to the Psychopathology of the War Neuroses: Elizabeth Rosenberg. Cautionary Tales: Ella Freeman Sharpe. Charlotte Bronte—A Study of a Masochistic Character: Kate Friedlander.

ARCHIVES DE PSYCHOLOGIE. About four issues yearly. Delachaux & Niestlé S.A., Neuchâtel. Subscriptions per volume (four issues): 18 fr.

Vol. XXIX. No. 113, May, 1942. Introduction à l'étude des perceptions chez l'enfant, et analyse d'une illusion relative à la perception visuelles de cercles concentriques (Delboeuf): Jean Piaget,

avec la collaboration de Marc Lambercier, Ernest Boesch et Barbara von Albertini. No. 114, January, 1943. La notion de responsabilité et de justice immanente chez l'enfant: Igor H. Caruso.

THE JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. The Journal Press, Provincetown, Massachusetts. Annual subscription (two volumes): \$14.

Vol. XV. First Half, February, 1942. The sociological implications of neuroses: Paul Schilder. Can the product superiority of discussors be attributed to averaging or majority influences?: William M. Timmons. Conditions affecting the validity of personality inventories (I, II and III): Louis L. McQuitty. Regional differences in masculinity-femininity responses: Dorothy Rose Disher. The relation of recreation to personality adjustment: Jean Ogden Cavanaugh. The attitude of college students toward war: George J. Dudycha. Psychoanalytic techniques in social analysis: Marvin K. Opler. Relative influence of commercial and liberal arts curricula upon changes in students' attitudes: Key L. Barkley. Second Half, May. Differences in performance of Jewish and non-Jewish students on the American Council Psychological Examination: Audrey M. Shuey. Religious attitudes of denominational college students: Donald B. Gragg. Religion as motivation: Harold S. Tuttle. Humour in the making: Louise Omwake. The social psychology standard in comparative legislation: Duval T. McCutchen. The concept of social status: Raymond B. Cattell. The comparative academic achievement of orphanage and non-orphanage children: Rolfe C. Blanchard and Claude L. Nemzek. The attitudes of college students toward war and the Germans before and during the second World War: George J. Dudycha. A note concerning direct and differential prediction of academic success: Claude L. Nemzek. Vol. XVI. First Half, August. Fascist attitudes—Factor analysis of item correlations: Ross Stagner and E. T. Katzoff. Attitudes toward defensive, cooperative and aggressive war: Daniel Droba Day and O. F. Quackenbush. Sex differences in feeling and emotional disposition in a university population: E. B. Skaggs. Temporal change and sexual difference in moral judgments: Paul Crissman. The relationship of certain factors to scores on the Terman-Miles attitude-interest analysis test: F. E. Burger, C. L. Nemzek, and C. L. Vaughn. Voting groups among leading congressmen obtained by means of the inverted factor technique: Hilding B. Carlson and Willard Harrell. A study of certain factors involved in changes of opinion: Thomas N. Ewing. Sectional differences in the answers of college students to questions on race: Maurice Curtis Langhorne. The test intelligence of Osage Indians: John H. Rohrer. Second Half, November. The attitudes and attitude estimates of Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish students: Bert R.

Sappenfield. Memory of Teachers for pupils: Harold E. Burt. The isolation and measurement of nationalism: Leonard W. Ferguson. A skeptical note on the use of attitude scales toward war—(I) In 1940, 1941: Stanford C. Ericksen. Changes in general attitudes of women students during four years in college: E. C. Hunter. Self-esteem (dominance-feeling) and sexuality in women: A. H. Maslow. Vol. XVII. First Half, February, 1943. The problem of equating the environment of negro-white groups for intelligence testing in comparative studies: Herman G. Canady. The relation of evaluative attitudes to vocational interest and social adjustment: Seth Arsenian. Wolf-child histories from India: David G. Mandelbaum. Justifications for religious attitudes and habits: Paul C. Glick and Kimball Young. Linguistic and semantic factors in the psychodynamics of war: George W. Kisker. The relationship of Bernreuter personality scores to other parent characteristics, including parent-child behaviour: C. H. Patterson (Peterson). Second Half, May. Studies in beauty—(I) the relationship between beauty in women, dominance, and security: Milton Rokeach. Multiple factor analysis of traits of delinquent boys: Henry Harper Hart, R. L. Jenkins, Sidney Axelrad, and Phillip I. Sperling. Factors determining national stereotypes: Irvin L. Child and Leonard W. Doob. A recent epidemic of hysteria in a Louisiana high school: Edgar A. Schuler and Vernon J. Parenton. Leadership as related to the Bernreuter personality measures—(I) College leadership in extracurricular activities: Helen M. Richardson and Nelson G. Hanawalt. (II) An item analysis of responses of college leaders and non-leaders: Nelson G. Hanawalt, Helen M. Richardson, and R. Jane Hamilton. Individuals' estimates of group opinion: Richard Wallen. A study of some relationships between home adjustment and the behaviour of junior college students: Maurice D. Woolf. The prognostic value of the Washburne social adjustment inventory: Charles J. Marsh. Qualities which women college students hold important: Frank T. Wilson. Vol. XVIII. First Half, August. Psychological processes in the interview: Ralph F. Berdie. Attitudes toward racial segregation in Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Edgar A. Schuler. Social crisis and social attitude toward relief: F. Howard Forsyth. Toward a definition of propaganda: Edgar H. Henderson. Personality and typology: Isidor Chein. Psychological misconceptions of a group of Negro college students and their relationship to some other factors: Lily Brunschwig. The effect upon judgments of personality traits of varying a single factor in a photograph: G. R. Thornton. Second Half, November. Standardisation of a race attitude test for Negro youth: Eli S. Marks. Cultural differentials in intelligence: Frank J. Kobler. The influence of a dramatic production upon audience attitudes toward the play's thesis: William M. Timmons. Some outcomes of participation in dramatics—(I) Introduction and attitude toward the play:

William M. Timmons. Explicit denotation in language—A psychological contribution to methods in the social sciences: Raymond Rhine.

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW.

Vol. XIX. No. 3, March, 1942. The Slayer's Bounty—History of the Problem in Anglo-American Law: Alison Reppy. Incorporation by Reference in New York Wills: Harold L. Samuels. No. 4, May. Licenses and Tenancies for Years: William F. Walsh. "Life, Liberty—and Dower", Disinheritance of the Spouse in New York: Harry H. Schneider and Bertram M. Landesman. Procedure on Appeals to State School Authorities: Harry N. Rosenfeld.

THE ECONOMIC RECORD. Journal of the Economic Society of Australia and New Zealand. Melbourne University Press. Price: 5s.

Vol. XIX. No. 36, June, 1943. Australian Income Tax, 1943: H. S. Carslaw. Industrial Relations and Economic Theory: A. E. C. Hare. The Present versus the Future: J. S. G. Wilson. Price Stabilisation in New Zealand: H. L. Wise. The Australian Coal Industry, 1929-39: A. G. L. Shaw. No. 37, December. The Australian War Economy, May-November, 1943: H. Burton. Primary Products Prices: W. S. Kelly. Internal Marketing of New Zealand Primary Products: T. R. Smith. War-time Fertility and the Future Population of Australia: G. R. Bruns. Changes in New Zealand's Import Structure: W. B. Sutch.

THE FORUM OF EDUCATION: Thrice yearly. Teachers' College, Sydney. Annual subscription: 5s.

Vol. I. No. 2, November, 1942. Project Work with Student Teachers: J. M. Braithwaite. An experiment in Activity Work with a First-year High School Class: Renée Erdos. The N.S.W. Board of Secondary School Studies: T. T. Roberts. Verse-Writing and the Appreciation of Poetry: Gwen K. Sanders. No. 3, May, 1943. The Challenge of the Educational Outlook: G. S. Browne. The Case for Reform: R. G. Staines. Education in the Doldrums?: C. R. McRae. A Case for Technical Education: W. M. O'Neill. An Experiment in School Camping: S. A. Lenehan. Vol. II. No. 1, August. Consumer Opinion concerning the Value of Sydney Teachers' College Camp: M. L. G. Sheldon. The Place of the Activity Movement in Educational Thought: Jean B. McKenzie. An Activity Experiment in a Small School: I. E. Young. A New Interpretation of Technical Education: P. D. Riddell. Why We Should Teach History: E. J. Tapp. Secondary Education in the Doldrums?: I. S. Turner. No. 2, November. Teacher Training in New South Wales: C. R. McRae and I. S. Turner. Adult Education—Is it either Wanted or Needed?: W. G. K. Duncan.

Correspondence Courses for Student Teachers in the Forces: C. H. Currey and R. E. Wade. A Critical Examination of Certain Important Assumptions underlying History Teaching in Schools: G. W. Bassett. A Sixth Class Activity Programme: A. J. Wiltshire.

OCCUPATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. Quarterly. National Institute of Industrial Psychology, London. Annual subscription: £1.

Vol. XVI. No. 2, April, 1942. The Unity of Industrial Psychology: L. S. Hearnshaw. The Application of Psychology in Industry and Business: Morris S. Viteles. Some Workers' Mental Attitudes: G. W. Goodall. Aptitude Testing for Secondary Courses: George Kerr. Machinery and Man: Frederic Evans. A New Use for the Institute's Clerical Test in America: Grace M. Oberheim. No. 3, July. Psychology in War—The Military Work of American and German Psychologists: Cyril Burt. Accident Prevention in Industry: C. A. Oakley. Engineering and Aesthetics: Charles S. Myers. Absenteeism at a Midlands Munition Factory: V. J. Gosden. Decisions and their Significance: L. I. Hunt. Hazards of Promotion: Ernest Dockray. No. 4, October. Industrial Psychology and the Future: Alan F. Mohun. Some Problems of Inspection: Winifred Raphael. The Value of Statistics in Vocational Psychology (I): Cyril Burt. Tests of Technical Aptitude: Clifford W. Shuttleworth. An attempt to Devise a Test of Aesthetic Appreciation: Phyllis Nanney. Heating and Ventilation after the War: W. Douglas Seymour. Vol. XVII. No. 1, January, 1943. The Selection of Army Personnel: Charles S. Myers. The Appraisal of Vocational Guidance: M. B. Stott. The Toleration of Conflict: Marion Miller. The Value of Statistics in Vocational Psychology (II): Cyril Burt. No. 2, April. The Birmingham Experiment in Vocational Selection and Guidance: E. Patricia Hunt. The Group-Mind in Trade Unionism: C. Delisle Burns. The Use of Percentiles: Patrick Slater. The Place of Vocational Guidance in a Child Guidance Clinic: Alice Haas. In Praise of the Day Continuation School: Fearnley Lane. No. 3, July. War-time Reflections on Vocational Problems: Angus Macrae. The Use of Psychological Methods in War-time in Australia: K. S. Cunningham. Part-time Labour in Munions Work: J. Howie Mitchell. Prognostic Tests for Students of Architecture: D. W. Harding. Increased Production through Movement Study: N. N. Exton-Wood. The Development of Spatial Judgment and its Relation to Some Educational Problems: Patrick Slater. No. 4, October. An Inquiry into Public Opinion regarding Educational Reforms (I): Cyril Burt. The Relation between Psychological Test Scores and Subsequent Proficiency of Apprentices in the Engineering Industry: Frank Holliday. Suggestions for Management Selection and Training: A. H. Seymour. Occupational Psychologists and the Assessment of Temperament: Alec Rodger.

NOTES AND NEWS.

AUSTRALASIAN ASSOCIATION OF PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

Nomination of Office-Bearers.

NOMINATIONS are now invited from Members of Council of office-bearers for 1944. The offices which lie open to nomination are:

- (1) Editor of *The Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy*.
- (2) President.
- (3) Vice-Presidents.
- (4) Hon. Secretary.
- (5) Hon. Treasurer.
- (6) Hon. Counsel.

Nominations should be in the hands of the Secretary by May 15th.

J. A. PASSMORE,

Hon. Secretary.

* * * *

The Annual Congress of the Association was held in Sydney University on Saturday, October 23rd. Papers were read on "Logical Positivism", at the Morning Session, by J. A. Passmore and on "The Servile State", at the Afternoon Session, by John Anderson. (Articles based on these papers appear in this issue of the Journal.) Both meetings were well attended and productive of vigorous discussion; but the enforced absence, under present conditions, of visitors from other States is greatly to be regretted.

* * * *

The Journal again appears very late, and the Editor has had, in this instance, to combine two numbers in a single issue. He hopes, however, that 1944 will see some of the lost time made up, and looks for continued support from subscribers and from members of Council, from whom, while it remains impossible to hold Council meetings, he would be glad to receive communications on any matter affecting the interests of the Association.

